Ukeiley v. EPA , 896 F.3d 1158 ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                         FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    July 24, 2018
    PUBLISH                     Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    ROBERT UKEILEY,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                                   No. 16-9556
    UNITED STATES
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
    AGENCY; and ANDREW
    WHEELER, * Acting Administrator,
    United States Environmental
    Protection Agency,
    Respondents.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES
    ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ADMINISTRATION
    (AGENCY NO. EPA-R08-OAR-2015-0042)
    Vincent P. Calvano, Vincent P. Calvano, LLC, Boulder, Colorado, for Petitioner.
    Allan D. Greenberg, Attorney, Environment & Natural Resources Division
    (Jeffrey H. Wood, Acting Assistant Attorney General, United States Department
    of Justice, Denver, Colorado, and Randall Cherry, Office of Regional Counsel,
    Region 8, and Jonathan Skinner-Thompson, Office of General Counsel, United
    States Environmental Protection Agency, with him on the brief) United States
    Attorney’s Office, Denver, Colorado, for Respondents.
    *
    Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Andrew
    Wheeler is substituted for Scott Pruitt as the respondent in this case.
    Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and McHUGH, Circuit
    Judges.
    TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge.
    This petition for review challenges the Environmental Protection Agency’s
    2016 decision to certify Colorado’s compliance with air quality standards despite
    a number of days in which Colorado failed to meet those standards.
    Robert Ukeiley is a local property owner who suffers from a lung condition
    worsened by airborne particulates. He spends substantial time at a residence near
    Lamar, Colorado, a town on Colorado’s eastern plains. Like the rest of the high
    plains region, Lamar experiences many windy days, and the resulting dust storms
    generate airborne particulate pollution that affects its residents. Due to this
    pollution, between the early 1990s and 2005 the Environmental Protection
    Agency designated Lamar as a nonattainment area under the Clean Air Act.
    To achieve attainment, Lamar needed to comply with National Ambient Air
    Quality Standards (Standards) promulgated by the EPA. The Standards impose a
    variety of regulatory requirements designed to reduce the exposure of the public
    to dangerous levels of airborne pollutants. To achieve compliance with the
    Standards, Colorado developed a state implementation plan in 1994. In 2002,
    Colorado requested the EPA to redesignate the Lamar area as an attainment area
    and submitted a ten-year maintenance plan to demonstrate expected compliance
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    through 2015. The EPA approved the plan in 2005 and redesignated Lamar as an
    attainment area.
    In 2013, as part of its requirement for achieving attainment, Colorado
    submitted its second proposed ten-year maintenance plan for the Lamar area.
    Along with its submission, Colorado asked the EPA to exclude a number of days
    in which Lamar’s airborne pollutants exceeded the Standards. The EPA
    concurred on the request for some of the days and approved the plan in 2016.
    Ukeiley challenges that 2016 approval in his petition for review. He
    contends the EPA abused its discretion by granting Colorado’s request to exclude
    certain instances in which airborne dust exceeded the Standards. As we explain,
    the EPA did not err in approving Colorado’s maintenance plan. The EPA’s
    interpretation of the Clean Air Act and its application of that interpretation are
    correct. And the EPA’s regulations, related guidance, and the extensive
    administrative record all support the EPA’s decision. We therefore deny
    Ukeiley’s petition for review.
    I. Background
    We start with an overview of the statutory and regulatory scheme. We then
    discuss the specifics of Colorado’s request to exclude some instances in which it
    failed to comply with the Standards and the EPA’s rationale in granting the
    request.
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    A. Clean Air Act
    The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to establish National Ambient Air
    Quality Standards aimed at reducing airborne dust and soot particles in the air.
    Pursuant to that statutory mandate, the EPA adopted Standards that set
    pollution limits for various air contaminants, including the pollutant at issue
    here—fugitive dust or soot particles known as “PM-10.” PM-10’s are “particulate
    matter with an aerodynamic diameter less than or equal to a nominal ten
    micrometers.” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(t). The Standards applicable here are based on
    the daily particulate amounts for a geographic area averaged over a longer period
    of time. See 71 Fed. Reg. 61,144 (Oct. 17, 2006). A geographic area meets the
    Standards if it averages one or fewer 24-hour periods of concentration above the
    limit per calendar year, averaged over a three-year period. See 40 C.F.R. 50.6 and
    40 C.F.R. part 50, appendix K.
    The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to designate any geographic location
    that does not meet this standard as a “nonattainment area.” 42 U.S.C. § 7513(a).
    If the EPA designates a nonattainment area within a state, the state is required to
    submit a corrective plan that will ensure compliance with the air quality standards.
    42 U.S.C. § 7513a(a)(2)(A). Once a state achieves compliance, it can request the
    EPA to redesignate the nonattainment geographic area. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)(3).
    To be eligible for redesignation, the state must submit a plan that describes how
    the state will maintain air quality compliance for ten or more years after the
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    redesignation. 42 U.S.C. § 7505a(a). And at the eight year mark after
    redesignation, the state must further revise its plan to demonstrate how it will
    maintain its air quality for an additional ten years following expiration of the
    initial ten-year maintenance period. 42 U.S.C. § 7505a(b).
    B. Exceptional Events Rule
    The air quality standards are subject to certain exceptions under the Clean
    Air Act.
    Section 7619 directs the EPA to promulgate “regulations governing the
    review and handling of air quality monitoring data influenced by exceptional
    events.” 42 U.S.C. § 7619(b)(2) (emphasis added). Under § 7619(b)(1), an event
    is exceptional if it meets four statutory conditions: (1) it “affects air quality”; (2) it
    is not “reasonably controllable or preventable”; (3) it is “an event caused by
    human activity that is unlikely to recur at a particular location or a natural event”;
    and (4) the EPA has certified the exceptional event criteria have been met. 42
    U.S.C. § 7619(b)(1)(A). If all of these conditions are met, the EPA may exclude
    certain air-quality monitoring data when determining whether or not a state
    complied with its implementation plan.
    Consistent with its statutory mandate, the EPA has promulgated rules for
    administration of its exceptional events regime and specific guidelines as to what
    constitutes an exceptional event. Under the EPA’s Exceptional Events Rule
    (Rule), “[a] State . . . may request the Administrator to exclude data showing
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    exceedances or violations of any national ambient air quality standard that are
    directly due to an exceptional event . . . .” 40 C.F.R. 50.14(a)(1)(ii).
    In defining “exceptional event,” the Rule largely tracks the statutory
    definition:
    Exceptional event means an event(s) and its resulting
    emissions that affect air quality in such a way that there
    exists a clear causal relationship between the specific
    event(s) and the monitored exceedance(s) or violation(s),
    is not reasonably controllable or preventable, is an
    event(s) caused by human activity that is unlikely to
    recur at a particular location or a natural event(s).
    40 C.F.R 50.1(j) (second emphasis added).
    In addition, the EPA defines “natural event”:
    Natural event means an event and its resulting emissions,
    which may recur at the same location, in which human
    activity plays little or no direct causal role. For
    purposes of the definition of a natural event,
    anthropogenic sources that are reasonably controlled
    shall be considered to not play a direct role in causing
    emissions.
    40 C.F.R 50.1(k) (second emphasis added).
    The Rule’s definitions crystalize a basic foundation for the contours of
    exceptional events. To supplement these definitions, the EPA has also issued
    detailed technical guidance for exceptional events in various circumstances such as
    high wind events.
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    C. High Wind Guidance
    The EPA issued guidance for applying the Rule to high wind events, such as
    those that generate fugitive dust. See Treatment of Data Influenced by
    Exceptional Events, 72 Fed. Reg. 13,560 (Mar. 22, 2007). In particular, the
    guidance instructs that for a state to be eligible for an exclusion, it must meet a
    number of technical elements. These elements include a showing that the high
    wind event (1) was not reasonably controllable; (2) caused the attainment area to
    be out of compliance with the standards; (3) was a natural event; and (4) was in
    excess of natural historical fluctuations. 1
    1
    Elements for the Technical Demonstration of High Wind Dust Events
    •     Air agencies’ demonstrations must address the following
    six technical elements under the EER before the EPA
    can concur on a high wind dust event demonstration:
    1. whether the event was not reasonably
    controllable or preventable (nRCP)
    2. whether there was a clear causal
    relationship (CCR)
    3. whether there would have been no
    exceedance or violation but for the event
    (NEBF)
    4. whether the event affects air quality
    (AAQ)
    5. whether the event was caused by human
    activity unlikely to recur or was a natural
    event (HAURL / Natural Event)
    6. whether the event was in excess of
    normal historical fluctuations (HF)
    R., Vol. 3 at 1960 (EPA, Interim Guidance on the Preparation of Demonstrations
    in Support of Requests to Exclude Ambient Air Quality Data Affected by High
    (continued...)
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    As with the Exceptional Events Rule, the guidance tracks the statutory
    language concerning the frequency of exceptional events. The EPA requires
    exceptional events attributable to human activity be “unlikely to recur,” but it
    permits recurring “natural event[s].” R., Vol. 3 at 1960. “The EPA acknowledges
    that natural events, such as high wind dust events, can recur and still be eligible
    for exclusion under the [Rule]. Therefore, events do not necessarily have to be
    rare to satisfy this element.” 
    Id. at 1978.
    But the EPA guidance still requires all
    exceptional events, including natural events, to be outside “normal historical
    fluctuations.” 
    Id. To determine
    whether an event is in excess of historical
    fluctuations, the EPA uses a “weight-of-evidence approach.” 
    Id. In this
    approach,
    no absolute numerical value or percentile of the event’s relative rarity will
    guarantee a successful demonstration that the event was in fact outside normal
    historical fluctuations. Instead, the EPA uses a holistic methodology looking to
    factors such as meteorological and soil conditions, in addition to statistical data
    about the event’s frequency.
    D. Colorado’s Compliance with the Standards
    In 1991, the EPA designated Lamar as a nonattainment area. 56 Fed. Reg.
    56,735 (Nov. 6, 1991). As a result, Colorado was required to develop and institute
    1
    (...continued)
    Winds Under the Exceptional Events Rule (May 2013)) (emphasis added).
    -8-
    a State Implementation Plan, which the EPA approved in 1994. In 2005, the EPA
    redesignated the Lamar area as attainment and approved Colorado’s ten-year
    maintenance plan. In 2013, Colorado submitted a revised ten-year PM-10
    maintenance plan to the EPA that would ensure attainment through 2025.
    For approval of its revised maintenance plan, Colorado had to show that it
    was in compliance with the Standards. As explained above, that meant
    demonstrating that the Lamar area did not exceed the applicable Standard for more
    than one-day-per-year on a rolling three-year average. Over the period between
    2001 and 2015, the Lamar area experienced numerous exceedances of the
    Standard. Colorado asked that 55 of these exceedances be set aside as excludable
    high wind events.
    In support of its request, Colorado submitted meteorological analysis for
    each of these events to show there would have been no exceedance but for the high
    wind event. The analysis included comparisons to historical wind fluctuations and
    other information suggesting the winds were aberrational on these
    occasions—even though high winds might be expected with some level of
    frequency in the area.
    E. The EPA’s Decision and Rationale
    The EPA granted Colorado’s request for 34 of the 55 flagged exceedances.
    It found Colorado adequately showed each of the 34 events met the criteria listed
    in the guidance for high wind exceptional events: each event was not reasonably
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    controllable or preventable; a causal relationship existed between correlation data
    and wind speeds; reasonable controls were implemented and enforced; the wind
    speed was high enough to overwhelm the controls; the event was outside historical
    fluctuations; and it was a natural event.
    After examining the data and making an initial determination that it would
    exclude the exceedances, the EPA solicited public comments on its proposed
    decision. After receiving only one comment, the EPA issued a final rule that
    approved Colorado’s plan revision for PM-10 and excluded the 34 exceedances on
    the basis that these were exceptional events.
    II. Analysis
    Ukeiley claims the EPA wrongfully categorized these 34 exceedances where
    air quality exceeded the maximum PM-10 standard. He argues the exclusion
    criteria were not met because windy days in Lamar are common occurrences,
    therefore meeting neither the statutory nor the regulatory definitions for
    exceptional events. As a result, he contends the EPA arbitrarily and capriciously
    applied the exceptional events standard found in the Clean Air Act. 2
    2
    The EPA argues Ukeiley’s challenge is untimely. In the EPA’s view,
    Ukeiley is arguing that the EPA should have included an additional factor of
    “rarity” when classifying an exceptional event. In short, the EPA claims Ukeiley
    is challenging the Exceptional Events Rule itself, a challenge he should have
    brought when the Rule was promulgated in 2007.
    We do not agree. Ukeiley specifically challenges the EPA’s decision as
    (continued...)
    -10-
    A. Standard of Review
    We review agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act. “The
    APA requires courts to consider agency action in conformity with the agency’s
    statutory grant of power, and agency action is unlawful if it is ‘in excess of
    statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.’”
    Sinclair Wyoming Ref. Co. v. EPA, 
    887 F.3d 986
    , 990 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing 5
    U.S.C. § 706(2)(C)).
    Our APA review is limited. “Under the APA, we will not set aside agency
    action unless it is procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious in substance, or
    manifestly contrary to the statute.” US Magnesium, LLC v. EPA, 
    690 F.3d 1157
    ,
    1164 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Agency
    action is arbitrary or capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress
    has not intended it to consider” or “entirely failed to consider an important aspect
    of the problem.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted). An
    agency’s decision is likewise arbitrary if it “offered an explanation for its decision
    that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
    could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”
    
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, although our
    2
    (...continued)
    inconsistent with “the statutory term ‘exceptional event’ and its regulatory
    definition.” Pet. Br. at 8. This is a challenge to the decision and its statutory
    provenance, not to the Rule itself.
    -11-
    inquiry is “searching and careful,” our “review is ultimately a narrow one.” Maier
    v. EPA, 
    114 F.3d 1032
    , 1039 (10th Cir. 1997).
    When reviewing agency action, we apply the familiar analytical framework
    set forth in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
    467 U.S. 837
    (1984).
    Under Chevron, we first consider if “Congress has directly spoken to the precise
    question at issue” and, if so, we apply the statute’s plain meaning and the inquiry
    ends. 
    Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 990
    (quoting 
    Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842
    –843). But “if
    the statute is silent or ambiguous about the question at issue” then “we defer to the
    authorized agency and apply the agency’s construction so long as it is a reasonable
    interpretation of the statute.” Oklahoma v. EPA, 
    723 F.3d 1201
    , 1207 (10th Cir.
    2013). At the second Chevron step, we defer to administrative determinations on
    matters of technical evaluation and judgment. See City of Albuquerque v.
    Browner, 
    97 F.3d 415
    , 427 (10th Cir. 1996) (“We decline to second-guess the
    EPA’s technical determination, which is entitled to substantial deference . . . .”).
    Our review here, therefore, starts with the definition of an exceptional event
    set forth by Congress in § 7619(b). If we find no ambiguity, our inquiry ends. If
    we find some ambiguity, we proceed to analyze the reasonableness of the EPA’s
    interpretation of congressional intent as set forth in the Exceptional Events Rule.
    Finally, we ask whether the EPA’s application of the Rule to Colorado’s request
    was arbitrary or capricious.
    -12-
    B. Application of the Standards
    Ukeiley first contends the EPA’s exclusion of the high wind exceedances
    violates the plain meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 7619(b)(A)(iii). Specifically, he
    maintains the high frequency and regularity of these natural wind events does not
    make them “exceptional” under the statute. As he sees it, the “EPA can only
    exclude monitoring data that is rare and exceeding the usual,” Pet. Br. at 32
    (emphasis added), and he points to dictionary definitions for support. For
    instance, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “exceptional” as “out of the ordinary”;
    and the Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary defines “exceptional” as “forming
    an exception: rare.” Pet. Br. at 32. Both definitions imply a limit on the
    frequency of any event, including a “natural event.” Ukeiley therefore concludes
    that since windy days in the Lamar area happen frequently, they should not be
    eligible for exclusion as an exceptional event. Because the Exceptional Events
    Rule varies from his interpretation of the statute, Ukeiley argues the EPA’s
    application of it here is arbitrary and capricious.
    We disagree. “When a statute includes an explicit definition, we must
    follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s ordinary meaning.”
    Stenberg v. Carhart, 
    530 U.S. 914
    , 942 (2000). Here we find no ambiguity. In
    § 7619, “exceptional event” functions as a two-word term of art. In defining the
    term, Congress provided several guideposts for interpreting the phrase: these
    events must “affect air quality”; not be “reasonably controllable or preventable”;
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    and be “an event caused by human activity that is unlikely to recur at a particular
    location or a natural event.” 42 U.S.C. § 7619(b)(A) (emphasis added).
    Furthermore, Congress specifies what cannot be an exceptional event: “stagnation
    of air masses or meteorological inversions”; “a meteorological event involving
    high temperatures or lack of precipitation”; or “air pollution relating to source
    noncompliance.” 42 U.S.C. § 7619(b)(B). These requirements served as a starting
    point for the EPA’s rulemaking to further define the boundaries of exceptional
    events.
    Of great importance here, the congressional definition makes a distinction
    between human-caused events and natural events. The EPA can only qualify a
    human-caused event as an exceptional event if it is unlikely to recur—meaning the
    event was a one-off that should have no long-term or recurring health-related
    consequences. For instance, human-induced recurring agricultural practices would
    not be eligible for exclusion as exceptional events. By contrast, the statute’s
    definition does not include the same “unlikely to recur” limitation for natural
    events, such as high wind days. The import of this difference is clear: Congress
    did not exclude recurring natural variations from its definition of “exceptional
    event.”
    We therefore disagree with Ukeiley’s interpretation of the statute and find
    the statute clear and unambiguous. And since the EPA’s Rule complies with the
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    statute’s plain meaning, we cannot find its application here arbitrary and
    capricious.
    Additionally, both the Rule and the interim guidance outline factors for
    classifying exceptional events derived from the statute. Specifically, the EPA
    instructs state agencies seeking exclusions of exceedances to demonstrate that
    exceedances—including those resulting from natural events—are not reasonably
    controllable, that the high wind actually caused the exceedances, and that the
    events exceeded normal historical wind fluctuations. This methodology confirms
    high wind events that recur based on local conditions found on the Colorado plains
    can qualify as exceptional events as long as they meet certain criteria. 3
    Ukeiley further argues that even if the Rule and interim guidance reasonably
    interpret the statute, the EPA’s decision was still arbitrary and capricious because
    it was based on faulty reasoning and insufficient evidence. But the record is clear
    that the EPA relied on considerable wind and meteorological data in reviewing
    Colorado’s application for exclusion. Colorado supported its request for an
    exclusion with reams of technical data, in accordance with the Rule and the EPA’s
    guidance. And for each set of exceedances excluded, the EPA examined multiple
    factors. For example, it looked at the percentile of the measurements based on
    location; whether any exceedances since 2005 were caused by events other than
    3
    It follows that, even if we discerned some ambiguity, we would still
    uphold the EPA’s decision as a reasonable construction of the statute.
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    high winds from distant areas carrying PM-10 dust; soil conditions; and
    meteorological conditions. See, e.g., R., Vol. 3 at 599, 860, 1060, 1161, 1407,
    1692, 1874. Its decision thus relied on technical judgments grounded in data—not
    in arbitrariness or caprice.
    We conclude that in both promulgating the Rule and applying it, the EPA’s
    actions were not arbitrary or capricious.
    III. Conclusion
    Socrates is said to have observed, “the same wind is blowing, and yet one of
    us may be cold and the other not.” The Dialogues of Plato 517 (Benjamin Jowett,
    trans., Encyclopedia Brittanica 1952). For the winds of Lamar, Ukeiley hopes his
    personal interpretation of “exceptional” will override Congress’s statutory
    definition and the EPA’s reasonable application of it. But we are bound by law
    and reasonable decisions applying it. Therefore, we DENY the petition.
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