United States v. Dante Brown , 386 F. App'x 892 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 12, 2010
No. 09-14187 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 93-06179-CR-UU
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DANTE BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 12, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dante Brown, a federal prisoner convicted of a crack cocaine offense,
appeals the denial of his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion for a reduced sentence
based on Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines.1 No reversible error has
been shown; we affirm.
A district court may modify a term of imprisonment in the case of a
defendant who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing
range that later has been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2). But a reduction of a term of imprisonment is unauthorized under
section 3582(c)(2) if the retroactive amendment “does not have the effect of
lowering the defendant’s applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B).
Amendment 706 retroactively reduced by two the base offense levels in
crack cocaine sentences calculated pursuant to the drug quantity table, U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1(c). U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. 1 May 2008). The highest base
offense level of 38 now applies to a defendant responsible for at least 4.5
kilograms of crack cocaine; earlier, a base offense level of 38 applied to 1.5
kilograms or more of crack cocaine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(1); United States v.
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We review for an abuse of discretion a district court’s decision not to grant a sentence
reduction under section 3582(c)(2). United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir.
2005). And we review de novo the court’s legal conclusions about the scope of its authority in a
section 3582(c)(2) proceeding. United States v. James, 548 F.3d 983, 984 (11th Cir. 2008).
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Jones, 548 F.3d 1366, 1369 (11th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1657 (2009)
(explaining that “the guidelines now provide a base offense level of 36 for
defendants who are responsible for at least 1.5 kilograms but less than 4.5
kilograms of crack cocaine”).
At his original sentencing, Brown received a base offense level of 38 and,
with an upward adjustment for his role in the offense, had a total offense level of
41. Brown’s criminal history category was VI, and his guidelines range was 360
months to life imprisonment. The court sentenced Brown to 360 months. The
district court denied Brown’s section 3582(c)(2) motion, concluding that his base
offense level of 38 remained unchanged after Amendment 706 because his offense
involved over 75 kilograms of crack cocaine.
On appeal, Brown argues that the district court erred in concluding that he
was responsible for 75 kilograms of crack cocaine. At his original sentencing, the
court determined only that he was responsible for at least the 1.5 kilograms of
crack cocaine necessary to qualify him for a base offense level of 38. The
government concedes that the district court erred in its recent drug-quantity
determination.
Even assuming that the district court relied on an incorrect factual finding,
its ultimate conclusion -- that Amendment 706 did not lower Brown’s guidelines
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range -- was correct. Amendment 706 would have reduced Brown’s base offense
level from 38 to 36. But, with his upward adjustment for his role in the offense
and his criminal history category of VI (both of which remained unchanged),
Brown’s guidelines range still was 360 months to life imprisonment. See U.S.S.G.,
Ch. 5, Pt. A, Sentencing Table; United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 781 (11th
Cir. 2000) (explaining that, in a section 3582(c)(2) proceeding, “all original
sentencing determinations remain unchanged with the sole exception of the
guideline range that has been amended since the original sentencing”). So, because
Brown received the lowest possible guidelines sentence, his substantial rights were
unaffected; and the district court’s error was harmless. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a)
(“[a]ny error . . . that does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded”);
United States v. Newsome, 998 F.2d 1571, 1579 (11th Cir. 1993) (concluding that
a remand was unnecessary where defendants’ base offense levels were unaffected
by the court’s error and they received the lowest possible terms of imprisonment).
Because Amendment 706 did not have the effect of reducing Brown’s
guidelines range, Brown was unentitled to a sentence reduction. We affirm the
district court’s denial of his section 3582(c)(2) motion.
AFFIRMED.
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