Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC , 421 F. App'x 920 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                   [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
    U.S.
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    NOV 30, 2010
    No. 10-12077                   JOHN LEY
    Non-Argument Calendar                CLERK
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-22347-UU
    MARCUS D. MIMS,
    lllllllllllllllllllll                                          Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    ARROW FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC,
    lllllllllllllllllllll                                          Defendant - Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (November 30, 2010)
    Before EDMONDSON, CARNES and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Marcus Mims appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint against
    Arrow Financial Services, LLC, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mims’
    complaint alleged that Arrow acted in violation of the Telephone Consumer
    Protection Act, 
    47 U.S.C. § 227
    . Mims acknowledges that this Court has held that
    federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over private actions under the Act.
    Mims, however, contends that we should reconsider our binding precedent in light
    of two Supreme Court decisions and a Seventh Circuit decision.
    We held in Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc. that “Congress granted
    state courts exclusive jurisdiction over private actions under the Act,” and
    therefore “federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction [over] private actions
    under the Act.” 
    136 F.3d 1287
    , 1288–89 (11th Cir. 1998), modified, 
    140 F.3d 898
    (11th Cir. 1998). We are bound by this precedent. See Smith v. GTE Corp., 
    236 F.3d 1292
    , 1303 (11th Cir. 2001).
    Mims, in asking this Court to reconsider its precedent, points to Grable &
    Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng’g, 
    545 U.S. 308
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 2363
     (2005),
    and Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 
    538 U.S. 691
    , 
    123 S. Ct. 1882
    (2003). Neither of those cases considered the Act, and neither of them explicitly
    or implicitly overrules our precedent. See United States v. Kaley, 
    579 F.3d 1246
    ,
    1255 (“To constitute an overruling . . . the Supreme Court decision must be clearly
    on point.”) (citations and quotations omitted). Additionally, the Seventh Circuit’s
    decision in Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 
    427 F.3d 446
     (7th Cir. 2005),
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    does not overturn our precedent. See Kaley, 
    579 F.3d at 1255
     (“We may disregard
    the holding of a prior opinion only where that holding is overruled by the Court
    sitting en banc or by the Supreme Court.”) (citations and quotations omitted).
    Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Mims’ complaint for lack
    of subject matter jurisdiction.
    AFFIRMED.
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