Brian Say v. Umatilla School , 364 F. App'x 385 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              FEB 08 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    BRIAN SAY,                                       No. 09-35091
    Plaintiff - Appellant,              D.C. No. 3:08-cv-00348-ST
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    UMATILLA SCHOOL DISTRICT 6, a
    political subdivision of the State of Oregon
    and public body corporate; ADAM
    RUSSELL, as a member of the Umatilla
    School District Board of Directors; TOBY
    CRANSTON, as a member of the Umatilla
    School District Board of Directors; PAT
    LAFFERTY, as a member of the Umatilla
    School District Board of Directors;
    SCOTT LARSON as a member of the
    Umatilla School District Board of
    Directors; JAN MCIVER, as a member of
    the Umatilla School District Board of
    Directors; SONDRA PANKEY, as a
    member of the Umatilla School District
    Board of Directors; BOB WIMBERLY, as
    a member of the Umatilla School District
    Board of Directors,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Oregon
    Janice M. Stewart, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 4, 2010 **
    Seattle, Washington
    Before: RYMER, GOULD, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
    Brian Say appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
    Umatilla School District. Say argues that the process by which Umatilla
    terminated his contract as Superintendent did not comport with the requirements of
    the Due Process Clause. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
    de novo. Greene v. Camreta, 
    588 F.3d 1011
    , 1021 (9th Cir. 2009). We are
    unpersuaded by Say’s arguments and affirm the judgment of the district court.
    As a general matter, before being fired a public employee with a property
    interest in continued employment “is entitled to oral or written notice of the
    charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an
    opportunity to present his side of the story.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
    
    470 U.S. 532
    , 546 (1985). Here, Say received written notice, an explanation of
    Umatilla’s evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. He argues,
    however, that the hearing with which he was provided was not meaningful because
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    the school board had already prejudged the case against him. We are willing to
    accept the premise of Say’s argument but not his conclusion.
    To some extent, the Board was forced to “prejudge” Say’s case. There
    would have been no need for a hearing unless the Board had decided that there
    were grounds for terminating Say’s employment. The Board’s decision to
    terminate Say’s employment could only be based on its judgment that Say’s
    performance was not satisfactory. That the Board was familiar with Say’s
    performance and the facts of his case, moreover, does not disqualify it from
    conducting the hearing. See Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ.
    Ass’n, 
    426 U.S. 482
    , 493 (1976); Vanelli v. Reynolds Sch. Dist. No. 7, 
    667 F.2d 773
    , 779 (9th Cir. 1982). That the Board members had some view about Say’s
    performance was inevitable; it was their responsibility to monitor him. It also does
    not diminish the process provided to Say: he had a full opportunity to persuade the
    Board members that he should keep his job.
    Even if the board “prejudged” Say’s case, there is no evidence that it
    exhibited “impermissible bias” during the termination process. See 
    Vanelli, 667 F.2d at 779
    n.10. Public officials are presumed to act with honesty and integrity.
    
    Hortonville, 426 U.S. at 497
    . In order to rebut that presumption, Say must point to
    evidence that members of the Board had a “personal or financial stake in the
    decision that might create a conflict of interest . . . [or evidence] of personal
    animosity.” 
    Hortonville, 426 U.S. at 491-92
    . Because Say does not argue that
    Board members had a personal or financial stake in the decision, he must prove
    that Board members bore some kind of animosity toward him.
    The evidence Say amasses falls far short in this respect. Say primarily relies
    on individual Board members’ statements to the effect that Say’s performance was
    not up to par. Say does not point to any personal attacks or any other conduct or
    language that could be construed as evidence of animosity. Indeed, he admits that
    he was not at all surprised by the Board’s reasons for wanting to terminate his
    contract, because they were the same concerns the Board had been raising for
    years. School board members do not exhibit impermissible bias by attempting to
    fulfill their public responsibilities.
    For the same reasons, the district court did not err in denying Say’s breach of
    contract claim.
    AFFIRMED.