United States v. Tyvion Benson , 888 F.3d 1017 ( 2018 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 17-2094
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Tyvion Wanye Benson
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul
    ____________
    Submitted: April 9, 2018
    Filed: May 1, 2018
    ____________
    Before GRUENDER, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    BENTON, Circuit Judge.
    Tyvion Wanye Benson pled guilty to conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. §
    922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The
    district court1 sentenced him to 54 months’ imprisonment to run consecutively to a
    1
    The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the
    District of Minnesota.
    related, undischarged state sentence. Benson appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28
    U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
    At the time of sentencing, Benson was serving a 60-month state sentence for
    possessing a firearm. The state conviction arose from the same conduct as the federal
    offense. In the plea for the federal offense, the parties agreed to recommend the
    statutory maximum of 60 months. They also recognized that the district court would
    decide whether to credit Benson for time served for his related state sentence.
    In his sentencing memorandum, Benson requested that his federal sentence run
    concurrently with the remainder of his undischarged state sentence. At sentencing,
    he did not renew this request. However, he did request credit for time served for his
    state sentence. The district court gave him partial credit for time served (6 months).
    It sentenced him to 54 months to run consecutively to the undischarged portion of his
    state sentence (19 months). Benson did not object. He now appeals.
    Benson believes his federal sentence should run concurrently to his
    undischarged state sentence. This court reviews “a district court’s decision to impose
    a consecutive or concurrent sentence for reasonableness.” United States v.
    McDonald, 
    521 F.3d 975
    , 980 (8th Cir. 2008).2
    2
    The government argues this court should review for plain error because
    Benson did not object to the consecutive sentence at sentencing. In United States v.
    Poe, this court applied plain error review because the defendant “did not raise this
    issue before the district court at sentencing.” Poe, 
    764 F.3d 914
    , 916 (8th Cir. 2014)
    (emphasis added). See United States v. Ristine, 
    335 F.3d 692
    , 694 (8th Cir. 2003)
    (applying plain error review where defendant did not “object at sentencing”)
    (emphasis added). But, in United States v Naranjo, this court applied plain error
    review because the defendant failed to raise the issue “either in the sentencing
    memoranda or at sentencing.” Naranjo, 459 Fed. Appx. 579, 580 (8th Cir. 2012).
    Here, the issue is further complicated by the fact that Benson did not object to a
    consecutive sentence in his sentencing memorandum. Rather, he only requested a
    -2-
    A district court may order a federal sentence consecutive to an undischarged
    state sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (“[I]f a term of imprisonment is imposed on a
    defendant who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms
    may run concurrently or consecutively.”). See Setser v. United States, 
    566 U.S. 231
    ,
    244 (2012) (holding section 3584 applies to state sentences). If unspecified,
    “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively.” 18
    U.S.C. § 3584(a). In determining whether sentences run concurrently or
    consecutively, district court “shall consider . . . the factors set forth in section
    3553(a).” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b).
    Benson believes the district court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors in
    imposing a consecutive sentence. This belief has no merit. The district court said:
    “This sentence of 54 months, which will be consecutive to the state sentence, I do
    find to comply with statutory objectives. I think it’s sufficient but not more than
    necessary to accomplish the objectives of justice.” It thus considered the § 3553(a)
    factors and explained that a consecutive sentence was necessary “to accomplish the
    objectives of justice.” See 
    McDonald, 521 F.3d at 980
    (holding the district court was
    “well within its broad discretion” in ordering consecutive sentences where the district
    court said the sentence was appropriate “under the advisory [G]uidelines” and it
    “considered all the other statutory factors”).
    Benson argues the consecutive sentence violates U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(2) which
    says that when “a term of imprisonment resulted from another offense that is relevant
    conduct to the instant offense of conviction . . . the sentence for the instant offense
    shall . . . run concurrently to the remainder of the undischarged term of
    concurrent sentence. This court need not decide the issue here.
    -3-
    imprisonment.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(2). But the guidelines are advisory, and section
    5G1.3(b)(2) does not prohibit the district court from exercising its statutory authority
    to impose a consecutive sentence. United States v. Martinez Rodriguez, 508 Fed.
    Appx. 573, 575 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Section 5G1.3(b) . . . is merely advisory, and the
    district court retains statutory authority to impose a partially consecutive sentence.”),
    citing 18 U.S.C. § 3584; United States v. Lone Fight, 
    625 F.3d 523
    , 525-26 (8th Cir.
    2010) (“Even if the guidelines do not recommend that sentences run consecutively,
    the district court has broad statutory authority, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3584, to
    impose consecutive terms.”).
    For the first time in his reply, Benson argues the sentence was substantively
    unreasonable. This argument is waived. Jenkins v. Winter, 
    540 F.3d 742
    , 751 (8th
    Cir. 2008) (“This court does not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal in
    a reply brief unless the appellant gives some reason for failing to raise and brief the
    issue in his opening brief.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    The district court’s decision to impose a consecutive sentence was reasonable.
    *******
    The judgment is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-2094

Citation Numbers: 888 F.3d 1017

Filed Date: 5/1/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023