Shuler v. Ingram & Associates , 441 F. App'x 712 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT           FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-14509                 SEP 29, 2011
    JOHN LEY
    Non-Argument Calendar               CLERK
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:08-cv-01238-AKK
    ROGER SHULER,
    CAROL SHULER,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    INGRAM & ASSOCIATES,
    NCO FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INC.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (September 29, 2011)
    Before MARCUS, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Roger and Carol Shuler (“the Shulers”), proceeding pro se, appeal the district
    court’s order granting the summary judgment motions of defendants Ingram &
    Associates (“Ingram”) and NCO Financial Systems, Inc. (“NCO”) on all claims raised
    in the Shulers’s complaint as amended, which alleged violations of the Fair Debt
    Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 
    15 U.S.C. § 1692
    , et seq., and various torts
    under Alabama law. On appeal, the Shulers argue that: (1) the district court
    procedurally erred by not holding a hearing before ruling on the summary judgment
    motions, granting summary judgment while discovery issues remained unresolved,
    and failing to consider evidence in the light most favorable to the Shulers; (2) the
    district court substantively erred in finding that the defendants did not violate the
    FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g, 1692d(2), 1692d(5), 1692e and e(4)-(5), and 1692f; and
    (3) the district court erred in finding that the Shulers’s Alabama tort law claims -- for
    fraud, invasion of privacy, defamation, and wanton failure to train and supervise
    employees -- failed. After thorough review, we affirm.1
    1
    As a threshold matter, we note that we are obligated to examine our own jurisdiction sua
    sponte. Finn v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 
    821 F.2d 581
    , 585 (11th Cir. 1987).
    Fed.R.App.P. 3(c)(1)(B) requires that a notice of appeal “designate the judgment, order, or part
    thereof being appealed.” Ordinarily, the failure to abide by this requirement will preclude that
    appellate court from reviewing any judgment or order not so specified. McDougald v. Jenson,
    
    786 F.2d 1465
    , 1474 (11th Cir. 1986). However, when the “overriding intent was effectively to
    appeal” the original judgment, a notice of appeal stating that it appeals from an order on a tolling
    post-judgment motion must be construed as an appeal from the original judgment and not merely
    from the denial of the post-judgment motion. Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, Inc., 
    616 F.2d 734
    ,
    738 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980) (quotation omitted). (In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1209
    2
    We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Holloman
    v. Mail-Well Corp., 
    443 F.3d 832
    , 836 (11th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is
    appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
    party, presents no genuine issue of fact and compels judgment as a matter of law. 
    Id. at 836-37
    ; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. “A party opposing a properly submitted motion for
    summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleadings, but
    must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Eberhardt
    v. Waters, 
    901 F.2d 1578
    , 1580 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotation and brackets omitted).
    Speculation or conjecture cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. Cordoba v.
    Dillard’s, Inc., 
    419 F.3d 1169
    , 1181 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, summary judgment is
    proper “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
    existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
    bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322 (1986).
    We may affirm a summary judgment “if there exists any adequate ground for doing
    (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth
    Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981)).
    Here, the Shulers’s notice of appeal indicated that they only sought review of the district
    court’s denial of their Rule 59(e) motion. Despite the Shulers’s failure to abide by Fed.R.App.P.
    3(c)(1)(B), we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s summary judgment orders because
    we construe the Shulers’s notice as an effective appeal from the summary judgment orders, given
    that the Shulers are proceeding pro se and clearly intended to appeal them. See Kicklighter, 616
    F.2d at 738 n.1.
    3
    so, regardless of whether it is the one on which the district court relied.” Fitzpatrick
    v. City of Atlanta, 
    2 F.3d 1112
    , 1117 (11th Cir. 1993). “It is [also] well settled in this
    circuit that Rule 56(c) does not require an oral hearing.” Milburn v. United States,
    
    734 F.2d 762
    , 765 (11th Cir. 1984).
    The Supreme Court has held that where a summary judgment motion was not
    filed until one year after the action commenced and where the parties had conducted
    discovery, the respondent could make “no serious claim . . . that [it] was ‘railroaded’
    by a premature motion for summary judgment.” Celotex Corp., 
    477 U.S. at 326
    .
    “Any potential problem with such premature motions can be adequately dealt with
    under Rule 56(f).” 
    Id.
     Rule 56(f) provides that “[i]f a party opposing the [summary
    judgment] motion shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present
    facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may . . . order a continuance to
    enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be
    undertaken.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f)(2).2 “The presence of [R]ule 56(f) shows that [an]
    appellant’s argument that it is per se improper to grant summary judgment without
    providing the opponent an opportunity to conduct discovery is without merit.”
    2
    Subsequent to the 2010 amendments, which became effective after the entry of
    judgment in this case, this provision is now embodied by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d) (“If a nonmovant
    shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to
    justify its opposition, the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to
    obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.”).
    4
    Reflectone, Inc. v. Farrand Optical Co., 
    862 F.2d 841
    , 844 (11th Cir. 1989). Because
    “[c]ourts cannot read minds, . . . ‘the party opposing the motion for summary
    judgment bears the burden of calling to the district court’s attention any outstanding
    discovery.’” 
    Id.
     (quotation omitted).
    First, we reject the Shulers’s argument that the district court procedurally erred
    in granting summary judgment to the defendants. For starters, because Rule 56(c)
    does not require an oral hearing, the district court did not procedurally err in failing
    to hold a hearing. Nor were the Shulers railroaded by a premature summary judgment
    motion. As the record shows, the Shulers initially filed suit in July 2008, the
    discovery period closed on October 30, 2009, and both defendants filed summary
    judgment motions by November 30, 2009. The Shulers never sought a continuance
    pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f), the absence of which renders the Shulers’s argument
    meritless. Although the Shulers footnoted in their counseled oppositions to the
    summary judgment motions that they had ongoing discovery issues with NCO and
    Ingram, these issues appeared to relate only to the alleged agency relationship
    between the defendants, a relationship the district court treated as true anyway.
    In addition, we will not consider the Shulers’s claim that the district court did
    not construe the evidence in the light most favorable to them because they failed to
    5
    specify in their brief when and how the district court failed to do so.3 In any event,
    the district court used the correct summary judgment standard, explicitly stating on
    3
    We recognize that “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
    drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.” Boxer X v. Harris, 
    437 F.3d 1107
    , 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). However, the leniency afforded pro se litigants
    does not give courts license to serve as de facto counsel or to rewrite an otherwise deficient
    pleading in order to sustain an action. GJR Inv., Inc. v. County of Escambia, Fla., 
    132 F.3d 1359
    , 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds as recognized in, Randall v. Scott, 
    610 F.3d 701
    , 709 (11th Cir. 2010). We deem abandoned issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se
    litigant. Timson v. Sampson, 
    518 F.3d 870
    , 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Further, an issue is considered
    abandoned when “a party seeking to raise a claim or issue on appeal [fails to] plainly and
    prominently so indicate.” United States v. Jernigan, 
    341 F.3d 1273
    , 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003).
    Further, “absent extraordinary circumstances, legal theories and arguments not raised
    squarely before the district court cannot be broached for the first time on appeal.” Bryant v.
    Jones, 
    575 F.3d 1281
    , 1308 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
    130 S.Ct. 1536
     (2010). We will not
    decide an issue or argument not adequately presented to the district court, which may include a
    failure to cite supporting authority. Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 
    572 F.3d 1327
    , 1352 (11th
    Cir. 2009); Access Now, Inc. v. SW Airlines Co., 
    385 F.3d 1324
    , 1331 (11th Cir. 2004). “In
    deciding issues on appeal we consider only evidence that was part of the record before the district
    court.” Selman v. Cobb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 
    449 F.3d 1320
    , 1332 (11th Cir. 2006).
    On appeal, not only have the Shulers abandoned the argument that the district court failed
    to construe the evidence in their favor, but they also have abandoned their § 1692e(4) claim
    because they failed to brief it fully; their claim that Ingram could not legally sell their house per §
    1692e(5) because they provided this Court with no supporting legal authority that a debt collector
    is prohibited from suing a debtor and selling the debtor’s house; their § 1692f claim because they
    failed to meaningfully argue it on appeal and to raise it sufficiently before the district court; their
    claim that Ingram falsely represented under Alabama law that it legally could sell their house
    because they failed to cite authority to the district court or this Court showing that Ingram could
    not pursue collection remedies against their house; their claim that Ingram invaded their privacy
    when it improperly contacted Mrs. Shuler, a non-party to the debt, improperly gathered
    information, and made an unlawful threat because they raised these arguments for the first time
    on appeal; and their defamation claim because they failed to meaningfully argue it on appeal and
    to raise it sufficiently before the district court. (And in any event, the Shulers’s defamation claim
    is meritless since they admitted below that neither defendant reported their debt to a credit
    bureau.) Moreover, because the Shulers did not brief an argument on the district court’s denial
    of their Rule 59(e) motion, they have abandoned this issue.
    6
    two occasions in each opinion that it construed the evidence of record in the light
    most favorable to the non-moving party -- the Shulers.
    Next, we are unpersuaded by the Shulers’s argument that the district court
    substantively erred in finding that the defendants did not violate various sections of
    the FDCPA, including 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692g, 1692d(2), 1692d(5), and 1692e(5).
    Under § 1692g, a debt collector must communicate to the debtor, either in the initial
    communication or within five days after the initial communication, information that
    includes the following: (1) the amount of the debt; (2) the name of the creditor to
    whom the debt is owed; and (3) statements regarding the consumer’s right to dispute
    the debt, obtain verification of the debt, or obtain the name and address of the original
    creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).
    Here, the district court correctly found that Ingram complied with § 1692g(a).
    The record shows that, on July 9, 2007, the same day that Ingram first attempted
    telephone contact with Mr. Shuler, Ingram mailed him a document entitled
    “Instructions for Making Payment or Disputing the Debt,” which fully complied with
    § 1692g(a). Notably, Mr. Shuler responded to this very document in order to dispute
    the debt. Moreover, the Shulers judicially admitted these facts because their
    opposition to Ingram’s summary judgment motion did not controvert Ingram’s twelfth
    7
    undisputed fact -- that Ingram mailed Mr. Shuler an initial demand letter containing
    the requisite information on July 9, 2007.4
    Under § 1692d(2), a debt collector is prohibited from “engag[ing] in any
    conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person
    in connection with the collection of a debt,” including “[t]he use of obscene or
    profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the
    hearer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(2). This subsection “was meant to deter offensive
    language which is at least akin to profanity or obscenity . . . [and that] might
    encompass name-calling, racial or ethnic slurs, and other derogatory remarks which
    are similar in their offensiveness to obscene or profane remarks.” Jeter v. Credit
    Bureau, Inc., 
    760 F.2d 1168
    , 1178 (11th Cir. 1985). Claims under § 1692d “should
    be viewed from the perspective of a consumer whose circumstances makes him
    relatively more susceptible to harassment, oppression, or abuse.” Id. at 1179. A debt
    collector’s simple warning that a lawsuit may cause a consumer “‘embarrassment,
    inconvenience, and further expense’ is a true statement . . . [and] does not create a
    tone of intimidation.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Such consequences of a debt
    4
    Further, we will not review Mrs. Shuler’s deposition because the Shulers never
    submitted it to the district court. Indeed, the Shulers even stated that they did not submit the
    deposition because it was unnecessary to create genuine issues of material fact. Also, because
    the Shulers failed to file the deposition simultaneously with their oppositions to summary
    judgment, they waived their rights per the Uniform Initial Order entered by the district court on
    August 26, 2009.
    8
    collection [] lawsuit are so commonplace that even a consumer susceptible to
    harassment, oppression, or abuse would not have been harassed, oppressed, or abused
    by the statement in and of itself.” Id. (emphasis in original).
    As applied here, Ingram did not engage in abusive conduct or use abusive
    language. The transcripts of these calls show that Ingram’s employees merely
    explained to Mr. Shuler the potential consequences that he faced if he failed to pay
    his debt and Ingram filed suit against him and obtained a favorable judgment --
    namely, placing a lien on his property, selling the deed to his house, and garnishing
    up to 25% of his disposable income. Ingram’s statements therefore involved
    “commonplace” consequences of a debt collection lawsuit, and the Shulers have not
    established otherwise. Moreover, even crediting the Shulers’s allegations that
    Ingram’s employees were “testy,” “abusive,” and “smart-alecky,” the employees’
    conduct resulted from Mr. Shuler’s persistent claims that they had to help him take
    on lawyers and judges in an unrelated matter. In fact, only Mr. Shuler used obscene
    language.
    Under § 1692d(5), a debt collector is prohibited from “[c]ausing a telephone
    to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously
    with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.” 15 U.S.C. §
    1692d(5). However, Ingram’s five telephone calls to the Shulers, including one
    9
    successful contact with Mr. Shuler that lasted for less than five minutes and two
    voicemail messages, do not amount to repeated or continuous attempts to annoy,
    abuse, or harass the Shulers. Moreover, Ingram did not violate § 1692d(5) by calling
    Mr. Shuler after Mr. Shuler had told Ingram not to do so. As the record shows, Mr.
    Shuler effectively nullified this prior instruction when he subsequently called Ingram
    to speak about the debt, thereby giving Ingram a reasonable basis to call him again.
    Under § 1692e, a debt collector is prohibited from using “any false, deceptive,
    or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”
    15 U.S.C. § 1692e. We apply the “least-sophisticated consumer” standard to evaluate
    whether a debt collector’s communication violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. See LeBlanc
    v. Unifund CCR Partners, 
    601 F.3d 1185
    , 1193 (11th Cir. 2010).
    It is also worth noting that “a party is bound by the admissions in his
    pleadings.” Best Canvas Prods. & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 
    713 F.2d 618
    , 621 (11th Cir. 1983). “[J]udicial admissions are proof possessing the highest
    possible probative value . . . [and] are facts established not only beyond the need of
    evidence to prove them, but beyond the power of evidence to controvert them.” Hill
    v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
    124 F.2d 104
    , 106 (5th Cir. 1941). A party cannot avoid the
    consequences of the acts or omissions of his voluntarily selected “lawyer-agent.”
    Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 
    370 U.S. 626
    , 633-34 (1962).
    10
    Here, the Shulers’s false representation claim is without merit. The district
    court properly granted summary judgment in Ingram’s favor because the Shulers
    admitted that facts 1 through 13 in Ingram’s summary judgment motion were
    undisputed. Thus, the Shulers judicially admitted the facts that Mr. Shuler had a debt
    with American Express, that American Express placed the debt with NCO for
    collection, that NCO referred the past due debt to Ingram, a debt collector, and that
    American Express retained Ingram as legal counsel. In addition, the Shulers’s related
    argument -- that they should not be held responsible for their former attorneys’
    admissions in their opposition brief -- is without merit because a litigant is generally
    bound by all acts and omissions of his attorney. See 
    id.
    Section 1692e also prohibits a debt collector from making a “threat to take any
    action . . . that is not intended to be taken.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). A claim raised
    under § 1692e(5) “requires proof of a fact which amounts to a per se violation [and
    the] sophistication, or lack thereof, of the consumer is irrelevant to whether [the debt
    collector] threatened to take any action that was not intended to be taken.” Jeter, 
    760 F.2d at 1175
     (quotation, brackets and ellipses omitted).
    In Jeter, we considered whether a debt collector falsely threatened to take legal
    action in the immediate or near future. 
    Id.
     We determined that a jury could
    reasonably find that a debt collector’s letters to a debtor that referenced a five-day
    11
    period preceding the recommendation of a lawsuit against the debtor were indicative
    of a threat to recommend legal action immediately upon the expiration of the five-day
    period or shortly thereafter if the alleged debt was not paid. 
    Id. at 1176
    . Jeter also
    concluded that a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the debt collector ever
    intended to recommend legal action against the debtor. 
    Id. at 1177
    . We reasoned, in
    part, that the debt collector’s “conclusory affidavit” that it indeed intended to take
    legal action was not dispositive, especially in light of the small percentage of its debt
    collection efforts that had resulted in suit. 
    Id.
    “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
    allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
    misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. __, 
    129 S.Ct. 1937
    , 1949 (2009).
    The complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, but must set forth “more
    than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
    action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555 (2007).
    The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants
    with respect to § 1692e(5). Even though Ingram never filed suit against Mr. Shuler,
    § 1692e contains no provision that filing a lawsuit is the only way for a debt collector
    to establish that it actually had intended to file a lawsuit. Moreover, not only was
    there a reasonable likelihood that Ingram, a lawyer and debt collector, would indeed
    12
    sue the Shulers, but the Shulers have not presented evidence to show that Ingram
    secretly never intended to sue or has only sued on rare occasions. Thus, the Shulers’
    speculation as to Ingram’s underlying intentions was insufficient to raise a genuine
    issue of material fact.
    We also reject the Shulers’s argument that the district court erred in finding
    that the Shulers’s Alabama tort law claims -- for fraud, invasion of privacy, and
    wanton failure to train and supervise employees -- failed. To establish a false
    misrepresentation (or fraud) claim under 
    Ala. Code § 6-5-101
    , the plaintiff must show
    “(1) a false representation (2) concerning a material existing fact (3) relied upon by
    the plaintiff (4) who must be damaged as a proximate result.” Cherokee Farms, Inc.
    v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 
    526 So. 2d 871
    , 875 (Ala. 1988) (quotation omitted). In
    Bosarge Offshore, LLC v. Compass Bank, 
    943 So. 2d 782
    , 786-88 (Ala. 2006), the
    Alabama Supreme Court concluded that the customer did not detrimentally rely on
    the bank’s allegedly fraudulent letter of credit issued to the customer for the
    customer’s new business, because the customer had already entered into a new
    business arrangement before the bank issued the letter and presented no evidence of
    harm stemming from reliance on a misrepresentation. 943 So.2d at 786-88.
    Here, the Shulers’s fraud claim -- based on Ingram’s statement that it was hired
    by American Express -- fails in light of their admission on summary judgment that
    13
    American Express retained Ingram as legal counsel, so the Shulers have conceded this
    fact and are bound. Moreover, mere consultation with a bankruptcy lawyer -- whom
    the Shulers did not retain -- does not amount to detrimental reliance on a creditor’s
    claims. Further, the Shulers presented no specific facts concerning any anguish or
    distress that would raise a genuine issue for trial. In fact, Mr. Shuler testified that he
    was already taking medication for depression and anxiety prior to Ingram’s debt
    collection efforts, and that his doctor did not increase his dosage on account of the
    debt issue.
    As for the invasion of privacy claim, the Alabama Supreme Court has
    “recognized the right of a creditor to take reasonable action to pursue a debtor and
    collect a debt.” Jacksonville State Bank v. Barnwell, 
    481 So.2d 863
    , 865 (Ala. 1985).
    However, when a creditor’s actions “exceed the bounds of reasonableness,” the
    debtor may bring a claim for invasion of privacy. 
    Id. at 865-66
     (finding, in part, that
    28 to 35 phone calls to one’s home and place of employment fall within the realm of
    a “systematic campaign of harassment”). In the debtor-creditor context, invasion of
    privacy has been characterized as “the wrongful intrusion into one’s private activities
    in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a
    person of ordinary sensibilities.” 
    Id. at 865
     (quotation omitted).
    14
    In this case, the district court properly found that Ingram did not invade the
    Shulers’s privacy because Ingram had the right to make reasonable efforts to collect
    the debt and the single telephone conversation with Mrs. Shuler about payment
    arrangements and the legal consequences of not paying the debt did not exceed the
    bounds of reasonableness. Although Mrs. Shuler became hysterical during the call,
    the Shulers offered no specific facts showing that Ingram was attempting by
    harassment to coerce her into payment arrangements or to frighten her with the
    prospect of selling the Shulers’s house. Thus, the Shulers failed to show how this
    conversation wrongfully would cause mental suffering or humiliation to a person of
    ordinary sensibilities.
    Finally, a party alleging wanton defects in training and supervision must prove
    the underlying wrongful conduct of employees. See Voyager Ins. Cos. v. Whitson,
    
    867 So.2d 1065
    , 1073 (Ala. 2003); Thrasher v. Ivan Leonard Chevrolet, Inc., 
    195 F.Supp.2d 1314
    , 1320 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (“[T]he plaintiff must establish that the
    allegedly incompetent employee committed a common-law, Alabama tort.”).
    Alabama law defines “wantonness” as “[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless
    or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” 
    Ala. Code § 6-11-20
    (b)(3).
    “‘Wanton supervision’ requires that the employer wantonly disregard its agent’s
    15
    incompetence.” Armstrong Bus. Servs., Inc. v. AmSouth Bank, 
    817 So. 2d 665
    , 682
    (Ala. 2001).
    Here, the Shulers’s wanton and reckless supervision and training claim fails as
    a matter of law because they have failed to establish that Ingram’s employees
    committed any tort under Alabama law -- including fraud, invasion of privacy, or
    defamation -- as discussed above. Likewise, their argument that the district court
    deprived them from making the claim by foreclosing discovery is without merit,
    since, as we found above, the Shulers never sought a continuance to pursue discovery.
    AFFIRMED.
    16
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-14509

Citation Numbers: 441 F. App'x 712

Filed Date: 9/29/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (30)

Armstrong Business Services, Inc. v. AmSouth Bank , 817 So. 2d 665 ( 2001 )

Cherokee Farms, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. , 526 So. 2d 871 ( 1988 )

VOYAGER INSURANCE COMPANIES v. Whitson , 867 So. 2d 1065 ( 2003 )

Bosarge Offshore, LLC v. Compass Bank , 943 So. 2d 782 ( 2006 )

Jacksonville State Bank v. Barnwell , 481 So. 2d 863 ( 1985 )

Thrasher v. Ivan Leonard Chevrolet, Inc. , 195 F. Supp. 2d 1314 ( 2002 )

Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co. , 385 F.3d 1324 ( 2004 )

Reflectone, Inc. v. Farrand Optical Company, Inc., Farrand ... , 862 F.2d 841 ( 1989 )

Gary McDougald Cross-Appellant v. Vivian L. Jenson, Cross-... , 786 F.2d 1465 ( 1986 )

Diane Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc. , 760 F.2d 1168 ( 1985 )

Bryant v. CEO DeKalb Co. , 575 F.3d 1281 ( 2009 )

Blue Sky L. Rep. P 73,254, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 95,264 T.J. ... , 901 F.2d 1578 ( 1990 )

Jeffrey Michael Selman v. Cobb Co. School District , 449 F.3d 1320 ( 2006 )

best-canvas-products-supplies-inc-dba-best-canvas-products-co-v , 713 F.2d 618 ( 1983 )

j-richard-finn-and-regina-r-finn , 821 F.2d 581 ( 1987 )

Randall v. Scott , 610 F.3d 701 ( 2010 )

Smith v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections , 572 F.3d 1327 ( 2009 )

GJR Investments v. Cty. of Escambia , 132 F.3d 1359 ( 1998 )

LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners , 601 F.3d 1185 ( 2010 )

Timson v. Sampson , 518 F.3d 870 ( 2008 )

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