Visiontron Corp. v. United States ( 2022 )

20-1273
Visiontron Corp. v. United States
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 17th day of October, two thousand twenty-two.
PRESENT:
JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
Circuit Judges,
COLLEEN MCMAHON,
District Judge. *
_____________________________________
VISIONTRON CORP.,
Petitioner,
v. No. 20-1273
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
*Judge Colleen McMahon, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, sitting by designation.
FOR PETITIONER: David P. Fallon, Law Offices of David P. Fallon,
PLLC, Sayville, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Jeffrey C. Bossert, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Justin R. Markel, Paul Fiorino, Senior
Litigation Counsels, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
Petition for review of a decision of the Office of the Chief Administrative
Hearing Officer for the Executive Office of Immigration Review (“OCAHO”).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review of the decision of the
OCAHO is DENIED.
Appellant Visiontron Corp. (“Visiontron”) petitions pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(e)(8) for review of a final order issued by OCAHO, in which an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) concluded that Visiontron had committed
substantive violations of section 274A of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the
“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1324a, and imposed a fine of $47,850. Specifically, in a March
17, 2020 written order, the ALJ found, based on a 2018 inspection of Visiontron’s
employment eligibility forms by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”),
that Visiontron had “failed to prepare and/or present I-9[] [employment eligibility
verification forms] for nine employees,” “failed to timely prepare and/or present
I-9s for three employees,” and “failed to ensure proper completion of section 1
and/or failed to properly complete sections 2 or 3 for twenty-five employees.” J.
App’x at 238. Based on these findings, the ALJ determined that Visiontron was
“liable for thirty-seven violations of [8 U.S.C.] § 1324a(a)(1)(b).” Id. ICE sought
$101,703.50 in penalties for these violations. After reviewing the record and the
relevant statutory factors set out in 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5), the ALJ rejected ICE’s
proposed penalty and instead imposed a fine of $47,850. Visiontron now
petitions for review of that decision.
“We review an order of the OCAHO issued pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324a
under the arbitrary[-]and[-]capricious standard.” Buffalo Transp., Inc. v. United
States, 844 F.3d 381, 384 (2d Cir. 2016). We review an agency’s factual findings
under the substantial-evidence standard and its legal determinations de novo.
Id. “When reviewing agency fines[,] our inquiry is limited to whether the agency
made an allowable judgment in its choice of the remedy.” Id. at 386 (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted).
Section 274A of the INA requires employers to verify that their employees
are legally authorized to work in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b). To
do this, employers must complete the I-9 employment eligibility verification form
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within three business days of an employee’s hire. See Buffalo Transp., 844 F.3d at
384 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 274a.2(b)(1)(ii)). Employers must provide these forms for
inspection by ICE upon three business days’ notice. See id. (citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 274a.2(b)(2)(i)–(ii)). Failure to adequately complete or provide these forms can
result in civil penalties. See id. at 384–85.
As noted above, OCAHO determined that Visiontron had committed
thirty-seven violations of section 274A. When OCAHO finds a violation of
section 274A, it must set a fine for each individual violation. For violations that
occurred on or between September 29, 1999 and November 2, 2015, the penalty
range is $110 to $1,100. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(2). For violations that occurred
after November 2, 2015, and which are assessed after January 29, 2018 but on or
before June 19, 2020, the penalty range is $224 to $2,236. See 28 C.F.R. § 85.5. In
assessing the fine, OCAHO must give “due consideration” to five factors:
(1) “the size of the business of the employer being charged,” (2) “the good faith of
the employer,” (3) “the seriousness of the violation,” (4) “whether or not the
individual was an unauthorized alien,” and (5) “the history of previous
violations.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(5); see also 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(2).
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Here, the ALJ concluded that a fine of $47,850 was appropriate after
carefully considering the relevant statutory factors. Specifically, the ALJ found
that Visiontron was “a small business with fewer than 100 employees,” which was
a mitigating factor. J. App’x at 234. The ALJ further observed that Visiontron
“did not have a history of violations,” and treated this factor – along with the
“good faith” factor – as neutral. Id. at 234–35. As to the seriousness factor,
however, the ALJ noted that Visiontron committed “serious” violations, including
failing to sign the required employer attestation, failing to prepare I-9 forms, and
failing to ensure that employees attest to their immigration status. Id. at 235–36.
And as to certain of the violations (pertaining to six unauthorized workers listed
in Count IIIA), the ALJ concluded that penalties for the Count IIIA violations were
further aggravated by the presence of unauthorized workers. Id. at 236. After
balancing these factors, the ALJ determined that the following fines were
appropriate: $645 for the two violations that occurred before November 2, 2015
(out of a penalty range of $110 to $1,100); $1,290 per violation for the majority of
violations occurring after November 2, 2015 (out of a penalty range of $224 to
$2,236); and $1,525 for the violations in Count IIIA (also out of a penalty range of
$224 to $2,236). Id. at 237.
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Visiontron nonetheless asserts that the ALJ’s penalty calculation was
arbitrary and capricious. 1 First, Visiontron contends that it was “improper” for
the ALJ to use “ICE’s proposed fines as a starting point” when assessing the fine
against Visiontron. Visiontron Br. at 10. But the ALJ properly acknowledged
that the government’s “penalty calculations are not binding in OCAHO
proceedings,” J. App’x at 239 (internal quotation marks omitted), and specifically
stated in the order that, “for the majority of violations,” she would “us[e] a
mid-range penalty as a base penalty,” id. at 237.
Visiontron next argues that it was wrong for the ALJ to use “the mid-range
penalty as a base penalty” for the majority of the violations, because doing so
“improperly replaced the minimum fine base with the mid-range . . . as the
[presumed] base” for OCAHO penalties. Visiontron Br. at 11. But the
regulations nowhere suggest that the ALJ must treat the minimum allowable fine
as the starting point for all penalties in all cases. The regulations merely require
that the ALJ consider the five statutory factors when setting a fine. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324a(e)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.10(b)(2). This the ALJ clearly did, finding that, after
1Visiontron does not contest any of the ALJ’s factual findings and only challenges the ALJ’s
assessment of the appropriate fine as arbitrary and capricious.
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considering the totality of the circumstances as set forth in the record and
pleadings, a mid-range base penalty was appropriate as a starting point of the
analysis for the majority of the violations, before she applied adjustments based
on each of the statutory factors to determine the ultimate fine. J. App’x at 237.
In short, the ALJ’s method of calculating the fine was neither arbitrary nor
capricious, nor outside her considerable discretion when it comes to the
determination of penalties. Accordingly, because the ALJ’s choice of calculation
methods was clearly “allowable,” we will not disturb it. Buffalo Transp., 844 F.3d
at 386 (internal quotation marks omitted). 2
Finally, Visiontron insists that the ALJ’s fine is disproportionate to the
company’s violations and that the ALJ “did not give proper weight to the
[statutory] factors.” Visiontron Br. at 13. As noted above, when we review an
administrative fine, our inquiry is limited to asking whether the administrative
body made “an allowable judgment in its choice of the remedy” that was neither
2 Indeed, there is no single method for calculating penalties, and OCAHO ALJs have used a
variety of methods to calculate fines. See, e.g., United States v. Davis Nursery, Inc., No. 93A00193,
1994 WL 721954, at *11 (O.C.A.H.O. Sept. 30, 1994) (applying a “mathematical[-]formula”
approach to calculate fines that gives equal weight to each of the five statutory factors); United
States v. Williams Produce, Inc., No. 93A00220, 1995 WL 265081, at *4 (O.C.A.H.O. Feb. 3, 1995)
(applying a “judgmental . . . approach” that sets “each [statutory] factor’s significance . . . based
on the facts of [the] specific case”).
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arbitrary nor capricious. Buffalo Transp., 844 F.3d at 386 (internal quotation marks
and alteration omitted). Again, the ALJ here clearly based the fine on her
assessment of the statutory factors, including, for example, the size of Visiontron’s
business and the six unauthorized workers on its payroll. The ALJ then relied on
these factors when assessing the fine. We therefore cannot say that the ALJ failed
to provide “well-reasoned bases for the fine amounts based on [Visiontron’s]
specific circumstances.” Id. at 387.
The fact that OCAHO has imposed lesser fines in other cases is of no
moment. A fine is not “rendered invalid in a particular case because it is more
severe than sanctions imposed in other cases,” as each case turns on the unique
facts at hand. Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 187 (1973); see also
Hershberg v. SEC, 210 F. App’x 125, 126 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding sanctions are
imposed on a case-by-case basis). Because the ALJ set a fine within the
permissible penalty range after carefully considering the statutory factors, the fine
was an “allowable judgment” that this Court will not disturb. United States v.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 170 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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We have considered Visiontron’s remaining arguments and find them to be
meritless. 3 Accordingly, we DENY the petition for review.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
3Visiontron also raises a fleeting constitutional challenge to the fine, conclusorily asserting that
the fine is “grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense” in violation of the Eighth
Amendment’s excessive fines clause. Visiontron Br. at 19. Visiontron, however, fails to
sufficiently develop this argument and has thus forfeited it. See United States v. Botti, 711 F.3d
299, 313 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[I]ssues adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some
effort at developed argumentation, are deemed waived.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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