Janice Smets v. Donald Winter , 370 F. App'x 812 ( 2010 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                                 MAR 10 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    JANICE SMETS,                                    No. 08-56960
    Plaintiff - Appellant,              D.C. No. 2:05-cv-06461-DDP-
    FMO
    v.
    DONALD C. WINTER, Secretary of the               MEMORANDUM *
    Navy Substituted for Gordon R. England
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 5, 2010**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: GOULD, IKUTA and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    The Navy provided a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its 2003
    decision to eliminate use of video teletraining technology. The district court
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    precluded Smets from introducing internet printouts to establish the cost-
    effectiveness of the video teletraining program, a ruling that Smets does not
    challenge on appeal, and Smets introduced no other evidence that the Navy’s
    proffered reason was pretextual or that the decision was in retaliation for Smets’s
    EEOC activity. Therefore, Smets did not establish a genuine issue of material fact
    as to retaliation. See Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 
    439 F.3d 1018
    , 1028
    n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 
    281 F.3d 1054
    , 1062–63
    (9th Cir. 2002).
    Nor did Smets create a genuine issue of material fact as to her claim that the
    Navy rescinded its 2006 job offer in retaliation against Smets’s EEOC activity.
    Smets failed to produce any evidence regarding the content of the telephone call
    between Sanchez and a Navy attorney, and her textually unsupported interpretation
    of Sanchez’s declaration does not create a genuine issue of material fact. See
    Villiarimo, 
    281 F.3d at 1061
    , 1065 n.10.
    Although Smets administratively exhausted her claim that the job offered by
    the Navy in 2003 was not substantially equivalent to the one offered in 1995,
    Smets’s evidence is limited to her testimony that two instructors informally told
    her that the 1995 position required less travel than set forth in the official job
    description. Such uncorroborated and self-serving testimony is insufficient to raise
    a genuine issue of material fact. See 
    id.
     For the same reason, Smets’s challenge to
    the EEOC’s 2005 order fails. 
    Id.
     Finally, a de novo review of Smets’s 2003 age
    discrimination claim is time barred. See 29 C.F.R § 1614.407(a), (c).
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-56960

Citation Numbers: 370 F. App'x 812

Filed Date: 3/10/2010

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023