United States v. Hipolito Alejandro Felix , 497 F. App'x 942 ( 2012 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-11173
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cr-14089-KMM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HIPOLITO ALEJANDRO FELIX,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(November 20, 2012)
Before HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges, and WHITTEMORE,* District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
*
Honorable James D. Whittemore, United States District Judge, Middle District of
Florida, sitting by designation.
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After pleading guilty, Hipolito Alejandro Felix appeals his conviction for
one count of attempting to produce child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a). On appeal, Felix challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea,
claiming for the first time that the magistrate judge did not adequately advise him
of the nature of the charges against him, and thus, that his guilty plea should be set
aside. After plain error review, and with the benefit of oral argument, we affirm
Felix’s conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Indictment
In November 2010, a federal grand jury indicted Felix on three counts:
attempting to persuade, induce, entice, and coerce a minor to engage in sexually
explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct,
which visual depiction was intended to be transported in interstate commerce and
was produced using materials that had been transported in interstate commerce, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (Count 1); using an internet service to knowingly
persuade, induce, entice, and coerce a minor to engage in sexual activity in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) (Count 2); and knowingly transferring obscene
material to a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1470 (Count 3).
Because this appeal involves only the § 2251(a) attempt offense in Count 1,
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we quote Count 1 in full:
On or about January 14, 2010, in St. Lucie County, in the
Southern District of Florida, the defendant,
HIPOLITO ALEJANDRO FELIX
did employ, use, persuade, induce, entice, and coerce a minor to engage
in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual
depiction of such conduct, which visual depiction was intended to be
transported in interstate commerce and was produced using materials
that had been mailed, shipped, and transported in interstate commerce,
or attempted to do so, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 2251(a).
In short, Count 1 charged Felix with attempting to induce or entice a minor to
engage in sexually explicit conduct in order to produce a picture of that conduct,
which picture was intended to be transported in interstate commerce and was
produced using materials that were transported in interstate commerce.
B. Plea Agreement and Factual Stipulation
On January 3, 2011, Felix entered a guilty plea pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement with the government. Under the agreement’s terms, Felix agreed to
plead guilty to Count 1 of the indictment, which the agreement listed on its first
page as “Attempt to Produce Child Pornography, in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 2251(a).” In exchange, the government agreed to dismiss
Counts 2 and 3 of the indictment and to request a three-level reduction to Felix’s
advisory sentencing guidelines range for his acceptance of responsibility. In the
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agreement, Felix acknowledged that Count 1 carried a 15-year mandatory
minimum and a 30-year maximum term of imprisonment.
Felix and the government concurrently executed and filed a factual
stipulation in support of his guilty plea to the § 2251(a) attempt offense in Count
1. Felix personally signed the factual stipulation and so did his attorney and his
interpreter. On its first page, the stipulation stated that, on or about January 14,
2010, Felix had
attempt[ed] to use, persuade, induce, entice, and coerce a minor to
engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual
depiction of such conduct, which visual depiction was intended to be
transported in interstate commerce and was produced using materials
that had been mailed, shipped, and transported in interstate commerce,
in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2251(a).
(emphasis added). Thus, the factual stipulation, signed by Felix, set forth all the
elements of the Count 1 offense.
The factual stipulation also contained the following factual details showing
the elements of the § 2251(a) attempt offense were satisfied. On January 19, 2010,
Detective Sheila LaGrega of the Port St. Lucie Police Department began an
investigation of inappropriate text messages sent to a 15-year-old female, who was
identified as “AB” with a date of birth of December 23, 1994. Defendant Felix
was AB’s foster father at the time.
AB advised Detective LaGrega that she had received sexually explicit text
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messages on her cell phone from a Yahoo! user named “tania_hot69.” AB also
advised Detective LaGrega that she had been replying to the text messages, and
that AB originally thought they were sent by her former friend named Tania. In
December 2009, AB came to realize that the text messages were not from Tania,
and she asked the “tania_hot69” user who he was. AB received a response from
“tania_hot69” indicating that the user was Felix.
Detective LaGrega reviewed the contents of AB’s cell phone. On the cell
phone was a message sent on January 14, 2010 from “tania_hot69.” The message
contained a picture of Felix holding his penis. A message sent from “tania_hot69”
to AB four minutes later said “let me see u pussy,” and a third message, sent
shortly after the second, said “Id like to see u pussy.” Detective LaGrega believed
that these messages were requests from Felix to AB to take a photo of her vagina
and send the photo to Felix. A later forensic examination of AB’s cell phone
revealed, in addition to the messages and photo previously discussed, photos of
AB taking a picture of herself in a mirror while exposing her vagina.
Detective LaGrega interviewed Felix, who admitted that he created the
“tania_hot69” Yahoo! username and sent text messages to AB using that
username. He also admitted sending a picture of his penis to AB. As to interstate
commerce, Felix acknowledged that the text messages he sent to AB were relayed
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through servers located in California, and that his and AB’s cell phones were
manufactured in foreign countries.
C. Plea Colloquy
At a change-of-plea hearing held on January 3, 2011, Felix, through an
interpreter, consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. Felix informed the
magistrate judge that he was 38 years old, had “finished everything” in school, and
that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol and had received no recent
treatment for mental illness or addiction.
Felix affirmed that he had received a copy of the indictment and had “fully
discussed” his charges and case in general with counsel. Felix admitted that he
was pleading guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, which he had signed after
reviewing it with counsel through the use of an interpreter. The colloquy between
Felix and the magistrate judge was as follows:
THE COURT: Have you received a copy of the indictment pending
against you and have you fully discussed those charges and the case in
general with your attorney?
FELIX: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Are you fully satisfied with the counsel, representation,
and advice given you in this case by your attorney?
FELIX: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Is your willingness to plead guilty the result of
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discussions that your attorney has had with the attorney for the
government which has resulted in this written plea agreement I have in
my hand which I’m showing you?
FELIX: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Did you have an opportunity to completely review this
plea agreement with your attorney through the use of an interpreter, and
discuss it with your attorney completely and have her answer all of your
questions before you signed it?
FELIX: Yes, sir.
Felix also admitted that he entered into the plea agreement because he
believed it was in his best interest to do so:
THE COURT: [Your attorney] has just told me that you believe that this
plea agreement and entering into this plea agreement and pleading guilty
pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement are in your best interest, is
that correct, sir?
FELIX: Yes, sir.
Felix confirmed that he was pleading guilty of his own free will, and
because he was guilty, as shown:
THE COURT: You have listened to all the advice that your attorney has
given you and you have decided that you wish to enter into this plea
agreement fully and voluntarily and plead guilty, is that correct, sir?
FELIX: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And while [your attorney] didn’t say it, I think she is
implying that she can give you the advice but you are the person that end
up suffering the penalty. If you go to jail or any other penalties which
are imposed at sentencing, you are the person that is sentenced. So it is
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your decision whether or not to plead guilty. Do you understand that,
sir?
FELIX: Yes, sir.
....
THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty of your own free will because
you are guilty?
FELIX: Yes, sir.
Proceeding to the terms of Felix’s plea agreement, the magistrate judge and
Felix engaged in this discussion:
THE COURT: Paragraph one of your plea agreement talks about the
charge to which you are pleading guilty. It says the defendant agrees to
plead guilty to Count One of the indictment which count charges the
defendant with attempt to produce child pornography in violation of
Title 18, United States Code, section 2251(a). Is that the charge to
which you understand you are pleading guilty, sir?
FELIX: A moment, please.
THE COURT: Okay. For the record Mr. Felix just wanted time to
discuss something with his attorney through the use of the interpreter.
I will ask you again. The charge that I read to you which is contained
within paragraph one of your plea agreement, Mr. Felix, is that the
charge to which you are pleading guilty?
FELIX: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: Any hesitation? Why are you hesitating when I ask you
that question? It is either a yes or no?
FELIX: I just (inaudible) that I have never been in trouble before. I
have never been in a case. That’s why I’m hesitating longer.
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THE COURT: That’s fine and I have no problem. I just want to make
sure that you understand that that is the charge to which you are
pleading guilty. Any issues concerning your background or the—any
other mitigation— factors in mitigation or statements you wish to make,
you will have the right to make at sentencing. I just need to make sure
that you understand the charge to which you are pleading guilty and that
you wish to do so, Sir. Otherwise you have a right to proceed to trial.
You have that constitutional right. No one wishes to make you plead
guilty, and I am going to discuss that later during this proceeding this
morning. I just want a clear record that this is what you wish to do.
And you wish to continue to plead guilty, is that correct, sir?
FELIX: Yes, Sir.
THE COURT: And the charge to which you understand you are pleading
guilty is the charge as set forth in Count One of the plea agreement
which I read to you, is that correct, sir?
FELIX: Yes, sir.
The magistrate judge next informed Felix that Count 1 carried a mandatory
minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment and a maximum of 30 years’
imprisonment, followed by a term of supervised release ranging from 5 years to
life. Felix indicated that he understood that as a result of his conviction, he could
be required to register as a sex offender and could be subject to additional
punishment for noncompliance. Felix further indicated that he understood the trial
rights that he gave up by pleading guilty, the process by which the district court
would calculate his advisory sentencing guideline range, and the collateral
consequences of being a convicted felon.
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Turning to the factual stipulation, the magistrate judge commented that it
appeared to set forth the elements of Count 1 sufficient to sustain Felix’s plea.
The magistrate judge observed that Felix, counsel for both parties, and an
interpreter signed the stipulation. Felix then admitted that he reviewed the
stipulation with counsel, and that it set forth the facts of his case as he understood
them. The colloquy went this way:
THE COURT: Mr. Felix, this stipulated factual basis, did you have an
opportunity to completely review it with your attorney through the use
of an interpreter and discuss it with her before you signed it?
FELIX: Yes, sir.
....
THE COURT: And, Mr. Felix, on the third line I’m pointing to with my
thumb on this stipulated factual basis is that your signature, sir?
FELIX: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And this was read to you by an interpreter who signed
below your name, is that correct, sir?
FELIX: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Do you agree to this fact, that these facts set forth in this
factual basis, sir, accurately set forth the facts in your case as you
understand them to be?
FELIX: Yes, sir.
The magistrate judge then inquired if there was any reason to read the
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stipulation into the record, but counsel for both parties indicated that there was
not. Specifically, the colloquy between the magistrate judge, Felix’s counsel
(Panayotta Augustin-Birch), and counsel for the government (Carmen Lineberger)
was as follows:
THE COURT: Miss Birch and Miss Lineberger, any reason I need to
read this [the stipulation] into the record if it is going to be filed?
MS. LINEBERGER: No, your honor.
MS. AUGUSTIN-BIRCH: No.
THE COURT: Thank you both. It will be filed.1
When asked how he pled to Count 1, Felix answered, “Guilty.” The
magistrate judge found that Felix was competent to enter an informed plea, and
was aware of the nature of his charge and the consequences of pleading guilty.
The magistrate judge further found that the plea to Count 1 was supported by an
independent factual basis that established each element of Count 1. Accordingly,
the magistrate judge declared that he would recommend that the district court
accept Felix’s guilty plea.
In a report and recommendation (“R&R”) detailing Felix’s plea hearing, the
magistrate judge reiterated that a factual basis existed that established all elements
1
Felix was represented throughout the case—before the magistrate judge, the district
judge, and this Court on appeal—by the same counsel from the office of the Federal Public
Defender.
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of Count 1. The magistrate judge recommended that the district court accept
Felix’s plea because Felix had “freely and voluntarily entered” it, and notified
Felix that he had 14 days to file objections to this recommendation. Neither party
objected to the R&R, and the district court issued a paperless order adopting the
R&R and accepting Felix’s plea of guilty to Count 1.
At a sentencing hearing held on February 28, 2011, the district court
sentenced Felix to a statutory mandatory minimum term of 15 years’
imprisonment, followed by a lifetime term of supervised release.
D. Post-Judgment Motion to Withdraw Plea
On March 8, 2011, Felix filed a pro se “Notice to Change of Plea.” Without
further explanation, Felix requested that the district court change his plea because
he was ready to proceed to trial. Shortly thereafter, through counsel, Felix filed a
notice of appeal of his judgment and sentence.
Following the government’s response, the district court construed Felix’s
“Notice to Change of Plea” as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and denied it.
The district court concluded that it had no authority to grant Felix relief because
he had already been sentenced. Alternatively, the district court found that Felix’s
motion was without merit.
Later in March 2011, Felix sent the district court a pro se motion for
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substitute counsel in which he contended that his counsel “tricked” him into
accepting the guilty plea. Felix maintained that he was innocent and “always
wanted to go to trial.” Felix repeated his request for substitute counsel in two
additional pleadings, filed with the district court in April and June 2011. In the
June request, Felix alleged that his attorney induced him to plead guilty despite his
innocence, that no child pornography was found on his computer, and that the
phone number from which the text messages were sent did not belong to him.
E. Felix’s Filings on Appeal
On appeal to this Court, Felix’s counsel originally filed a brief and motion
to withdraw from representation, pursuant to the procedure outlined in Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). After we denied Felix’s counsel’s
first motion to withdraw, Felix’s counsel filed a renewed motion, again asserting
that there were no issues of arguable merit for purposes of appeal. Felix opposed
counsel’s renewed motion, arguing that he had pled guilty to the wrong charge
based on the incorrect advice of counsel, who told him that the record would be
corrected to reflect that he was actually pleading guilty to Count 3 of the
indictment. Felix further argued that “[h]ad [he] known he would plead guilty to
§ 2251(a), [he] would not have entered plea during his Rule 11 hearing.”
We denied Felix’s counsel’s renewed motion to withdraw, directing counsel
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to file a brief addressing whether the magistrate judge, during Felix’s plea
colloquy, had complied with the second core concern of Rule 11 by ensuring that
Felix understood the nature of the charge to which he pled guilty. Thereafter,
Felix’s counsel filed a brief challenging the validity of Felix’s guilty plea. The
government filed a brief in opposition, arguing first that Felix had waived any
challenge to his guilty plea by failing to object to the magistrate judge’s R&R that
found that Felix’s plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, and second, that
Felix’s guilty plea was valid. Felix’s counsel did not file a reply brief.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
At the outset, we must address what standard of review governs our
consideration of Felix’s appeal. It is undisputed that neither Felix nor his counsel
objected to the magistrate judge’s Rule 11 colloquy or to the magistrate judge’s
R&R (finding Felix’s plea to Count 1 was knowing and voluntary). Ordinarily,
when a defendant fails to object to a violation of Rule 11 in the district court, we
review such claims, raised for the first time on appeal, for plain error. United
States v. Monroe, 353 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2003).
However, the government asserts that Felix waived any right to appeal at
all, relying on Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 59
authorizes a district judge to refer to a magistrate judge “any matter that may
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dispose of a charge or defense,” and provides that failure to object “waives a
party’s right to review” as follows:
[w]ithin 14 days after being served with a copy of the recommended
disposition, or at some other time the court sets, a party may serve and
file specific written objections to the proposed findings and
recommendations. Unless the district judge directs otherwise, the
objecting party must promptly arrange for transcribing the record, or
whatever portions of it the parties agree to or the magistrate judge
considers sufficient. Failure to object in accordance with this rule
waives a party’s right to review.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(1), (2) (emphasis added).
The Advisory Committee has explained that Rule 59’s “waiver provision is
intended to establish the requirements for objecting in a district court in order to
preserve appellate review of magistrate judges’ decisions.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 59
Advisory Committee’s note (2005) (emphasis added). The Advisory Committee
has also stated that, “[d]espite the waiver provisions, the district judge retains the
authority to review any magistrate judge’s decision or recommendation whether or
not objections are timely filed.” Id. (citing Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154, 106
S. Ct. 466, 474 (1985); Matthews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71, 96 S. Ct. 549,
554-55 (1976)). The government asserts Rule 59 waives not only Felix’s right to
object before the district court but also his right to review in this Court.
Here, the magistrate judge’s R&R informed Felix that he had 14 days to file
objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation to the district court that
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Felix’s guilty plea be accepted. The R&R did not, however, advise Felix if and
how his failure to object could affect his rights before this Court. The R&R did
not advise Felix that his failure to object would result in his waiver of his right to
appellate review of his guilty plea, under even a plain error standard. In addition,
this Court has not addressed, in a published opinion, the application of Rule
59(b)(2)’s waiver provision in the context of a challenge to the knowing and
voluntary nature of a defendant’s guilty plea. We need not address this Rule 59
issue because, even if Felix did not waive his right to challenge his guilty plea on
appeal to this Court, we would review Felix’s challenge only for plain error and
Felix has not shown plain error. See Monroe, 353 F.3d at 1349. In Part III, we
explain why.
III. DISCUSSION
To establish plain error, the defendant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain,
and (3) that affects substantial rights. United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012,
1018-19 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). If all three conditions are met, we may
exercise our discretion to recognize the error if the error “seriously affects the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation
marks and alteration omitted). For error to be plain, it must be “plain under
controlling precedent or in view of the unequivocally clear words of a statute or
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rule.” United States v. Lett, 483 F.3d 782, 790 (11th Cir. 2007); see also United
States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).
Under Rule 11, a court, when conducting a plea colloquy, must “conduct an
inquiry into whether the defendant makes a knowing and voluntary guilty plea.”
United States v. Hernandez-Fraire, 208 F.3d 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2000). In
accepting a defendant’s guilty plea, the court must specifically address the three
core concerns of Rule 11 by “ensuring that a defendant (1) enters his guilty plea
free from coercion, (2) understands the nature of the charges, and (3) understands
the consequences of his plea.” Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1019. As part of the plea
colloquy, Rule 11 requires that the court “inform the defendant of, and determine
that the defendant understands . . . the nature of each charge to which the
defendant is pleading.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G). The court must also
determine whether a factual basis supports the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3); see
also United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1125 (11th Cir. 1990)
(noting the court’s “independent[]” obligation to satisfy itself that there is a factual
basis for the plea).
A district court complies with the second core concern when the record
supports its finding that the defendant understood both (1) what he was admitting,
and (2) that “what he was admitting constituted the crime charged.” United States
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v. Mosley, 173 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). “[T]here is
no one mechanical way” by which a district court must advise a defendant of the
charge to which he is pleading guilty, and Rule 11 does not require that the district
court list every element of the offense seriatim. United States v. Wiggins, 131
F.3d 1440, 1442-43 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (holding the district court did
not plainly err in failing to separately outline the elements of a bank robbery
charge when it asked the defendant if he understood the nature of the charges, the
defendant unequivocally pled guilty and admitted that he robbed banks, and the
district court “incorporated the substance of those elements in a statement later on
in the plea colloquy”). Similarly, the district court need not explicitly ask whether
a defendant understands the nature of the charges against him. See United States
v. Camacho, 233 F.3d 1308, 1315-17 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding the district court
did not plainly err in failing to ask if the defendant understood the nature of a
cocaine distribution charge when it explained the facts that the government needed
to prove, the defendant acknowledged that she reviewed both the indictment and
the plea agreement with counsel, expressed no confusion about the charge, and the
facts were sufficient to establish her guilt). Rather, we will review whether the
district court adequately addressed the second core concern on a case-by-case
basis. United States v. James, 210 F.3d 1342, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
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In the present case, after our review of the entire record, we conclude that
Felix has not carried his burden of demonstrating plain error in the magistrate
judge’s Rule 11 plea colloquy. First, at the change-of-plea hearing, the magistrate
judge established that Felix had received a copy of the indictment and had fully
discussed the charges against him and his case in general with his attorney. The
indictment, under Count 1, quoted extensively from the statutory language of 18
U.S.C. § 2251(a) and indicated that Felix had either violated the statute “or
attempted to do so.”
Second, the first paragraph of Felix’s plea agreement, signed by Felix,
explicitly stated that Felix was agreeing to plead guilty to Count 1 of the
indictment, which the agreement identified as “Attempt to Produce Child
Pornography, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2251(a).” At
Felix’s change-of-plea hearing, the magistrate judge confirmed that Felix had
reviewed the agreement with his attorney and an interpreter, and that Felix had
voluntarily signed the agreement because it was in his best interests to plead
guilty. The magistrate judge then directed Felix’s attention to the first paragraph
of the plea agreement and asked Felix whether he understood that he had agreed
“to plead guilty to Count One of the indictment[,] which count charges the
defendant with attempt to produce child pornography in violation of Title 18,
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United States Code, Section 2251(a).” Although Felix then requested a moment to
discuss something with his attorney, following these discussions, Felix twice
confirmed that he understood that he was pleading guilty to Count 1 of the
indictment.
Third, and importantly here, Felix and the government executed and filed a
factual stipulation concurrently with the filing of the plea agreement. This factual
stipulation, on the top of its first page, identified the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a),
that Felix was charged with violating, and then went on to set out the elements of
an attempt to violate that statute. The stipulation then detailed the factual basis of
Felix’s attempt to produce child pornography and specifically included two facts
that satisfied the interstate commerce element of the offense: (1) the text messages
sent by Felix to AB were relayed through servers located in California; and
(2) Felix’s and AB’s cell phones were manufactured outside of the United States.
See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (the image of child pornography may be either
“transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign
commerce” or “produced or transmitted using materials that have been mailed,
shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce”). Felix, his
interpreter, and his attorney signed this stipulation, which set forth both the
language of the § 2251(a) attempt offense and a sufficient factual basis for Felix’s
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guilty plea to that particular offense.
Notably too, at Felix’s change-of-plea hearing, the magistrate judge
confirmed that Felix had read the stipulation with the assistance of an interpreter,
and that Felix understood that the stipulation set forth the details of his offense.
The magistrate judge then asked whether the government or Felix’s counsel
desired to have the stipulation read into the record, and both attorneys expressly
declined to have the magistrate judge read the stipulation in open court. We
emphasize that, in addition to setting out the elements of a § 2251(a) attempt
offense, the stipulation followed its recitation of the elements with the actual facts
of Felix’s offense, demonstrating how the elements were satisfied in Felix’s
particular case.
On appeal, Felix cannot now identify as error the magistrate judge’s failure
to expressly delineate the elements of his offense when (1) those elements were
listed in three separate documents that Felix admitted reading (in the case of the
indictment, plea agreement, and factual stipulation), and signing (in the case of the
plea agreement and factual stipulation), all with the aid of an interpreter; and
(2) his attorney expressly declined to have the magistrate judge read those
elements into the record in open court. We therefore conclude that, on this
particular record as a whole, there is ample support for the magistrate judge’s
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finding that Felix both understood the facts to which he was admitting, and that
those facts “constituted the crime charged.” Mosley, 173 F.3d at 1324.
In light of the facts and circumstances of this case, we cannot say that the
magistrate judge plainly erred in conducting Felix’s plea colloquy.2 We thus
affirm Felix’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
2
Because Felix has not shown error that is plain, we need not address the third and fourth
prongs of plain error review.
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