FDIC v. Coleman Drive Assoc., LLC , 395 F. App'x 602 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________ SEPTEMBER 3, 2010
JOHN LEY
No. 10-11107 CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-03076-WSD
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION, As Receiver Of Integrity Bank,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
COLEMAN DRIVE ASSOCIATES, LLC,
and PATRICK LEONARD,
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________
(September 3, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and HILL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Coleman Drive Associates, LLC, and Patrick Leonard appeal the denial of
their motion for recusal of the district judge in this case, and the district court’s
Confirmation Order that found that the property sold at foreclosure, which was the
purpose of this lawsuit, brought its true market value. We find no merit in these
issues.
1. The Denial of the Motion to Recuse
Appellants contend that the district judge exhibited an extra-judicial,
personal bias against them, citing several statements made by the district judge
that allegedly demonstrate this bias. A party moving for recusal bears the burden
of showing facts that, if true, would convince a reasonable man that such a
personal bias exists. Phillips v. Joint Legis. Comm. On Performance and
Expenditure Review of State of Miss., 637 F.2d 1014, 1019 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb.
1981). Where movant makes such a showing, it is legally sufficient and recusal is
mandated. Id.The district court denied appellants’ motion for recusal, holding that
appellants’ affidavit was not legally sufficient because the comments complained
of do not demonstrate a personal bias stemming from extra-judicial sources. At
most, the statements indicate a general familiarity with the subject matter of the
2
lawsuit – foreclosure and real estate markets – and, when looked at in context,
reveal that they were made in the course of efforts to determine the scope of
discovery, the issues to be heard at trial, and the case time line.1 A reasonable man
would not conclude from these comments that the court was biased against the
appellants. Accordingly, as a matter of law, the comments are legally insufficient
to trigger the district court’s duty to recuse.
2. The Valuation of the Property
Under Georgia foreclosure law, “the judge is given wide discretion in
deciding whether to confirm or deny confirmation . . . and his findings will not be
disturbed on appeal if there is any evidence to support it.” Weems v. McCloud,
619 F.2d 1081, 1086 (5th Cir. 1980). In reviewing the district court’s
confirmation, its findings of fact are reviewed only for clear error. Proudfoot
Consulting Co. v. Gordon, 576 F.3d 1222, 1230 (11th Cir. 2009). In this case, the
district court’s finding that the property sold at foreclosure brought its true market
value on the date of that sale was supported by the testimony of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation’s appraiser. The district court found that the
appraiser used reasonable methods in his appraisal and that these methods
1
For example, the complained of comment by the district court that “I understand
comparables, and I understand this market . . . ” was made in the context of how much
foundational testimony would be necessary at the bench trial. See V-2, Transcripts, p. 103.
3
supported his valuation of the property. This was substantial evidence to support
the district court’s findings as to the valuation of the foreclosed property.
Furthermore, the court’s decision to credit this testimony as to the value of the
property over that of appellants’ appraiser was well within the district court’s
discretion.
Finding no reversible error, the district court’s denial of the recusal motion
and its finding regarding the valuation of the property, which supported the
Confirmation Order, are
AFFIRMED.
4