Ricky Giddens v. United States , 579 F. App'x 959 ( 2014 )


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  •            Case: 13-10353    Date Filed: 09/18/2014   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-10353
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket Nos. 7:12-cv-90125-HL-TQL; 7:10-cr-00028-HL-TQL-1
    RICKY GIDDENS,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (September 18, 2014)
    Before HULL, MARCUS and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 13-10353     Date Filed: 09/18/2014   Page: 2 of 4
    Ricky Giddens, a federal prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his motion to
    vacate his sentence. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    . Giddens moved to vacate his sentence
    as unconstitutional because the district court failed to apply the Fair Sentencing
    Act of 2010 at his sentencing. The district court dismissed Giddens’s motion as
    procedurally barred because he failed to raise his arguments either at sentencing or
    on direct appeal. The court also denied Giddens’s request to amend his motion
    with a claim that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by not challenging his
    sentence at sentencing or on direct appeal. We granted a certificate of appealability
    to determine whether the district court erred in dismissing Giddens’s motion as
    procedurally barred without addressing his claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel. We affirm.
    We review the denial of a motion to amend a pleading for an abuse of
    discretion. See Brown v. Johnson, 
    387 F.3d 1344
    , 1347 (11th Cir. 2004). “Leave to
    amend a [pleading] is futile when the [pleading] as amended would still be
    properly dismissed or be immediately subject to summary judgment for the
    defendant.” Cockrell v. Sparks, 
    510 F.3d 1307
    , 1310 (11th Cir. 2007).
    To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must
    establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, falling below an objective
    standard of reasonableness, and the movant suffered prejudice as a result of the
    deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687−88, 
    104 S. Ct. 2
    Case: 13-10353     Date Filed: 09/18/2014    Page: 3 of 4
    2052, 2064−65 (1984). The standard governing counsel’s performance is
    “reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” 
    Id. at 688
    , 
    104 S. Ct. at 2065
    . We have explained that “the deference afforded an attorney’s decision is
    great and the bar for proving a Sixth Amendment violation is high.” Brownlee v.
    Haley, 
    306 F.3d 1043
    , 1059 (11th Cir. 2002). In the light of the strong presumption
    in favor of counsel’s competence, a movant who alleges ineffective assistance of
    counsel must establish that “no competent counsel would have taken the action that
    his counsel did take.” Chandler v. United States, 
    218 F.3d 1305
    , 1315 (11th Cir.
    2000) (en banc). It is well settled that the failure to anticipate a change in the law
    will not support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v.
    Ardley, 
    273 F.3d 991
    , 993 (11th Cir. 2001). The rule applies even if the claim,
    based upon anticipated changes in the law, was reasonably available when counsel
    failed to raise it. See Pitts v. Cook, 
    923 F.2d 1568
    , 1572–74 (11th Cir. 1991).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Giddens’s request to
    amend his motion to allege a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under our
    then-controlling precedent, United States v. Gomes, 
    621 F.3d 1343
     (11th Cir.
    2010), at the time of Giddens’s sentencing and direct appeal, he was not entitled to
    be sentenced under the lower mandatory minimums provided in the Fair
    Sentencing Act. Any failure by counsel to anticipate the change in decisional law
    in Dorsey v. United States, 
    132 S. Ct. 2321
     (2012), does not support Giddens’s
    3
    Case: 13-10353     Date Filed: 09/18/2014    Page: 4 of 4
    claim of ineffective assistance. See Ardley, 
    273 F.3d at 993
    . And because counsel
    was not ineffective, granting Giddens leave to amend his motion would have been
    futile. See Cockrell, 
    510 F.3d at 1310
    . The district court did not abuse its discretion
    by denying Giddens’s request to amend his motion.
    AFFIRMED.
    4