United States v. E. Goodman Obot , 373 F. App'x 941 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-14674 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 15, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-00034-CR-MHS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
E. GOODMAN OBOT,
a.k.a. Etiowo Archibong Obot,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(April 15, 2010)
Before BARKETT, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
E. Goodman Obot appeals the district court’s revocation of his supervised
release and imposition of a sentence for four months of imprisonment and twelve
months of supervised release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).1 Obot argues that
even though he did eventually allocute at sentencing, the district court pronounced
and imposed his sentence before affording him that opportunity in violation of the
Due Process clause and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(b)(2)(E).
Specifically, Obot asserts that the district court erred for failure to personally invite
him to speak. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
We review “questions involving the legality of a criminal sentence de novo.”
United States v. Taylor, 11 F.3d 149, 151 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). We also
review “de novo legal questions concerning the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.” United States v. Spears, 443 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam).
“Allocution is the right of the defendant to make a final plea on his own
behalf to the sentencing judge before his sentence.” United States v. Carruth, 528
F.3d 845, 846 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citation omitted). “In any probation
or supervised release revocation hearing, ‘a defendant must be afforded an
opportunity to make a statement and present any information in mitigation.’” Id.(citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.1(b)(2)(E)). Therefore, a district court’s failure to afford
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The record shows that Obot was released on February 5, 2010.
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to the defendant the right of allocution warrants reversal. Id. at 847; United States
v. Eads, 480 F.2d 131, 133 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (holding that, in a
revocation hearing, “sentences imposed upon those convictions are vacated and the
cause remanded to the district court for resentencing after affording the appellant
his right to allocute”); see also United States v. Phillips, 936 F.2d 1252, 1256 (11th
Cir. 1991).
We hold that, consistent with the requirements of Rule 32.1(b)(2)(E), the
district court did not abridge Obot’s right to allocute. The transcript from the
revocation hearing indicates that the district court specifically asked if Obot
“wish[ed] to make a statement.” Doc. 48 at 6. While the district court suggested
that the recommended sentence was appropriate, the record shows that the district
court did not impose the sentence until Obot had completed his allocution at
length. Doc. 49 at 8, 9–13. Therefore, the district court did not prematurely
announce Obot’s sentence. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
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