John Minott v. M/Y Brunello , 891 F.3d 1277 ( 2018 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-10374
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-22856-KMW
JOHN MINOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
M/Y BRUNELLO,
Official No. 71147, her engines, tackle, and appurtenances, in rem,
BRUNELLO YACHT CHARTERS, LTD.,
a foreign corporation, as owner of the M/Y Brunello,
DERECKTOR FLORIDA, INC.,
a Florida corporation,
XYZ CORPORATION(S),
marine contractors,
JOHN DOE,
as captain of the M/Y Brunello,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_______________________
(June 6, 2018)
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
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WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
This appeal from the denial of a warrant in rem for the arrest of a vessel
requires us to decide whether we have interlocutory jurisdiction, and if so, whether
John Minott established that the injury he allegedly suffered while boarding the
Brunello entitles him to a warrant in rem for the arrest of the vessel. Minott filed a
complaint against the Brunello and other parties alleging that he was entitled to
enforce a maritime lien against the Brunello for damages arising from a maritime
tort. He then moved the district court to direct the clerk to issue a warrant in rem
for the arrest of the Brunello, but the district court denied the motion. In addition to
expressing doubt about whether Minott’s claim fell within its maritime jurisdiction,
28 U.S.C. § 1333, the district court ruled that Minott’s claim did not “give[] rise to
a ‘maritime lien’ supporting the in rem seizure of the [v]essel” based on the
erroneous premise that maritime liens arise only by statute and not by operation of
the general maritime law. It also denied Minott’s motion for reconsideration. We
have interlocutory jurisdiction, id. § 1292(a)(3), Minott’s claim for a maritime tort
against the Brunello falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court, id.
§ 1333(1), and Minott is entitled to a warrant in rem, Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R.
C(3)(a)(i). We reverse and remand with instructions to direct the clerk to issue a
warrant in rem for the arrest of the Brunello.
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I. BACKGROUND
John Minott worked for Butch Kemp Designs, a marine engineering firm
hired to perform maintenance and repairs aboard the Brunello while it was docked
in navigable waters in Dania, Florida. Minott attempted to board the vessel, but
when he was walking up the gangway “the [v]essel[’s] captain or crew, suddenly
and without warning, put the engines in gear, causing the gangway . . . to detach
from the [v]essel and fall overboard, together with [Minott].” Minott suffered
“severe injuries to his head, neck, and spine.”
Minott filed a “verified complaint to enforce a maritime lien for damages
arising from a maritime tort” in the district court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(h); S.D.
Fla. Adm. & Mar. R. B(2). The complaint asserted an in rem claim against the
Brunello and in personam claims against other individual and corporate
defendants. Minott then moved the district court to direct the clerk to issue a
warrant in rem for the arrest of the vessel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. C(3)(a)(i);
S.D. Fla. Adm. & Mar. R. B(3)(a). He explained that the tort was “cognizable
under admiralty jurisdiction,” that he was “entitled to a maritime lien,” that he was
“entitled to arrest the [v]essel and litigate directly against [it] in rem,” and that the
vessel was “transitory in nature and at risk of leaving the jurisdiction of [the
district court] if not immediately arrested.”
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The district court denied the motion without prejudice after finding that
Minott failed to “establish good cause for the issuance of a warrant in rem.” It
concluded that a maritime tort cannot “form the basis for a maritime lien” and cited
a federal statute, 46 U.S.C. § 31342, that grants a lien to “a person providing
necessaries to a vessel.” The district court also explained that its “uncertainty”
whether Minott’s “claim [fell] under maritime jurisdiction . . . weigh[ed] against
issuing a warrant.” Although it did not decide the question, the district court
suggested that it lacked jurisdiction because Minott’s “activity . . . [was] not
significantly tied to maritime activity” and his accident had “minimal” potential to
“disrupt[] . . . maritime commerce.”
Minott moved for reconsideration and cited caselaw where plaintiffs filed in
rem actions against vessels for maritime torts. The district court denied the motion.
It explained that Minott’s original motion sought a warrant only “based on 46
U.S.C. [section] 31301(5)(B)” and that he could not “raise [new] arguments” that
he was “entitled to a warrant of arrest under [other] authorities.” It also explained
that these authorities “still . . . [failed to] convince [it] that alleged tort victims . . .
are entitled to issuance of a warrant of arrest in rem upon filing a complaint.”
Minott appealed and invoked our interlocutory jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(3).
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Whether a party’s claim[] give[s] rise to a maritime lien is a legal question
that is reviewed de novo,” Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned
Vessel, 861 F.3d 1278, 1297 (11th Cir. 2017), as is “[t]he [d]istrict [c]ourt’s
application of admiralty law and the local rules implementing that law,”
Isbrandtsen Marine Servs. v. M/V Inagua Tania, 93 F.3d 728, 733 (11th Cir.
1996). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Supplemental Rule C, we review the
facts alleged in the “complaint and . . . supporting papers” to determine “[i]f the
conditions for an in rem action [and warrant] appear to exist.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
Supp. R. C(3)(a)(i) (italics added).
III. DISCUSSION
We divide our discussion in two parts. First, we explain that we have
interlocutory jurisdiction over this appeal. Second, we explain that the district court
erred when it refused to direct the clerk to issue a warrant in rem for the arrest of
the Brunello.
A. We Have Interlocutory Jurisdiction.
We have interlocutory jurisdiction over appeals from “decrees of . . . district
courts . . . [that] determin[e] the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty
cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3).
“As a general rule, a district court’s order resolving one or more claims on the
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merits is appealable under [section] 1292(a)(3), irrespective of any claims that
remain pending.” Sea Lane Bahamas Ltd. v. Europa Cruises Corp., 188 F.3d 1317,
1321 (11th Cir. 1999). For example, we “ha[ve] jurisdiction over the appeal of an
order dismissing on the merits one or more parties from an action.” Id. (collecting
cases); see also Nichols v. Barwick, 792 F.2d 1520, 1522 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Not all
the rights and liabilities of the parties need be determined before such an order is
appealable.”); Trinidad Foundry & Fabricating, Ltd. v. M/V K.A.S. Camilla, 966
F.2d 613, 614 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1992). But we lack jurisdiction “when the order
appealed from ‘does not reach the merits of the claim and in no way determines,
denies, or prejudices any substantive rights of the parties.’” Sea Lane Bahamas,
188 F.3d at 1321 (quoting Jensenius v. Texaco, Inc., 639 F.2d 1342, 1343 (5th Cir.
Unit A Mar. 1981)).
The refusal of the district court to issue a warrant in rem for the arrest of the
Brunello falls within our interlocutory jurisdiction because it has the effect of a
final order that “reach[es] the merits of the claim” and “prejudices [the] substantive
rights of [Minott].” Id. (quoting Jensenius, 639 F.2d at 1343). To be sure, the
decision refusing to arrest the Brunello did not resolve Minott’s claims against the
other defendants. But it resolved his claim against the vessel, and he is entitled to
immediate review of that decision.
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The refusal to arrest the Brunello resolved the question of the vessel’s
liability because “[a]ttachment subjecting the res to the jurisdiction of the court is a
prerequisite to a finding of in rem liability.” Dow Chem. Co. v. The Barge UM-
23B, 424 F.2d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 1970) (italics added). For example, in The Pesaro
the Supreme Court exercised interlocutory jurisdiction over a “decree” that
released a vessel from arrest but did not “formally” “dismiss the libel.” 255 U.S.
216, 217 (1921). The Supreme Court explained that although the “decree . . . [did]
not dismiss the libel,” this detail was not “decisive” because “[t]he decree . . .
declare[d] [that the vessel was] not subject to any such process[,] . . . direct[ed] her
release . . ., [and] end[ed] the suit as effectually as if it formally dismissed the
libel.” Id. In short, although the question whether to arrest a vessel arises at the
beginning of litigation, it also “reach[es] the merits of the claim,” Sea Lane
Bahamas, 188 F.3d at 1321 (quoting Jensenius, 639 F.2d at 1343), because it
necessarily dictates jurisdiction and liability.
More importantly, a failure to arrest a vessel “prejudices [the] substantive
rights of the parties” in the light of the mobile nature of vessels. Id. (quoting
Jensenius, 639 F.2d at 1343). If a vessel leaves the jurisdiction while the district
court is resolving claims against other defendants, the plaintiff risks forever losing
his “substantive” right to “enforce a maritime lien,” Trinidad, 966 F.2d at 615,
because “where the res is no longer before the court, . . . in rem jurisdiction is
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destroyed” and the district court “can[not] proceed to adjudication.” L.B. Harvey
Marine, Inc. v. M/V River Arc, 712 F.2d 458, 459 (11th Cir. 1983) (italics added).
The Supreme Court highlighted this concern in Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania
Colombiana del Caribe, S.A., when it exercised interlocutory jurisdiction over “an
order . . . vacating a foreign attachment of a vessel.” 339 U.S. 684, 685 (1950); see
also id. at 688–89. The Supreme Court explained that “[a]ppellate review of [an]
order dissolving [an] attachment at a later date would be an empty rite after the
vessel had been released and the restoration of the attachment only theoretically
possible,” id. at 689, and it underscored that the question of attachment “f[e]ll in
that small class [of orders] which finally determine claims of right separable from
. . . rights asserted in the action . . . [that are] too important to be denied review and
too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be
deferred,” id. at 688–89 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp, 337 U.S.
541, 546 (1949)); see also Puerto Rico Ports Auth. v. Barge Katy-B, 427 F.3d 93,
101 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that concerns of “effective finality” establish that
“an order vacating an arrest finally determines the rights and liabilities of the
parties within the meaning of section 1292(a)(3)”). Because Minott’s present
inability to proceed in rem against the Brunello may become permanent if the
vessel departs the district, we have interlocutory jurisdiction.
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B. The District Court Erred when It Refused To Direct the Clerk To Issue a
Warrant In Rem for the Arrest of the Brunello.
We divide this section in two parts. First, we explain that the tort alleged in
the complaint falls within the admiralty jurisdiction of the district court. Second,
we explain that this maritime tort entitles Minott to proceed in rem against the
Brunello and obligates the district court to direct the clerk to issue a warrant in rem
for the vessel’s arrest.
1. The Alleged Incident Falls Within Admiralty Jurisdiction.
The Constitution grants federal courts power over “all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Maritime
jurisdiction over torts is based on the location of the incident and a nexus to
maritime activity. See 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law § 3-5
(5th ed. 2017). A district court has jurisdiction if the tort “occurred on navigable
water or . . . [occurred] on land [but] was caused by a vessel on navigable water,”
and if the tort “ha[d] sufficient connection with maritime activity.” Alderman v.
Pac. N. Victor, Inc., 95 F.3d 1061, 1064 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Jerome B.
Grubart Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995)).
The “connection” element of this test for maritime-tort jurisdiction “raises
two issues.” Id. “First, we are required to assess the general features of the type of
accident involved . . . to determine whether the incident has a potentially disruptive
impact on maritime commerce.” Id. (quoting Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534) (internal
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quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff can satisfy this requirement by alleging
“[u]nsafe working conditions aboard a vessel under repairs, maintenance, or
conversion” because an accident caused by such conditions “could have the
potential to disrupt further repairs of that vessel, vessels being worked on at the
same dock, or vessels waiting to be worked upon.” Id. “Second, we must determine
whether the general character of the activity giving rise to the incident shows a
substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.” Id. (quoting Grubart, 513
U.S at 534) (internal quotation marks omitted). This inquiry looks to “the activities
of the tortfeasor” and encompasses a “broad” range of conduct, including
“conversions, repairs, or maintenance aboard a vessel in navigable water.” Id. at
1065.
The district court suggested, without deciding, that it lacked admiralty
jurisdiction. It underscored that Minott’s fall had “minimal” “potential[]” to
“disrupt[] . . . maritime commerce . . . [because] any rescue effort would likely
occur from land.” And it explained that “[t]he general character of [Minott’s]
activity—walking to the boat—[was] not significantly tied to maritime activity.”
The district court concluded that its “uncertainty” about this question “weigh[ed]
against issuing a warrant.” We disagree.
Minott clearly alleged a maritime tort. The incident “occurred on navigable
water,” id. at 1064 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), when the
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Brunello was docked in Dania, Florida. Although Minott was not yet aboard the
vessel when the gangway collapsed, “[i]t is well established that traditional
maritime law encompasses the gangway.” White v. United States, 53 F.3d 43, 46
(4th Cir. 1995). For example, in The Admiral Peoples, the Supreme Court
explained that admiralty jurisdiction extended to an accident where a
“disembarking . . . [passenger] was injured by falling from a gangplank leading
from the vessel to the dock,” 295 U.S. 649, 650 (1935), because the gangplank
“was no less part of the vessel because in its extension to the dock it projected over
the land,” id. at 651–52. To be sure, the Supreme Court mentioned that “while [the
passenger] was on the gangplank, she had not yet left the vessel.” Id. at 652(emphasis added). But this observation about the passenger’s direction of travel
does not affect the “basic fact . . . that the gangplank [is] a part of the vessel.” Id. at
651. If anything, Minott’s injury is a stronger candidate for admiralty jurisdiction
because he fell into the water, unlike the passenger in The Admiral Peoples who
“was violently thrown forward upon the dock.” Id. at 652. Our predecessor circuit
also explained in O’Keeffe v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co., 354 F.2d 48 (5th Cir.
1965), that a plaintiff “sustained his injury over navigable water,” id. at 50, when
he was “lifted . . . from the dock” where he was working by a winch and struck
either “the dock . . . [or] the side of the ship” before he fell into the water and
drowned, id. at 49. And even if Minott’s injury had occurred on land, it was
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“caused by” the vessel, Alderman, 95 F.3d at 1064, when its “captain or crew . . .
put the engines in gear.” An injury caused by a vessel in navigable waters is a
maritime tort.
The incident satisfied the first element of the “connection test” because the
“general features of [this] type of accident . . . [had] a potentially disruptive impact
on maritime commerce.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Minott’s employer had been hired to “perform maintenance and repairs aboard the
. . . Brunello,” and Minott’s injury threatened “to disrupt further repairs of that
vessel,” not to mention the repairs of “vessels being worked on at the same dock
. . . [and] vessels waiting to be worked upon.” Id. The district court overlooked
these consequences when it narrowly considered only the possibility of a “rescue
effort [that] would likely occur from land” and failed to contemplate the potential
impact of worker injuries on maritime commerce. To be sure, this particular
accident may not have had widespread effects, but “[w]hether or not disruption
resulted here is of no moment.” Id.On the second element, “the general character of the activity giving rise to
[Minott’s accident] shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime
activity.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court
focused on the activities of Minott when it explained that his “activity—walking to
the boat—[was] not significantly tied to maritime activity.” But this analysis
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considered the actions of the incorrect party because we look instead to “the
activities of the [alleged] tortfeasor”—in this case, the Brunello. Id. at 1065(emphasis added). Minott alleged that the gangway fell when “the [v]essel captain
or crew . . . put the engines in gear,” and the operation and movement of a vessel in
navigable waters are quintessential “maritime activit[ies].” Id. at 1064. That the
incident occurred when the vessel was docked for “maintenance and repairs” also
underscores its maritime quality, for “[w]ork upon ships . . . docked in navigable
waterways is an indispensable maritime activity.” Id. at 1065.
2. Minott is Entitled to a Warrant In Rem for the Arrest of the Brunello.
A vessel is “an entity apart from its owner” that “is liable . . . for torts,”
Merchants Nat’l Bank of Mobile v. Dredge Gen. G. L. Gillespie, 663 F.2d 1338,
1345 (5th Cir. Unit A Dec. 1981), and a maritime tort gives the victim a lien
against the vessel “by operation of the general maritime law,” Schoenbaum, supra,
at § 9-1. This “lien is created as soon as the claim comes into being,” and the
“principle [of an automatic lien] . . . [is] equally applicable to all claims . . . which
can be enforced in admiralty against the ship, whether arising out of tort or of
contract.” The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113, 117 (1898); see also The Bird of
Paradise, 72 U.S. 545, 554, 555 (1866) (explaining that “[s]hip-owners,
unquestionably, as a general rule, have a lien upon the cargo for the freight” that
“arises from the usages of commerce, independently of the agreement of the
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parties, and not from any statutory regulations”); Craddock v. M/Y The Golden
Rule, 110 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (“A maritime lien attaches and
is perfected by operation of law when the claim arises.”); Riverway Co. v. Spivey
Marine & Harbor Serv., 598 F. Supp. 909, 912 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (“The creation of a
maritime lien requires no judicial action; the lien is a right of the injured party
which arises at the moment of the breach or tort and attaches to the res.” (citing
The Bold Boccleaugh, 13 Eng. Rep. 884 (1851))).
“Federal district courts obtain in rem jurisdiction over a vessel when a
maritime lien attaches to it,” Crimson Yachts v. Betty Lyn II Motor Yacht, 603 F.3d
864, 868 (11th Cir. 2010), and “[u]nder traditional admiralty law, maritime
property is subject to arrest in order to enforce a maritime lien,” Merchants Nat’l
Bank, 663 F.2d at 1345. “Upon [the] filing [of] an in rem complaint, the clerk of
court issues a warrant for the arrest of the res.” Crimson Yachts, 603 F.3d at 868.
This process is controlled by Supplemental Rule C, which provides that “[a]n
action in rem may be brought . . . [t]o enforce any maritime lien,” Fed. R. Civ. P.
Supp. R. C(1) (italics added), and that, “[i]f the conditions for an in rem action
appear to exist, the court must issue an order directing the clerk to issue a warrant
for the arrest of the vessel,” id. Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. C(3)(a)(i) (emphasis and
italics added); see also S.D. Fla. Adm. & Mar. R. B.
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The district court ruled that Minott “failed to establish that his negligence
claim [gave] rise to a ‘maritime lien’ supporting the in rem seizure of the [v]essel.”
It ruled that maritime liens are exclusively “governed by 46 U.S.C. [section]
31342,” which addresses materialmen’s liens. It then underscored that this statute
“provides that only a ‘person providing necessaries to a vessel’ has a maritime lien
and corresponding right to bring a civil action in rem,” and that “[t]he applicable
statutes and rules do not expressly contemplate that a ‘maritime tort’ can form the
basis for a ‘maritime lien.’” The district court concluded that in rem proceedings
for torts would be “untenable and contrary to the applicable law.” And it chastised
Minott for failing to cite more than one “authority that would allow for the arrest of
a vessel [for a tort].”
The district court erred. The authority cited by Minott, Craddock, 110 F.
Supp. 3d at 1276, correctly stated that a maritime tort gives the victim a lien
against the vessel. See id. (explaining that the plaintiff “has alleged a maritime
tort” and that “[i]t follows that [he] has a maritime lien” because “[a] maritime lien
attaches and is perfected by operation of law when the claim arises”). Indeed, the
“characteristic maritime liens recognized under United States law” include
“[c]laims for maritime torts including personal injury.” Schoenbaum, supra, at § 9-
1. And contrary to the reasoning of the district court that section 31342 is the only
font for maritime liens and in rem proceedings, “[m]ost maritime liens arise by
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operation of the general maritime law.” Id. To be sure, Congress can change
maritime law, but nothing in section 31342, which addresses the completely
different question of materialmen’s liens, abrogates Minott’s ability to assert a tort
claim. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of
Legal Texts 318 (2012) (“A statute will be construed to alter the common law only
when that disposition is clear.”); cf. Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404,
416 (2009) (explaining that “Congress was envisioning the continued availability
of . . . common-law causes of action” “for injured seamen” when it passed the
Jones Act to confer additional statutory rights). Indeed, federal courts have long
acknowledged a wide variety of maritime liens “arising out of services rendered to
or injuries caused by [a vessel].” Schoenbaum, supra, at § 9-1 (emphasis added)
(collecting cases). And Minott cited several authorities dating to the 1800s that
establish that a vessel’s tort grants the injured victim an automatic lien. See, e.g.,
The Anaces, 93 F. 240 (4th Cir. 1899). In short, his “prima facie showing that [he
had] an action in rem against the [Brunello] . . . and that the [Brunello] [was]
within the district,” Craddock, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 1277, obligated the district court
to “order . . . the clerk to issue a warrant for the arrest of the vessel,” Fed. R. Civ.
P. Supp. R. C(3)(a)(i).
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IV. CONCLUSION
We REVERSE and REMAND with instructions for the district court to
enter an order directing the clerk to issue a warrant for the arrest of the Brunello.
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