United States v. De Castro , 113 F.3d 176 ( 1997 )


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  •                     United States Court of Appeals,
    Eleventh Circuit.
    No. 95-4648.
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    Maria J. DE CASTRO, a.k.a. Fifi, Defendant-Appellant.
    Feb. 5, 1997.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of Florida. (No. 94-320-CR-EBD), Edward B. Davis, Judge.
    Before TJOFLAT and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and REAVLEY*, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    REAVLEY, Senior Circuit Judge:
    Appellant Maria De Castro complains that the district court
    erred in failing to let the jury decide the element of materiality
    in her trial for making false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C.
    § 1010.    We conclude that materiality is an element of this crime,
    but that failing to submit this element to the jury was harmless
    error.     We also conclude that the admission of evidence regarding
    a government investigation was not plain error.       Accordingly we
    affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    De Castro was charged with conspiracy to make and making false
    statements to the Department of Housing and Urban Development
    (HUD), for the purpose of obtaining federally insured mortgages, in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1010.        She was convicted of
    conspiracy and five of the six substantive counts.
    *
    Honorable Thomas M. Reavley, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
    the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    The government's proof showed that De Castro and others
    submitted applications for mortgages insured by the Federal Housing
    Administration (FHA), an agency within HUD, on behalf of low income
    applicants.             The     applications      contained       false      employment
    information regarding the applicants.                   De Castro was a mortgage
    broker who acted as an authorized underwriter for the loans.                          De
    Castro, two real estate brokers, and several putative "employers"
    participated       in     the    scheme    to    obtain    the    government-backed
    mortgages.       The "employers" were business owners paid to submit
    false   employment        verifications         that    were   part    of    the    loan
    documentation.         De Castro decided the amount of income used, so as
    to   meet    the    qualification         requirement     of     the   FHA    for   each
    applicant.         She signed a certification form for each of the
    mortgages, stating that she had reviewed the case file and found
    that it met HUD's requirements.              The real estate brokers, Virginia
    and Osvaldo Labrador, as well as several of the loan applicants and
    false employers, testified for the government.                   One of the brokers
    testified that "with [De Castro's] signature, the cases could be
    approved" by the FHA.
    The district court instructed the jury that materiality was an
    element     of   the     offense.      The      court   further    instructed       that
    materiality was a question of law for the court to decide and that
    the court had already determined that the alleged false statements
    were material. The defendant objected to the instruction and moved
    for a mistrial.           Because it was then well-established in this
    circuit that materiality was a question of law,1 the district court
    overruled the objection and denied the motion.
    After the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Gaudin,
    however, we now know that the Constitution requires the jury to
    determine whether a false statement is material if materiality is
    an   element    of   the   offense.2   The rule in     Gaudin   applies
    retroactively to this direct appeal, which was pending when Gaudin
    was decided.3
    ANALYSIS
    We first determine whether materiality is an element of 18
    U.S.C. § 1010, and, if it is, whether it was harmless error for the
    district court to direct a verdict against defendant on that
    element.
    1. Materiality is an Element of 18 U.S.C. § 1010
    Whether materiality is an element of 18 U.S.C. § 1010 is an
    issue of law reviewed de novo.4        Section 1010 reads, in pertinent
    1
    See United States v. Kramer, 
    73 F.3d 1067
    , 1074 (11th
    Cir.1996) (noting that it was well-established that materiality
    was a question of law before Gaudin).
    2
    United States v. Gaudin, --- U.S. ----, ----, 
    115 S. Ct. 2310
    , 2320, 
    132 L. Ed. 2d 444
    (1995) (materiality under 18 U.S.C. §
    1001 is a question for the jury); 
    Kramer, 73 F.3d at 1074
    (applying Gaudin to 18 U.S.C. § 1623).
    3
    Griffith v. Kentucky, 
    479 U.S. 314
    , 328, 
    107 S. Ct. 708
    ,
    716, 
    93 L. Ed. 2d 649
    (1987) ("[A] new rule for the conduct of
    criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all
    cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet
    final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule
    constitutes a "clear break' with the past."); 
    Kramer, 73 F.3d at 1074
    (applying Gaudin retroactively).
    4
    See United States v. Hooshmand, 
    931 F.2d 725
    , 737 (11th
    Cir.1991) (statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed
    de novo).
    part:
    Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining any loan ... from any
    person ... with the intent that such loan ... shall be offered
    to or accepted by the Department of Housing and Urban
    Development for insurance, ... or for the purpose of
    influencing in any way the action of such Department, makes,
    passes, utters, or publishes any statement, knowing the same
    to be false ... shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
    imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
    Although the word "material" does not appear in the statute,
    we believe that precedent and logic dictate that a materiality
    requirement be read into it.         In    Gevinson v. United States,        we
    upheld    an   indictment   charging      violations   of   §   1010   because
    "[m]ateriality, while not alleged in haec verba, is alleged in
    substance and this is sufficient."5         We stated that the evidence at
    trial was sufficient to make out a case "of knowingly and wilfully
    uttering and passing a false material statement with the intent to
    influence FHA in a transaction pending before FHA." 6              Relying on
    Gevinson, we stated in United States v. Black that in order to
    obtain a valid conviction under § 1010, "it was necessary for the
    government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant]
    knowingly made a false statement concerning a material fact to HUD
    as charged in the indictment...."7
    We do not believe that Gevinson's and Black's use of the term
    "material"     was   careless   or   accidental.       We   have   implied    a
    materiality element into analogous false statement statutes.              For
    5
    
    358 F.2d 761
    , 763 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    385 U.S. 823
    ,
    
    87 S. Ct. 51
    , 
    17 L. Ed. 2d 60
    (1966).
    6
    
    Id. at 765
    (emphasis added).
    7
    
    644 F.2d 445
    , 447 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds,
    
    651 F.2d 392
    (5th Cir.1981) (emphasis added).
    example, in United States v. Swearingen, we held that materiality
    was an element of 18 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2),8 and in United States v.
    Rapp, we listed materiality as an element of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1005 and
    1014.9      Requiring a false statement to be material excludes trivial
    falsifications from prosecution. If materiality is not an element,
    then       the    statute    reaches   statements   that   are   incapable   of
    influencing HUD.            We do not believe that Congress intended this
    result.
    In United States v. Hoag, the Seventh Circuit held that
    materiality is not an element of § 1010, reasoning that the word
    8
    
    858 F.2d 1555
    , 1556, 1558 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied,
    
    489 U.S. 1083
    , 
    109 S. Ct. 1540
    , 
    103 L. Ed. 2d 844
    (1989). At the
    time, 18 U.S.C. § 1344 stated:
    (a) Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute,
    a scheme or artifice—(1) to defraud a federally
    chartered or insured financial institution; or (2) to
    obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets,
    securities, or other property owned by or under the
    custody or control of a financial institution by means
    of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
    promises shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
    imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
    9
    
    871 F.2d 957
    , 963-64 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    493 U.S. 890
    , 
    110 S. Ct. 233
    , 
    107 L. Ed. 2d 184
    (1989). 18 U.S.C. § 1005
    reads in pertinent part:
    Whoever makes any false entry in any book, report,
    or statement of [any Federal Reserve bank, member bank,
    national bank or insured bank] with intent to injure or
    defraud such bank [or various government actors] shall
    be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more
    than five years, or both.
    18 U.S.C. § 1014 reads in pertinent part:
    Whoever knowingly makes any false statement or
    report, or willfully overvalues any land, property or
    security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the
    action of ... any [FDIC-insured bank] upon any ... loan
    shall be fined $5,000 or imprisoned not more than two
    years, or both.
    "material" does not appear in its wording. 10                  Hoag was criticized
    in United States v. Staniforth, which noted that Hoag created
    tension with decisions that had implied a materiality element into
    other false statement statutes.11                  Staniforth refused to extend
    Hoag, adopting instead the "better view" that materiality is an
    element of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.12              We agree that following Hoag would
    create a tension with our circuit's treatment of § 1010 and other
    false statement statutes.
    Aside from repeating Hoag's argument that the word "material"
    does not appear in § 1010, the government argues that the statute's
    intent requirement obviates the need for a materiality element.
    The government asserts that § 1010's intent requirement, which
    limits prosecution to those who make false statements "for the
    purpose     of    influencing"       HUD,   already    meets    the   objective    of
    excluding        trivial     false    statements      from   prosecution.         The
    government        also     argues    that    the    intent     requirement   brings
    materiality in "by the back door," because juries will generally
    determine a defendant's purpose in making a false statement by
    considering the statement's ability to influence HUD's actions—that
    is, by considering whether the statement is material.13
    These arguments are not without some force, but we are not
    writing on a blank slate.             The intent requirement of § 1010 does
    10
    
    823 F.2d 1123
    , 1125-26 (7th Cir.1987).
    11
    
    971 F.2d 1355
    , 1358 (7th Cir.1992).
    12
    
    Id. 13 See
    id. at 1357-58 
    (noting that materiality often plays a
    role in determining whether the intent requirement of false
    statement statutes is met).
    not differ in any meaningful way from the intent requirements in §§
    1344, 1005, and 1014, yet Swearingen and Rapp read materiality into
    those statutes.     Further, while in most cases an individual is
    unlikely   to   provide   information   actually   immaterial   to   the
    recipient, intending to influence it, this need not always be so.
    Thus reading materiality into false statement statutes serves a
    useful function in preventing trivial prosecutions.
    While Gevinson, Black, Swearingen, and Rapp favor including
    materiality as an element of § 1010, the government points to no
    precedent indicating otherwise.     We hold that materiality is an
    element of 18 U.S.C. § 1010.
    2. Harmless Error
    Although the district court erred in failing to allow the jury
    to decide the element of materiality, the question remains whether
    the error is reversible.      The courts are divided on whether a
    Gaudin error is reversible per se, or is instead susceptible to
    plain error review or harmless error review.14      Gaudin itself did
    14
    See United States v. Jobe, 
    90 F.3d 920
    , 925 (5th Cir.1996)
    (Gaudin error subject to plain error review); United States v.
    McGhee, 
    87 F.3d 184
    , 186-87 (6th Cir.) (same), petition for
    rehearing en banc granted, 
    95 F.3d 1335
    (6th Cir.1996); United
    States v. David, 
    83 F.3d 638
    , 646-47 (4th Cir.1996) (Gaudin error
    subject to plain error review, but error always "affects
    substantial rights" under plain error test); United States v.
    Raether, 
    82 F.3d 192
    , 194 (8th Cir.1996) (Gaudin error subject to
    harmless error review); United States v. DiRico, 
    78 F.3d 732
    ,
    736-38 (1st Cir.1996) (Gaudin error is a "structural defect" not
    subject to harmless error analysis); United States v. Pettigrew,
    
    77 F.3d 1500
    , 1511 (5th Cir.1996) (Gaudin error not subject to
    harmless error analysis); United States v. Lopez, 
    71 F.3d 954
    ,
    960 (1st Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 
    116 S. Ct. 2529
    ,
    
    135 L. Ed. 2d 1053
    (1996) ("[O]ur best guess is that the Supreme
    Court would regard [Gaudin error as] reversible per se if there
    were a timely objection—although not automatically "plain error'
    if no objection occurred....").
    not resolve this question.15
    In      Chapman   v.     California,16       the   Court     held     that    a
    constitutional error does not render a conviction reversible per
    se;     instead such an error can be held harmless if the reviewing
    court is "able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt."17         Although Chapman recognized that "there are
    some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their
    infraction can never be treated as harmless error,"18 the Court has
    since      recognized   that    such   errors,     sometimes     referred    to    as
    "structural" errors or defects,19 "are the exception and not the
    rule," and that there is a "strong presumption" that harmless error
    analysis      is   applicable    to    a   trial    error   of     constitutional
    dimension.20
    Although constitutional errors are presumptively subject to
    review for harmless error, other courts have struggled with whether
    Sullivan v. Louisiana21 forecloses such review.                  In Sullivan, the
    Court held that harmless error analysis cannot be applied to a
    15
    Gaudin, --- U.S. at ---- - 
    ----, 115 S. Ct. at 2321-22
    (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
    16
    
    386 U.S. 18
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 824
    , 
    17 L. Ed. 2d 705
    (1967).
    17
    
    Id. at 24,
    87 S.Ct. at 828.
    18
    
    Id. at 23,
    87 S.Ct. at 827-28.
    19
    E.g., 
    Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280-83
    , 113 S.Ct. at 2082-83;
    Arizona v. Fulminante, 
    499 U.S. 279
    , 308-11, 
    111 S. Ct. 1246
    ,
    1264-65, 
    113 L. Ed. 2d 302
    (1991) (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., for
    the Court).
    20
    Rose v. Clark, 
    478 U.S. 570
    , 577-79, 
    106 S. Ct. 3101
    , 3106,
    
    92 L. Ed. 2d 460
    (1986).
    21
    
    508 U.S. 275
    , 
    113 S. Ct. 2078
    , 
    124 L. Ed. 2d 182
    (1993).
    defective reasonable doubt instruction.          The Court reasoned that
    where there is a defective reasonable doubt instruction, there is
    no jury verdict within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment upon
    which a harmless error scrutiny can operate.22          In an alternative
    analysis, the Court held that the error was a "structural error,"
    that is, a serious and basic error that infected the entire trial,
    "with     consequences      that   are   necessarily   unquantifiable   and
    indeterminate," and hence one where harmless error analysis in
    inapplicable.23
    In three recent cases, our court has addressed whether the
    failure to allow the jury to decide the materiality element is
    reversible.     In United States v. Kramer,24 the defendant urged that
    the error was reversible per se.          We rejected this argument, and
    concluded that even though the error was plain, the defendant did
    not meet requirement of showing that his substantial rights were
    affected, i.e. that the outcome of the trial was affected by the
    error.25     Again in United States v. Toussaint26 and United States v.
    Calhoon,27 we held that the district court's failure to let the jury
    decide materiality was not prejudicial under the plain error
    standard and hence was not reversible.
    Our case is distinguishable from Kramer, Toussaint and
    22
    
    Id. at 280-81,
    113 S.Ct. at 2082.
    23
    Id. at 
    280-83, 113 S. Ct. at 2082-83
    .
    24
    
    73 F.3d 1067
    (11th Cir.1996).
    25
    
    Id. at 1074-75.
         26
    
    84 F.3d 1406
    , 1407 (11th Cir.1996).
    27
    
    97 F.3d 518
    , 529-30 (11th Cir.1996).
    Calhoon in one regard.       In our case defense counsel did object to
    the failure of the district court to allow the jury to decide the
    element of materiality.       In Kramer, Toussaint and Calhoon, there
    was no objection and the court therefore turned to the plain error
    standard of review.       Plain error review applies to alleged errors
    under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) to which there was no objection at the
    trial.     The rule provides that "[p]lain error or defects affecting
    substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to
    the attention of the court."        In United States v. Olano,28 the Court
    defined the standards for plain error review.          The Court held that
    the defendant seeking a reversal for plain error must establish (1)
    an error, (2) which was plain, and (3) which affected "substantial
    rights."29      Even if these requirements are met, the reviewing court
    is left with discretion to correct the error, and should not
    correct     the   error   unless   it   seriously   affects   the   fairness,
    integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.30
    Significant to our case, the Court in Olano held that in
    deciding whether the error affected "substantial rights" under Rule
    52(b), the review is similar to harmless error review when there is
    a timely objection under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a).          Rule 52(a) provides
    that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not
    affect     substantial    rights   shall   be   disregarded."       The   Court
    explained that prejudice is the focus under either subpart of Rule
    52 when deciding whether the defendant's substantial rights were
    28
    
    507 U.S. 725
    , 
    113 S. Ct. 1770
    , 
    123 L. Ed. 2d 508
    (1993).
    29
    
    Id. at 730-32,
    113 S.Ct. at 1776.
    30
    
    Id. affected: The
    third and final limitation on appellate authority under
    Rule 52(b) is that the plain error "affec[t] substantial
    rights." This is the same language employed in Rule 52(a),
    and in most cases it means that the error must have been
    prejudicial:    It must have affected the outcome of the
    District Court proceedings. When the defendant has made a
    timely objection to an error and Rule 52(a) applies, the Court
    of Appeals normally engages in a specific analysis of the
    District Court record—a so-called "harmless error" inquiry—to
    determine whether the error was prejudicial.       Rule 52(b)
    normally requires the same kind of inquiry, with one important
    difference: It is the defendant rather than the Government
    who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.
    In most cases, the Court of Appeals cannot correct the
    forfeited error unless the defendant shows that the error was
    prejudicial.31
    We read the Court to say that the ultimate question of harm or
    prejudice is the same whether or not objection is made at the time
    of trial, but the burden of persuading the appellate court of the
    harm or prejudice is borne by the government where objection was
    made at trial.      The Court did leave open the possibility that some
    errors, such as the structural defects described in Fulminante,32
    might also be deemed to affect substantial rights regardless of
    their effect on the outcome of the trial.33
    We conclude that even though there was an objection in our
    case pointing out the Gaudin error, the error is not reversible per
    se, but is subject to harmless error review.         The mere fact that an
    objection     was   raised   does   not   render   harmless   error   review
    inapplicable. The Supreme Court has employed harmless error review
    31
    
    Id. at 734-35,
    113 S.Ct. at 1778 (citations omitted).
    32
    Arizona v. Fulminante, 
    499 U.S. 279
    , 308-11, 
    111 S. Ct. 1246
    , 1264-65 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., for the Court).
    33
    Olano, 507 U.S. at 
    734-35, 113 S. Ct. at 1778
    .
    where objections were lodged with the district court.34           Moreover,
    the law of our circuit compels the conclusion that a Gaudin error
    is not reversible per se even where the defendant does object.
    Olano teaches that the prejudice requirements under the plain error
    and harmless error standards are the same, except for the burden of
    persuasion.     If our court in     Kramer, Toussaint and Calhoon had
    concluded     that   the   Gaudin   errors   in   those   cases   were   not
    susceptible to prejudice scrutiny, either because the error was
    structural or because there was no constitutional verdict on which
    to conduct a review for prejudice, it would not have conducted a
    prejudice analysis.        In short, we believe that our court has
    already held that Sullivan does not extend to Gaudin errors.
    In United States v. Medina,35 the court held that a district
    court's failure to submit a jurisdictional element of a drug
    offense to the jury, and directed verdict on that element, was not
    reviewable for harmless error and hence was reversible per se.36
    However, since the three other cases discussed above (two of which
    preceded Medina) hold that the specific error at issue here—failing
    to submit the element of materiality to the jury—is not reversible
    per se but is instead subject to review for prejudice, we follow
    these precedents rather than Medina.
    Applying harmless error analysis to this case, we conclude
    that the Gaudin error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.             We
    34
    E.g. 
    Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 283
    , 
    294-96, 111 S. Ct. at 1250
    , 1257; United States v. Hasting, 
    461 U.S. 499
    , 502-03, 510-
    11, 
    103 S. Ct. 1974
    , 1977, 1981, 
    76 L. Ed. 2d 96
    (1983).
    35
    
    90 F.3d 459
    (11th Cir.1996).
    36
    
    Id. at 464.
    have defined the test for materiality as "whether a statement has
    a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the
    exercise of a governmental function."37 The government conclusively
    proved     that   De   Castro's        submission    of   fraudulent   documents,
    containing false employment information about mortgage applicants,
    not only had the capacity to influence the government, but in fact
    influenced    the      FHA    to   guarantee   the    loans    in   issue.        More
    specifically, the proof established that the FHA would not have
    insured the mortgages but for De Castro's submission of the false
    loan documents, certification that they were accurate, recruitment
    of the false employers, and calculation of the income amounts
    listed on the employer verification forms.
    We are further persuaded that the error was harmless because
    of the finding the jury did make.                    While not instructed to
    determine materiality, the jury was instructed to decide, and found
    beyond a reasonable doubt, that De Castro submitted the false
    documents "for the purpose of obtaining a mortgage insured by the
    Department of Housing and Urban Development."                 As explained above,
    the intent element is not the same as the materiality element.                    The
    former concerns the defendant's state of mind, while the latter
    concerns the effect on the government agent. However, proof of the
    two   elements     are       closely    related.      The   materiality      of   the
    statements is evidence of intent to influence government action, in
    this case the approval of the mortgages.                  Conversely, proof that
    the defendant intended to influence the government is evidence that
    37
    United States v. Grizzle, 
    933 F.2d 943
    , 948 (11th Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    502 U.S. 897
    , 
    112 S. Ct. 271
    , 
    116 L. Ed. 2d 223
    (1991).
    the   statements     she   made   were   material.        While   there   may   be
    instances where a defendant intends to influence government action
    by making immaterial statements, such circumstances are not present
    here.
    3. Admission of HUD Findings
    De Castro separately argues that the district court erred in
    permitting the government to introduce a HUD "finding" of fraud.
    Scott Kottman, a loan specialist and investigator for HUD, was the
    government's      first    witness.      He   testified    that    he   began   an
    investigation after a large number of mortgage defaults in the
    Phoenix area.        He noticed that the majority of the bad loans
    involved the same broker, Virginia Labrador, and that the same
    employers kept appearing in the files.             He then discovered that
    home buyers were not employed where the files indicated, and linked
    the paperwork in the files to De Castro.          Kottman testified that he
    investigated De Castro's company, Phoenix Mortgage, because of
    "[t]he unusually large number of false claims."                   He went on to
    testify that after the investigation De Castro was suspended from
    doing business with the FHA.          The suspension letter was admitted
    into evidence without objection.
    Citing United States v. Christo38 and other authority, De
    Castro complains that it is error to allow the introduction of the
    results of an agency's "findings" in a criminal trial. She further
    argues that the error was compounded by the prosecutor's statements
    in his opening and closing arguments, such as the statement in
    opening argument that HUD "found evidence of fraud," and the
    38
    
    614 F.2d 486
    (5th Cir.1980).
    statement in closing argument that HUD "concluded there was fraud
    on the part of Phoenix."
    De Castro concedes that there was not a proper objection to
    the evidence or the argument of the prosecutor, and accordingly the
    plain error of review applies.
    In Christo, the defendant was convicted of misapplication of
    bank funds.         The government's theory was that bank overdrafts in
    violation      of     a   civil      banking     statute     constituted         criminal
    misapplication.           The jury was further instructed that the civil
    violation could be considered in deciding criminal liability.                         The
    court      found    plain    error     based   on    "the    inclusion      of    [civil]
    violations in the case," and "indeed the whole tenor of the
    trial."39      In these regards Christo bears little similarity to our
    case.      In our case the government never contended, nor was the jury
    instructed, that a violation of a civil statute was sufficient to
    establish, or even relevant to, guilt under a criminal statute made
    the basis of the indictment.
    The error here, if any, does not rise to the level of plain
    error.      Kottman did not testify that there was an agency finding of
    "fraud."        The government offered extensive evidence from the
    participants in the scheme that De Castro submitted fraudulent
    documents to HUD.           The prosecutor never argued that a HUD finding
    of fraud was sufficient to convict De Castro, and instead reminded
    the jurors in closing argument of the testimony of ten witnesses
    besides Kottman.          Under the plain error standard, De Castro does
    not   carry     her   burden      of   showing      that    the   claimed    error    was
    39
    
    Id. at 492.
    prejudicial, meaning "that the error affected the outcome of the
    District Court proceedings."40 Even if De Castro had met this prong
    of the plain error test, we should not exercise our discretion to
    correct a plain error unless the error seriously affected "the
    fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."41
    The     error,    if   any,   in   allowing   the   evidence   of   the   HUD
    investigation does not satisfy this last element of the plain error
    test.
    AFFIRMED.
    40
    Olano, 507 U.S. at 
    734-35, 113 S. Ct. at 1778
    .
    41
    
    Id. at 732,
    113 S.Ct. at 1776.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 95-4648

Citation Numbers: 113 F.3d 176

Filed Date: 4/30/1997

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/19/2016

Authorities (29)

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United States v. Sherman Wayne Swearingen , 858 F.2d 1555 ( 1988 )

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United States v. Pettigrew , 77 F.3d 1500 ( 1996 )

United States v. John Christo, Jr. , 614 F.2d 486 ( 1980 )

United States v. Gertrude King Black and Bill Black , 644 F.2d 445 ( 1981 )

United States v. Hooshang Hooshmand , 931 F.2d 725 ( 1991 )

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United States v. Thomas Staniforth , 971 F.2d 1355 ( 1992 )

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Daniel Gevinson v. United States , 358 F.2d 761 ( 1966 )

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United States v. Gertrude King Black and Bill Black , 651 F.2d 392 ( 1981 )

United States v. Jobe , 90 F.3d 920 ( 1996 )

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