Divine Motel Group, LLC v. Rockhill Insurance Company , 655 F. App'x 779 ( 2016 )


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  •             Case: 15-13020   Date Filed: 07/19/2016   Page: 1 of 13
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-13020
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:14-cv-00031-MMH-JRK
    DIVINE MOTEL GROUP, LLC,
    d.b.a. Royal Inn,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ROCKHILL INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (July 19, 2016)
    Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Divine Motel Group, LLC (“Divine”) appeals the district court’s grant of
    Rockhill Insurance Company’s (“Rockhill”) motion for summary judgment on
    Divine’s complaint raising one count of breach of contract. On appeal, Divine
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    argues that the district court (1) misinterpreted its insurance contract, and (2) erred
    by discounting its proffered evidence. After careful review, we affirm.
    A.
    The relevant factual background is this.             On June 20, 2012, Divine
    purchased the Royal Inn, a two-building property in Live Oak, Florida. The
    property had previously been run as a motel, until the previous owner defaulted on
    its mortgage and then ceased operations in November 2011. Rockhill issued an
    insurance policy to Divine, insuring the Royal Inn against the risk of physical loss
    for the period from June 20, 2012, through June 20, 2013. The policy contained a
    coverage exclusion for rain damage to the building interiors (“the interior-rain-
    damage exclusion”), which said: “[Rockhill] will not pay for loss of or damage to
    . . . [t]he interior of any building or structure, or to personal property in the
    building or structure, caused by or resulting from rain, . . . whether driven by wind
    or not.”   The policy contained an exception to this exclusion, providing that
    Rockhill would pay for damage to the interiors caused by rain if “[t]he building or
    structure first sustains damage by a Covered Cause of Loss to its roof or walls
    through which the rain . . . enters.” The policy listed “windstorm” as a covered
    cause of loss.
    On June 25, 2012, Tropical Storm Debby struck the Live Oak area. During
    the storm, a significant amount of rainwater entered the Royal Inn buildings,
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    causing damage to the carpeting, drywall, and furnishings. Divine filed a claim
    under the insurance policy, which Rockhill denied based on the interior-rain-
    damage exclusion. Divine then sued Rockhill for breach of contract in state court,
    and Rockhill removed the case to federal district court. In district court, Divine
    argued that the exception to the interior-rain-damage exclusion applied because
    rainwater from Tropical Storm Debby entered the Royal Inn through portions of
    the roofs and walls that had been damaged by the storm. Rockhill moved for
    summary judgment, which the district court granted, concluding that Divine failed
    to proffer sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the exception
    applied. Divine filed this timely appeal.
    B.
    We review a district court order granting summary judgment de novo,
    applying the same legal standard as the district court. Nat’l Parks Conservation
    Ass’n v. Norton, 
    324 F.3d 1229
    , 1236 (11th Cir. 2003). We also review de novo
    legal questions, including a district court’s interpretation of an insurance contract.
    Stephens v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 
    749 F.3d 1318
    , 1321 (11th Cir. 2014).
    At the summary-judgment stage, we view the material presented and draw
    all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Animal
    Legal Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
    789 F.3d 1206
    , 1213-14 (11th Cir. 2015).
    Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant demonstrates that “there is no
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    genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The substantive law applicable to the case
    determines which facts are material. United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop.,
    
    941 F.2d 1428
    , 1437 (11th Cir. 1991).
    If the burden of proof is on the nonmovant, the movant must either:
    (1) demonstrate that the nonmovant has failed to proffer sufficient evidence to
    support an essential element of its case; or (2) proffer affirmative evidence
    demonstrating that the nonmovant will be unable to prove an essential element at
    trial. 
    Id. at 1437-38
    . If the movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine factual
    dispute by either method, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant, which must
    show that a genuine issue remains for trial. 
    Id. at 1438
    . To discharge this burden,
    the nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical
    doubt as to the material facts.”       Scott v. Harris, 
    550 U.S. 372
    , 380 (2007)
    (quotation omitted). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
    trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial” and
    the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. 
    Id.
     (quotations omitted). “An
    issue is not ‘genuine’ if it is unsupported by the evidence or is created by evidence
    that is ‘merely colorable’ or ‘not significantly probative.’” Baloco v. Drummond
    Co., Inc., 
    767 F.3d 1229
    , 1246 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation omitted), cert. denied,
    
    136 S. Ct. 410
     (2015). In other words, “[a] mere scintilla of evidence in support of
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    the nonmoving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary
    judgment; there must be evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the
    [nonmoving] party.” 
    Id.
    C.
    This diversity case arises in Florida, and it is undisputed that the substantive
    law of Florida applies. Under Florida law, courts must construe insurance policies
    according to their plain meaning and resolve ambiguities in favor of the insured.
    Intervest Constr. of Jax, Inc. v. Gen. Fid. Ins. Co., 
    133 So. 3d 494
    , 497 (Fla. 2014).
    However, the insured has the burden to prove its claim is covered under the policy.
    E. Fla. Hauling, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 
    913 So. 2d 673
    , 678 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
    App. 2005). Where, as here, the policy is an “all-risk” policy, “recovery . . . will as
    a rule be allowed for all fortuitous losses not resulting from misconduct or fraud
    unless the policy contains a specific provision expressly excluding the loss from
    coverage.” Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Branch, 
    234 So. 2d 396
    , 398 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
    App. 1970). Once the insured establishes “a loss apparently within the terms of the
    policy,” the burden shifts to the insurer to prove an exclusion applies. 
    Id.
     If an
    exception to the exclusion exists, the burden shifts back to the insured to prove the
    exception applies.    E. Fla. Hauling, 
    913 So. 2d at 678
    ; see LaFarge Corp. v.
    Travelers Indem. Co., 
    118 F.3d 1511
    , 1516 (11th Cir. 1997).
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    The operative issue in this case is whether Divine satisfied its burden -- at
    the summary-judgment stage -- to prove that the exception to the interior-rain-
    damage exclusion applied, by showing that Tropical Storm Debby damaged parts
    of the Royal Inn’s roofs or walls through which rainwater entered.
    D.
    Divine first argues that the district court erred by relying on Florida
    Windstorm Underwriting v. Gajwani, 
    934 So. 2d 501
     (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005),
    and requiring it to prove that wind from Tropical Storm Debby created an
    “opening” in the Royal Inn’s roofs or walls through which rainwater entered.
    Divine contends that, unlike in the policy at issue in Gajwani,1 the exception in its
    insurance policy requires only “damage” to the roof or walls through which rain
    enters, not an “opening.”           Divine maintains that the deposition testimony of
    structural engineer Michael Linehan, who performed a cause-and-origin analysis of
    the rain damage for Rockhill, demonstrated that rainwater entered the Royal Inn
    through damage to the walls.
    1
    The policy in Gajwani stated:
    We will not pay for loss or damage to the interior of any building or structure, or
    the property inside the building or structure, caused by rain . . . whether driven by
    windstorm or not, unless the direct force of Hurricane, other Wind, or Hail
    damages the building or structure causing an opening in the roof or wall and the
    rain . . . enters through this opening.
    
    934 So. 2d at 505-06
    .
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    Linehan performed a visual assessment of the property on July 12, 2012 --
    about two weeks after the storm -- and he issued his cause-and-origin report about
    a month and a half later, on August 28, 2012. In his report, Linehan identified the
    two buildings making up the Royal Inn as Building A and Building B.               He
    concluded that rainwater from Tropical Storm Debby entered both buildings
    through gaps under the exterior entry doors and sliding glass doors of the
    individual room units. He opined that rainwater also entered Building B via
    “[l]eaks through the exterior two-story south concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall as
    a result of a temporary overwhelming and saturation of the referenced CMU wall
    components in response to wind-driven rain with Tropical Storm Debby.” Linehan
    explained that concrete block walls like Building B’s south CMU wall:
    [are made of] cementitious material, so they . . . absorb moisture. It’s
    considered a mass wall type system. So even if it’s covered with
    cladding, like stucco, which is also cementitious, it is very normal for
    water to be absorbed and then dry out over time.
    That does not typically create a problem to the interior finishes
    because the mass of the wall is so great that water will typically not
    penetrate through the depth of the cladding and the complete width of
    the wall to negatively affect the interior finishes.
    In this case, Tropical Storm Debby was a severe rain event and there
    [were] also other issues independent of simply having a mass wall.
    There are cracks in the wall. There were other factors where water
    could have entered because of the cracks or deficient waterproofing.
    But, in general, it was such a severe rain event that I do believe it was
    possible water could have seeped all the way through the block wall
    without these other issues.
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    Divine focuses on Linehan’s statement that heavy rains from Tropical Storm
    Debby caused temporary saturation of Building B’s south CMU wall. It contends
    that the saturation constituted “damage” through which the rainwater entered.
    However, Divine has not pointed to any evidence that the CMU wall was, in fact,
    damaged during the storm. Linehan testified that it is normal for concrete block
    walls to absorb water and that Building B’s south CMU wall “temporarily” became
    saturated during the storm so that rainwater likely seeped through it into the
    interior of the building. Linehan’s testimony indicates that the wall functioned as
    it was designed to function and, because of the quantity of rain that fell during
    Tropical Storm Debby, some rainwater penetrated into the interior of Building B.
    Divine has not pointed to any evidence indicating the wall was not able to “dry out
    over time” -- as Linehan testified these walls are designed to do -- or that Tropical
    Storm Debby otherwise caused damage to the wall through which the rainwater
    entered. Accordingly, the district court did not err in rejecting Divine’s argument
    that saturation of Building B’s south CMU wall constituted “damage by a Covered
    Cause of Loss to [Royal Inn’s] roof or walls through which the rain . . . enter[ed].”
    E.
    Divine next argues that, even if an opening is required for the exception to
    apply, it proffered sufficient evidence to show that winds from Tropical Storm
    Debby created openings in the Royal Inn’s roofs through which rainwater entered.
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    Divine relies on the deposition testimony of: (1) Rockhill’s insurance adjuster,
    Brian O’Connor; (2) Linehan; and (3) Thomas Miller, an engineer Divine retained
    to perform a “water intrusion assessment.”
    O’Connor inspected the Royal Inn about a week after Tropical Storm Debby
    hit. During his inspection, O’Connor observed “three areas of the roof which were
    pulled up from the membrane.” The areas consisted of “three strips measuring
    approximately six inches in width and varied in length from 5 feet to 8 feet.”
    O’Connor could not tell if the strips had been damaged by wind from Tropical
    Storm Debby, nor could he tell if rainwater had entered through the strips.
    Consequently, Rockhill retained Linehan to conduct a cause-and-origin analysis.
    Linehan concluded that rainwater did not enter Building B through the roof
    during Tropical Storm Debby.         However, on Building A, Linehan observed
    “deteriorated sealants” and “unadhered, overlapped cap sheet of the modified
    bitumen roofing membrane” which, he concluded, allowed rain to enter during the
    storm. Linehan opined, however, that these openings existed prior to Tropical
    Storm Debby, and had not been created or even exacerbated by winds from the
    storm.     He based this conclusion on the weathering patterns surrounding the
    openings and the “distinct lack of wind-related damage” to the roof as a whole,
    such as heavier patterns of damage to the edges of the roof, torn or missing
    portions of cap sheet, and missing or torn away gutters and downspouts.
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    During his deposition, Rockhill’s counsel questioned Linehan about an
    appraisal of the Royal Inn, done in April 2012 -- nearly three months before
    Tropical Storm Debby hit the Live Oak area. The appraisal report concluded that:
    [T]he subject motel facility is in poor condition and several items of
    deferred maintenance and damage to the buildings were noted . . . .
    The exterior of the building requires painting and based on interior
    signs of roof leakage, the roofs either need to be repaired or replaced.
    Damage to the interior rooms of the facility noted included several
    holes in the drywall walls, damaged ceramic tile in the guest rooms,
    missing or damaged acoustical ceiling tiles, water damaged drywall
    ceilings, soiled carpets, and mildewed and damaged furniture.
    Linehan testified that he had not been aware of the appraisal report at the time he
    conducted his cause-and-origin analysis, but the report supported his conclusions.
    In particular, the fact that the furniture was mildewed “strongly suggest[ed] a
    moisture problem,” which was “consistent with [the] preexisting roof leaks . . .
    documented in [his] report.”
    Thomas Miller conducted his water intrusion assessment in March 2014,
    almost two years after Tropical Storm Debby.         Based on his inspection and
    conversations with the property owner, Miller documented significant water
    damage to the interior of the Royal Inn, including the carpeting, ceiling, and
    drywall. He concluded, “within a reasonable professional probability,” that water
    intrusion from Tropical Storm Debby was the cause of the damage. Miller testified
    that Divine did not ask him to determine whether Tropical Storm Debby had
    caused any wind damage to the roofs or walls of the Royal Inn buildings, and his
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    assessment report did not address that issue.     However, Miller was aware of
    Linehan’s August 28, 2012 report, which concluded that the buildings had not
    sustained any wind damage during the storm. Miller disagreed with Linehan’s
    conclusion. He identified a photograph in Linehan’s report, which he included in
    his own assessment report, depicting a breach in the roof about one square foot in
    size. Miller believed the breach could have been caused by winds from Tropical
    Storm Debby. He clarified, however, that he had not been asked to assess whether
    the buildings had sustained any wind damage, and he was “not saying that [the
    photo depicted] wind damage.” He was “just saying [he couldn’t] rule it out.”
    Divine maintains that the testimony of O’Connor, Linehan, and Miller
    created a genuine factual dispute about whether Tropical Storm Debby created
    openings in the Royal Inn’s roofs through which rainwater entered. The district
    court rejected this argument. It concluded that Miller’s statement that he could not
    rule out wind as a cause of the roof damage Linehan documented amounted to a
    mere scintilla of evidence, from which a reasonable jury could not conclude that
    Tropical Storm Debby, in fact, caused roof damage to the Royal Inn through which
    rainwater entered. The district court noted that Miller’s statement concerning the
    cause of the roof damage was outside the scope of his investigation. The court also
    noted that Miller did not opine that wind had actually caused roof damage and he
    provided no analysis that contradicted Linehan’s reasoning.
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    Divine argues that the district court erred in finding that its proffered
    evidence on the cause of the roof damage amounted to a mere scintilla that was
    insufficient to survive summary judgment.        We disagree.     While O’Connor,
    Linehan, and Miller all investigated the damage inflicted on the Royal Inn by
    Tropical Storm Debby, none of them came to the conclusion that the property
    sustained roof damage during the storm through which rainwater entered.
    O’Connor testified only that he observed three areas of the roof that could have
    been damaged by winds from Tropical Storm Debby, but he was unsure whether
    the damage pre-existed the storm. Linehan testified that winds from Tropical
    Storm Debby had not caused any roof damage at the Royal Inn and that the roof
    damage he observed pre-existed the storm.        Miller, whom Divine retained to
    investigate water intrusion at the Royal Inn, did not form an opinion as to whether
    Tropical Storm Debby caused roof damage. He merely identified a photograph in
    Linehan’s report depicting roof damage and stated -- without any supporting
    analysis -- that he could not rule out wind as a cause of the damage.
    On this record -- which includes the pre-storm appraisal report noting the
    need for roof repairs and the presence of mildew on the Royal Inn’s furniture -- we
    conclude that Miller’s testimony failed to “do more than simply show that there is
    some metaphysical [possibility]” that Tropical Storm Debby damaged the Royal
    Inn’s roofs. Scott, 
    550 U.S. at 380
    . Miller’s testimony that he could not rule out
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    wind from Tropical Storm Debby as a cause of the roof damage depicted in one of
    Linehan’s photos constituted “merely colorable” evidence that Tropical Storm
    Debby created openings in the Royal Inn’s roofs through which rainwater entered.
    See Baloco, 767 F.3d at 1246. Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded
    that Miller’s testimony amounted to a mere “scintilla” of evidence, which was
    insufficient to survive Rockhill’s motion for summary judgment. See id.
    Divine also argues that the district court erroneously resolved a credibility
    dispute between Linehan and Miller in favor of Rockhill. Again, we disagree. It’s
    true that Miller’s statement that he could not rule out wind from Tropical Storm
    Debby as a cause of damage to the Royal Inn’s roofs was at odds with Linehan’s
    expert opinion that the Royal Inn did not sustain any roof damage during the storm.
    However, as discussed above, Miller did not offer an opinion as to the cause of the
    roof damage and he did not testify that the damage was caused by the storm. The
    district court did not discredit Miller’s testimony. Instead, the court found that the
    testimony was insufficient to prove that winds from Tropical Storm Debby did, in
    fact, cause roof damage through which rainwater entered. And as we’ve already
    concluded, the district court did not err in determining that Miller’s testimony was
    insufficient to discharge Divine’s burden at summary judgment to create a genuine
    factual dispute on this issue.
    AFFIRMED.
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