United States v. Byron Bryan , 136 F. App'x 257 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                             [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT         FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    June 10, 2005
    No. 04-15049
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                 CLERK
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 03-00073-CR-OC-10-GRJ
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    BYRON BRYAN,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (June 10, 2005)
    Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    The government appeals Byron Bryan’s 121-month sentence for conspiracy
    to distribute more than 5 kilograms of cocaine and more than 50 grams of cocaine
    base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) and 846, and possession
    with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and
    (b)(1)(C).
    Sentencing took place before the Supreme Court announced United States v.
    Booker, 543 U.S.___, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
     (2005).1 At sentencing, the district court
    concluded that it did not have the constitutional authority to enhance Bryan’s
    sentence based upon a quantity of drugs that exceeded the quantity contained in
    the indictment in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 
    124 S.Ct. 2531
    ,
    
    159 L.Ed.2d 403
     (2004). The government objected at sentencing and argues that
    the district court erred by extending Blakely to the Sentencing Guidelines and
    refusing to enhance Bryan’s sentence based on the sentencing guidelines even
    though the court decreased Bryan’s sentence based upon a reduction for
    acceptance of responsibility pursuant to the guidelines.
    In Booker, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory nature of the Federal
    Sentencing Guidelines rendered them incompatible with the Sixth Amendment’s
    guarantee to the right to a jury trial. Booker, 543 U.S. at ___, 125 S.Ct. at 749-52.
    In a second and separate majority opinion, the Court in Booker concluded that, to
    1
    Both parties’ briefs in this appeal were filed prior to the Supreme Court’s recent decision
    in Booker. Therefore, we requested and received supplemental briefing on the effect of Booker.
    2
    best preserve Congress’s intent in enacting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
    the appropriate remedy was to “excise” two specific sections—
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (b)(1) (requiring a sentence within the guideline range, absent a departure)
    and 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (e) (establishing standards of review on appeal, including de
    novo review of departures from the applicable guideline range)—thereby
    effectively rendering the Sentencing Guidelines advisory only. 
    Id.
     at ___, 125
    S.Ct. at 764. The Supreme Court noted, however, that courts must continue to
    consult the Guidelines, together with the factors listed in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).2 
    Id.
    The Court further indicated that both its “Sixth Amendment holding and . . .
    remedial interpretation of the Sentencing Act” must be applied to “all cases on
    direct review.” 
    Id.
     at ___, 125 S.Ct. at 769.
    One of Booker’s two defendants, Ducan Fanfan, was sentenced based upon
    the district court’s partial application of the Guidelines. Booker, 543 U.S. at ___,
    125 S.Ct. at 747. Specifically, the district court in Fanfan’s case refused to apply
    enhancements for additional drug quantities exceeding the quantities contained in
    the indictment or in the jury’s verdict, or for Fanfan’s role in the offense, but did
    2
    These factors include, inter alia, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
    characteristics of the defendant, the need for adequate deterrence, protection of the public, the
    pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
    disparities. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).
    3
    apply other provisions of the Guidelines that it found did not implicate the Sixth
    Amendment. 
    Id.
     The Supreme Court held that Fanfan’s sentence did not violate
    the Sixth Amendment because it did not exceed the sentence authorized by the
    jury’s verdict. 
    Id.
     at ___, 
    124 S.Ct. at 769
    . Nevertheless, the Court vacated
    Fanfan’s sentence to allow the government to seek resentencing consistent with
    Booker. 
    Id.
    Because the district court erred in light of Blakely and Booker by failing to
    properly calculate and consider the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, we
    vacate and remand Bryan’s sentence to the district court for resentencing
    consistent with Booker.3
    Upon careful review of the sentencing transcript and the presentence
    investigation report, and upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, we find
    reversible error.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    3
    Bryan does not argue that the Booker error was harmless, but rather urges this Court
    to ignore the error and simply review for reasonableness. However, “once the court of appeals has
    decided that the district court misapplied the Guidelines, a remand is appropriate unless the
    reviewing court concludes, on the record as a whole, that the error was harmless, i.e., that the error
    did not affect the district court's selection of the sentence imposed.” Williams v. United States, 
    503 U.S. 193
    , 203, 
    112 S.Ct. 1112
    , 1120-21 (1992).
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-15049

Citation Numbers: 136 F. App'x 257

Judges: Anderson, Barkett, Birch, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 6/10/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023