Frank Jackson v. Department of Corrections , 652 F. App'x 745 ( 2016 )

Case: 13-13905 Date Filed: 06/08/2016 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-13905
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cv-61003-RNS
FRANK JACKSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(June 8, 2016)
Before TJOFLAT, JILL PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 13-13905 Date Filed: 06/08/2016 Page: 2 of 6
Frank Jackson, a Florida prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial of his
petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On petition
for post-conviction relief, the Florida trial court held that Jackson failed to
establish deficient performance by counsel. Jackson contends the district court
erred in holding that the state habeas court did not unreasonably apply Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). After review, 1 we affirm.
In state court, Jackson was originally charged with armed robbery with a
firearm, but prior to jury selection, the state amended the information to instead
charge Jackson with attempted armed robbery with a firearm. After trial, a jury
convicted Jackson of the charge, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed
the conviction.
In his state court motion for post-conviction relief, Jackson contended his
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 2 by affirmatively misadvising
Jackson’s sentence exposure such that Jackson decided not to accept a plea deal
offered by the state. Jackson claimed that (1) trial counsel told him that his
1
“We review de novo the district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition. Hall v. Thomas, 611
F.3d 1259, 1284 (11th Cir. 2010). On de novo review, we, like the district court, consider
“whether the state court acted contrary to clearly established federal law, unreasonably applied
federal law, or made an unreasonable determination of fact.” Id. (quotation omitted). Indeed,
review under § 2254(d)(1) “goes no further” than asking whether “there is no possibility
fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [Supreme Court]
precedent[].” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).
2
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Jackson must have
demonstrated that his counsel’s performance was deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a
result of counsel’s deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.
2
Case: 13-13905 Date Filed: 06/08/2016 Page: 3 of 6
maximum sentence under the amended information was 15 years; (2) the state had
offered a 5-year sentence if Jackson would plead guilty and testify against his co-
defendant; and (3) Jackson would have accepted the plea deal if he had known that
his maximum sentence was 30 years. The state trial court summarily denied
Jackson’s motion. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court’s order and remanded for the trial court to attach portions of the record
refuting Jackson’s claim or to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the claim.
After an evidentiary hearing, the state trial court found that the state never
offered a plea deal and that Jackson’s counsel had properly advised Jackson
regarding his sentence exposure under the original information. The trial court
found, however, that Jackson’s counsel never informed Jackson of his sentence
exposure under the amended information, which was amended by ore tenus motion
immediately before trial. The trial court concluded that Jackson “ha[d] not proved
that his counsel was ineffective on the ground alleged” and therefore failed to
satisfy the deficient performance prong of Strickland.3 The court also noted that
“[d]efense counsel appeared to be arguing that [Jackson] was entitled to relief on
grounds beyond the specific claim raised in his motion” and held that it could not
3
Because the petitioner must establish both prongs of the Strickland test, a court may
conclude that the petitioner cannot satisfy one prong and decline to address the other prong. See
Dell v. United States, 710 F.3d 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2013).
3
Case: 13-13905 Date Filed: 06/08/2016 Page: 4 of 6
“provide relief on any ground not raised in the motion.” The Fourth District Court
of Appeal affirmed without comment.
On Jackson’s § 2254 petition in the Southern District of Florida, the
magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation in which he found the state
trial court’s findings to be supported by the evidence and agreed that Jackson failed
to establish deficient performance. The district court agreed with the R&R and
entered an order denying Jackson’s motion. On appeal, Jackson argues that the
state trial court’s findings of fact lead to the unavoidable conclusion that Jackson’s
counsel did misadvise Jackson regarding his sentence exposure. Jackson’s counsel
advised Jackson that he would be sentenced to life in prison on the original
information but never amended that advice when the state amended the
information.
Jackson’s argument fails for two reasons. First, that is not what Jackson
argued in state post-conviction proceedings. Jackson did not argue that he believed
himself to still be facing life imprisonment due to counsel’s failure to update
Jackson on the implications of the state’s amendment. Rather, Jackson argued and
testified that his counsel affirmatively told him that his maximum exposure under
the amended information was 15 years. There is no testimony that Jackson
believed his counsel’s original sentence-exposure advice remained accurate after
the state amended the information. In fact, Jackson repeatedly claimed to believe
4
Case: 13-13905 Date Filed: 06/08/2016 Page: 5 of 6
that the amendment reduced his exposure to 15 years. Jackson’s argument on this
appeal deviates from the grounds raised in his post-conviction motion and from the
testimony elicited in state court.
Second, even if the state court had been presented with this argument,
Jackson fails to show that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland in
declining to find deficient performance under these facts. Although Jackson cites
authority stating that defense counsel must properly advise a defendant regarding
sentence exposure in order to facilitate an informed decision regarding how to
plead, no case addresses facts comparable to those before us. See Jenkins v.
Greene, 630 F.3d 298, 309 (2d Cir. 2010) (Parker, J., dissenting) (opining that the
majority should have considered the merits of a New York prisoner’s § 2254
petition alleging that defense counsel was ineffective for advising the prisoner that
he would receive between 10 and 12 years when his actual sentence was 50 years);
United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 548–50 (3d Cir. 2005) (ordering an
evidentiary hearing on a federal prisoner’s § 2255 petition to determine whether
defense counsel failed to inform the defendant that he could enter an open plea and
receive a three-level reduction under the Sentencing Guidelines for acceptance of
responsibility); United States v. Herrera, 412 F.3d 577, 580–82 (5th Cir. 2005)
(declining to decide whether defense counsel’s alleged 27-month miscalculation of
5
Case: 13-13905 Date Filed: 06/08/2016 Page: 6 of 6
a defendant’s maximum sentence exposure constituted ineffective assistance and
instead ordering an evidentiary hearing on a federal prisoner’s § 2255 petition).
It is not an unreasonable application of Strickland to hold that a defense
attorney is not constitutionally deficient when he fails to update the defendant on
the possible sentencing effect of a last-minute, pre-trial amendment to the
information. See Ponticelli v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 690 F.3d 1271, 1291
(11th Cir. 2012) (“[W]e may issue a writ of habeas corpus only when the state
court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in
justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing
law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” (quotations omitted));
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1522 (2000) (O’Connor, J.,
writing for the majority) (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is
different from an incorrect application of federal law.” (emphasis in original)).
AFFIRMED.
6