Georgia Association of Latino Elected Officials, Inc. v. Gwinnett County Board of Registration and Elections ( 2022 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 20-14540    Date Filed: 06/08/2022   Page: 1 of 50
    [PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 20-14540
    ____________________
    GEORGIA ASSOCIATION OF LATINO
    ELECTED OFFICIALS, INC.,
    as an organization,
    GEORGIA COALITION FOR THE
    PEOPLE'S AGENDA, INC.,
    as an organization,
    ASIAN AMERICANS ADVANCING
    JUSTICE - ATLANTA, INC.,
    as an organization,
    NEW GEORGIA PROJECT,
    as an organization,
    COMMON CAUSE,
    as an organization,
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022      Page: 2 of 50
    2                       Opinion of the Court                 20-14540
    ALBERT MENDEZ,
    LIMARY RUIZ TORRES,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    GWINNETT COUNTY BOARD OF
    REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS,
    JOHN MANGANO,
    STEPHEN DAY,
    BEN SATTERFIELD,
    BEAUTY BALDWIN,
    ALICE O'LENICK,
    BRAD RAFFENSPERGER,
    in his official capacity as the Secretary of State of Georgia,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-01587-WMR
    ____________________
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540          Date Filed: 06/08/2022      Page: 3 of 50
    20-14540                 Opinion of the Court                           3
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, LAGOA, Circuit Judge, and
    SCHLESINGER,* District Judge.
    LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
    Plaintiffs—five organizations and two individual voters
    from Gwinnett County, Georgia—allege that absentee ballot appli-
    cations and voting-related information should have been, but were
    not, provided in both English and Spanish to voters in Gwinnett
    County during the 2020 election cycle. This appeal asks us to de-
    termine whether Defendants—the Gwinnett County Board of Reg-
    istrations and Elections, the Board’s individual members, and
    Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger—violated § 203 and
    § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
    Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act, 
    52 U.S.C. § 10503
    , re-
    quires certain States and their political subdivisions to provide vot-
    ing materials in languages in addition to English. Gwinnett County
    is subject to the requirements of § 203, and Plaintiffs seek relief un-
    der that section for all limited-English proficient, Spanish-speaking
    voters in Gwinnett County. Section 4(e), 
    52 U.S.C. § 10303
    (e), pro-
    hibits States from denying individuals who were educated in
    “American-flag schools” in a language other than English the right
    to vote because of an inability to understand English. Plaintiffs
    seek relief under § 4(e) for all limited-English proficient, Spanish-
    *Honorable Harvey Schlesinger, United States Senior District Judge for the
    Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540           Date Filed: 06/08/2022   Page: 4 of 50
    4                       Opinion of the Court                  20-14540
    speaking voters in Gwinnett County who were educated in Puerto
    Rico.
    The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of ju-
    risdiction and for failure to state a claim, and this appeal ensued.
    After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we va-
    cate the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and we af-
    firm its dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
    be granted.
    I.       BACKGROUND
    A. Factual Allegations
    The individual Plaintiffs are United States citizens registered
    to vote in Gwinnett County. Plaintiff Albert Mendez is a profes-
    sional bass fisherman. He was born in New York City and raised
    in Puerto Rico, where he attended Spanish-language schools.
    Plaintiff Limary Ruiz Torres is a part-time accountant. She was
    born and raised in Puerto Rico, where she attended Spanish-lan-
    guage schools. Neither Mendez nor Ruiz Torres can read English.
    The organizational Plaintiffs are the Georgia Association of
    Latino Elected Officials, Inc. (“GALEO”), the Georgia Coalition for
    the People’s Agenda, Inc., Asian Americans Advancing Justice–At-
    lanta, Inc., the New Georgia Project, Inc., and Common Cause.
    These organizations are engaged in “get-out-the-vote” activities
    and other voter registration efforts in Gwinnett County. The indi-
    vidual and organizational Plaintiffs (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540       Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 5 of 50
    20-14540               Opinion of the Court                        5
    that Defendants violated § 203, 
    52 U.S.C. § 10503
    , and § 4(e), 
    52 U.S.C. § 10303
    (e), of the Voting Rights Act during the 2020 elec-
    tion.
    Defendants are the Gwinnett County Board of Registrations
    and Elections and its individual members (collectively, the “Gwin-
    nett County Board of Elections”), and Georgia Secretary of State
    Brad Raffensperger (“Secretary Raffensperger” or the “Secretary”).
    The Gwinnett County Board of Elections administers elections in
    Gwinnett County, Georgia; its individual members are essentially
    election superintendents and responsible for conducting such elec-
    tions. Secretary Raffensperger is Georgia’s chief election official.
    In this capacity, Secretary Raffensperger is charged with overseeing
    and administering elections in Georgia. See O.C.G.A. § 21-2-50.
    The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 
    79 Stat. 437
    , prohibits various kinds of discrimination in voting. Section
    4(e), which was enacted in 1965 as part of the original Voting Rights
    Act, provides, in relevant part:
    No person who demonstrates that he has successfully
    completed the sixth primary grade in a public school
    in, or a private school accredited by, . . . the Common-
    wealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant
    classroom language was other than English, shall be
    denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local
    election because of his inability to read, write, under-
    stand, or interpret any matter in the English lan-
    guage . . . .
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 6 of 50
    6                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14540
    
    52 U.S.C. § 10303
    (e)(2). Plaintiffs allege that Gwinnett County has
    a substantial population of Spanish-speaking voters who were edu-
    cated in Puerto Rico and who are entitled to the protections of
    § 4(e).
    In 1975, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to include
    § 203. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 301, 
    89 Stat. 400
    ,
    402–03 (codified as amended at 
    52 U.S.C. § 10503
    ). Section 203(b)
    provides that “no covered State or political subdivision shall pro-
    vide voting materials only in the English language.” 
    52 U.S.C. § 10503
    (b)(1). A State or political subdivision is a “covered State or
    political subdivision” if the Director of the Census determines that
    certain language minority population thresholds are met and that
    “the illiteracy rate of the citizens in the language minority as a
    group is higher than the national illiteracy rate.”                
    Id.
    § 10503(b)(2)(A). Finally, § 203(c) provides:
    Whenever any State or political subdivision subject to
    the prohibition of subsection (b) of this section pro-
    vides any registration or voting notices, forms, in-
    structions, assistance, or other materials or infor-
    mation relating to the electoral process, including bal-
    lots, it shall provide them in the language of the ap-
    plicable minority group as well as in the English lan-
    guage.
    Id. § 10503(c).
    It is undisputed that Gwinnett County is a covered political
    subdivision pursuant to Section 203(b), and that whenever
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 7 of 50
    20-14540               Opinion of the Court                         7
    Gwinnett County provides the materials or information described
    in § 203, they must be in both English and Spanish. It is also undis-
    puted that the State of Georgia is not a “covered State” under
    § 203(b). See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 2006, Determina-
    tions Under Section 203, 
    81 Fed. Reg. 87,532
     (Dec. 5, 2016).
    In response to the public health crisis surrounding the spread
    of COVID-19 in early 2020, Secretary Raffensperger postponed
    Georgia’s 2020 presidential primary election from March to May
    2020. After Georgia Governor Brian Kemp issued a statewide shel-
    ter-in-place order in April 2020, Secretary Raffensperger postponed
    the 2020 primary election again to June 9, 2020, in order to allow
    his office and the counties time to “shore up contingency plans, find
    and train additional poll workers, and make other preparations.”
    With the election moved to June 9 and uncertainty regarding the
    spread of COVID-19, Secretary Raffensperger issued a press release
    encouraging Georgia voters to cast absentee ballots instead of vot-
    ing in person on election day:
    Considering the health risks posed by COVID-19,
    Georgians should seriously consider submitting an
    absentee ballot by mail . . . . [T]he extra precautions
    necessary to preserve voter and poll worker health
    during the pandemic will result in long wait times and
    an increased health risk that could be avoided
    through absentee ballots . . . .
    Under normal circumstances, absentee ballot applications
    are handled by county elections officials. Due to concerns about
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540           Date Filed: 06/08/2022        Page: 8 of 50
    8                         Opinion of the Court                     20-14540
    the effect of COVID-19, Secretary Raffensperger sought to facili-
    tate the use of absentee ballots by using CARES Act 1 funds to mail
    two rounds of absentee ballot applications to active Georgia vot-
    ers—the first round of approximately 6.9 million applications was
    mailed during the last week of March and a second round of ap-
    proximately 323,000 applications was mailed on or about April 21.
    These applications were provided only in English.
    Plaintiffs’ allegations against Secretary Raffensperger are not
    limited to the two mailings of English-only absentee ballot applica-
    tions. Plaintiffs also allege that “[a]ll election materials provided by
    the Georgia Secretary of State to Gwinnett County voters are Eng-
    lish-only.” Secretary Raffensperger “issues press releases that pro-
    vide critical and substantive election-related information,” and his
    official website “contains other critical information for Gwinnett
    County voters,” which are provided only in English. While pre-
    cinct cards, which “contain critical information” like a voter’s poll-
    ing place, voting districts, and change of address processes, are
    mailed to each voter upon registration by the relevant county
    board of registration and elections, they are also available—but
    only in English—on the Secretary’s website. Further, Secretary
    Raffensperger is “responsible for providing election-related
    1 Inresponse to the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress passed legislation provid-
    ing emergency relief to workers, small businesses, and states. See Coronavirus
    Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”), Pub. L. No. 116-136,
    
    134 Stat. 281
     (2020).
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540           Date Filed: 06/08/2022       Page: 9 of 50
    20-14540                  Opinion of the Court                             9
    training for nursing homes,” as well as “supplying election-related
    instructions—including those related to absentee voting—and sup-
    plies at nursing homes.” All of the instructions and supplies pro-
    vided to nursing homes by the Secretary are only in English.
    Unable to read English, Mendez and Ruiz Torres allege that
    they mistook the Secretary’s absentee ballot applications for “junk
    mail” and could not complete them.2 They also allege that they
    cannot “read the English-only voter precinct card accessible via the
    Georgia My Voter Page, the English-only election notices and in-
    formation posted on the Georgia Secretary of State’s website, and
    other English-only election materials furnished to [them] by De-
    fendants.”
    Plaintiffs’ allegations relating to the Gwinnett County Board
    of Elections fall into two categories: (1) failure to translate into
    Spanish the Secretary’s English-only materials and information,
    and (2) deficiencies in the English-to-Spanish translation function
    of the Board’s own website. Regarding the first category, Plaintiffs
    allege that the Gwinnett County Board of Elections does not trans-
    late into Spanish any of the voting materials and voting-related in-
    formation provided by the Secretary to voters in Gwinnett County,
    including the absentee ballot applications the Secretary mailed in
    March and April 2020, the absentee ballot application forms
    2 Afterthe complaint was amended to add the individual Plaintiffs, the Gwin-
    nett County Board of Elections mailed them bilingual absentee ballot applica-
    tions, which they were able to complete.
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 10 of 50
    10                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14540
    available on the Secretary’s website, the press releases issued by the
    Secretary, and other “critical information” posted on the Secre-
    tary’s website. Plaintiffs also allege that the Gwinnett Board of
    Elections does not post in Spanish on its own website the election
    information posted by the Secretary on his website.
    Regarding the second category, Plaintiffs allege that, while
    the Gwinnett County Board of Elections placed a bilingual absen-
    tee ballot application on its own website after this case was filed on
    April 13, 2020, “[t]o access that application, voters have to navi-
    gate” what Plaintiffs allege is “the [Board’s] English-only website.”
    Plaintiffs, however, concede that the website is not, in fact, English-
    only, as they allege that a Spanish-language computer-translated
    version of the website is accessible by clicking a box marked “Eng-
    lish >” at the bottom right-hand corner of the webpage. Plaintiffs
    allege that the website also provides a computer-generated Span-
    ish-language absentee ballot application if users click a button la-
    beled “In English.” But, Plaintiffs allege, that for limited-English
    proficiency, Spanish-speaking voters, it “would be difficult, if not
    impossible, . . . to navigate” the website, and that the English-to-
    Spanish translations themselves are “riddled with errors that could
    prevent Spanish-speaking voters from navigating the mail voting
    process.”
    Plaintiffs’ two counts seek relief against both the Secretary
    and the Gwinnett Board of Elections. Count I asserts that the Sec-
    retary and the Gwinnett Board of Elections violated § 203 because
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022      Page: 11 of 50
    20-14540                Opinion of the Court                         11
    the Secretary mailed two rounds of English-only absentee ballot
    applications to Gwinnett County’s voters, and “neither of the De-
    fendants mailed a bilingual or Spanish translated version of the ab-
    sentee ballot application” to any limited-English proficient, Span-
    ish-speaking voter in Gwinnett County. Count I also asserts that
    Defendants violate § 203 “on an ongoing basis by disseminating
    English-only press releases and all other election-related infor-
    mation published on the Secretary of State’s website, English-only
    voter precinct cards accessible to individuals logging on to the
    Georgia My Voter Page, and English-only election-related notices,
    instructions, and supplies to nursing homes, among other items.”
    The asserted effect of the alleged ongoing violations of § 203 is to
    “deny equal access to voting by mail” to Gwinnett County’s lim-
    ited-English proficient, Spanish-speaking voters in the 2020 pri-
    mary election and future elections. Count II asserts violations of
    § 4(e) based on the same conduct, although this claim is limited to
    Gwinnett County voters who attended school in Puerto Rico and
    are protected by § 4(e).
    In addition to attorneys’ fees and costs, Plaintiffs seek declar-
    atory and injunctive relief. First, Plaintiffs seek declarations that
    Defendants are violating §§ 203 and 4(e) on an ongoing basis be-
    cause they are providing “absentee ballot applications, press re-
    leases and all other election-related information published on the
    Secretary of State’s website, voter precinct cards accessible to indi-
    viduals logging on to the Georgia My Voter Page, and election-re-
    lated notices, instructions, and supplies to nursing homes” only in
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540       Date Filed: 06/08/2022    Page: 12 of 50
    12                     Opinion of the Court                20-14540
    English to Gwinnett County voters (or those Gwinnett County
    voters protected by § 4(e)). Second, Plaintiffs seek an injunction
    ordering Defendants to stop “all continuing violations” of §§ 203
    and 4(e), to mail bilingual absentee ballot applications to certain
    Gwinnett County voters, and to provide “bilingual versions of
    press releases and all other election-related information published
    on the Secretary of State’s website, bilingual voter precinct cards
    accessible to Gwinnett County voters logging on to the Georgia
    My Voter Page, and bilingual election-related notices, instructions,
    and supplies to nursing homes in Gwinnett County.”
    B. Procedural Background
    In response to Secretary Raffensperger’s mailing of the ini-
    tial English-only absentee ballot applications, the organizational
    Plaintiffs sued under §§ 203 and 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act.
    They subsequently filed an amended complaint adding the individ-
    ual Plaintiffs.
    With the 2020 presidential primary election approaching,
    Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion seeking preliminary injunctive
    relief on April 20, 2020. The motion requested that the district
    court “[e]njoin all continuing violations” of the Voting Rights Act
    and require the mailing of “accurately translated bilingual absentee
    ballot application[s] to Gwinnett County voters who were sent
    English-only applications or, alternatively, to all Gwinnett County
    voters who self-identified as ‘Hispanic/Latino’ when they regis-
    tered to vote and all voters residing in all Gwinett County precincts
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540       Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 13 of 50
    20-14540               Opinion of the Court                        13
    for which at least five percent of voters identified as Hispanic on
    their voter registration cards.” Defendants responded that Secre-
    tary Raffensperger is not subject to § 203 of the Voting Rights Act
    and that the Gwinnett Board of Elections had no duty to translate
    the materials sent by the Secretary’s office. Secretary Raffensper-
    ger further argued that § 4(e) did not require him to provide bilin-
    gual absentee ballot applications to Gwinnet County voters. The
    district court denied the motion, concluding that Plaintiffs were
    not likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.
    Plaintiffs then filed a second amended complaint that ex-
    panded the list of challenged English-only practices and included
    new factual allegations, such as Secretary Raffensperger’s sending
    of additional English-only absentee ballot applications and alleging
    that his office “may consider providing similar services for the pri-
    mary runoff and November General Election.” In response, De-
    fendants filed motions to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
    cedure 12(b)(1) for lack of standing and Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to
    state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
    After the district court held a hearing on the motions to dis-
    miss but before it had ruled on them, Plaintiffs sought leave to file
    a supplemental complaint to address two new developments.
    First, Plaintiffs alleged that Secretary Raffensperger had “launched
    an English-only online absentee ballot application portal—which
    Gwinnett County election officials [were] encouraging voters to
    use through a link on the county’s website.” Second, Plaintiffs
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540       Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 14 of 50
    14                     Opinion of the Court                 20-14540
    alleged that the Gwinnett County Board of Commissioners had
    voted to reject requests to mail absentee ballot applications to all
    of the county’s active registered voters for the November 2020 gen-
    eral election and, instead, “encourage[d] Gwinnett County voters
    to use the Georgia Secretary of State’s new English-only online ab-
    sentee ballot application portal.”
    On October 5, 2020, the district court granted Defendants’
    motions to dismiss. In its order, the district court found that Plain-
    tiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims because they did not suf-
    fer an injury in fact. The district court also determined that, even
    if they had suffered an injury, that injury was neither traceable to,
    nor redressable by, Defendants. Additionally, the district court
    found that Plaintiffs’ claims were moot because Secretary Raffen-
    sperger was “not likely to take the same challenged action again,
    such that it would subject Plaintiffs to the same alleged harm in the
    future.”
    In the alternative, the district court concluded that, even if
    Plaintiffs had standing, they failed to state a claim under Rule
    12(b)(6). In support of its conclusion, the district court explained
    that: (1) the State of Georgia is not subject to § 203 of the Voting
    Rights Act; (2) consequently, the Gwinnett Board of Elections had
    no duty to provide bilingual translations of the voting materials
    sent out by Secretary Raffensperger’s office; and (3) the Secretary’s
    actions did not violate § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act by condition-
    ing the right to vote on the ability to read or understand English.
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 15 of 50
    20-14540                Opinion of the Court                        15
    Although the district court did not rule on the pending mo-
    tion to supplement before issuing its order on the motions to dis-
    miss, it discussed the substance of the new allegations in its order
    of dismissal. And the district court found that “[n]othing in Plain-
    tiffs’ Motion to File a Supplemental Complaint alter[ed] [its] con-
    clusion.” The district court explained that § 203 applied based on
    the covered entity providing materials, “not the possibility that vot-
    ers within a covered jurisdiction may see or come across materials
    coming from outside it.”
    Plaintiffs timely appealed. Months later, after the parties
    filed their initial briefs to this Court, Governor Kemp signed Senate
    Bill 202 (Act 9) (2021) into law. The bill prohibits the Secretary of
    State from sending absentee ballot applications unless requested by
    the voter and, according to Plaintiffs, requires the Secretary’s office
    to provide a statewide online absentee ballot application portal.
    O.C.G.A. § 21-2-381(a)(1)(C)(i)–(ii) (effective July 1, 2021).
    II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to
    dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
    Parise v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 
    141 F.3d 1463
    , 1465 (11th Cir. 1998),
    and we review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to
    dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, Hill v.
    White, 
    321 F.3d 1334
    , 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). In our de novo review,
    we accept the allegations in the complaint as true and construe the
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540         Date Filed: 06/08/2022       Page: 16 of 50
    16                       Opinion of the Court                    20-14540
    facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Parise, 
    141 F.3d at 1465
    ; Hill, 
    321 F.3d at 1335
    .
    In the context of a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge to standing, “we
    typically confine our standing analysis to the four corners of the
    complaint” but “we may look beyond it when we have before us
    facts in the record.” Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 
    930 F.3d 1225
    ,
    1235 (11th Cir. 2019).
    Finally, to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
    “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
    true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
    v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
    Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007)). Establishing plausibility re-
    quires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted un-
    lawfully.” 
    Id.
    III. ANALYSIS
    On appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in
    dismissing their second amended complaint both for lack of stand-
    ing under Rule 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule
    12(b)(6). We address these issues in turn.
    A. Jurisdiction
    Article III of the Constitution limits the subject-matter juris-
    diction of federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S.
    Const. art. III, § 2. “To have a case or controversy, a litigant must
    establish that he has standing.” United States v. Amodeo, 
    916 F.3d 967
    , 971 (11th Cir. 2019). The “irreducible constitutional
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540         Date Filed: 06/08/2022       Page: 17 of 50
    20-14540                 Opinion of the Court                           17
    minimum” of standing consists of (1) an injury in fact that (2) is
    fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) is
    likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defs. of
    Wildlife, 
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560–61 (1992). These three elements “are
    not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of
    the plaintiff’s case.” 
    Id. at 561
    .
    “Standing is determined at the time the plaintiff’s complaint
    is filed,” Arcia v. Fla. Sec’ y of State, 
    772 F.3d 1335
    , 1340 (11th Cir.
    2014), but it must persist throughout a lawsuit. If a case “no longer
    presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give
    meaningful relief,” the case is moot and must be dismissed. Friends
    of Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 
    570 F.3d 1210
    , 1216
    (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. Fla.
    Dep’t of Health & Rehab Servs., 
    225 F.3d 1208
    , 1217 (11th Cir.
    2000)).
    A district court has “substantial authority. . . to weigh the
    evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear [a]
    case” when deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. Morrison v. Amway
    Corp., 
    323 F.3d 920
    , 925 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Lawrence v.
    Dunbar, 
    919 F.2d 1525
    , 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)). However, if a juris-
    dictional challenge implicates the merits of the underlying claim,
    such as here where interpretation of the Voting Rights Act will de-
    termine the merits as well as whether Plaintiffs have standing,
    “[t]he proper course of action for the district court . . . is to find that
    jurisdiction exists and deal with the objection as a direct attack on
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540       Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 18 of 50
    18                     Opinion of the Court                 20-14540
    the merits of the plaintiff’s case.” Id. at 925 (omission in original)
    (quoting Garcia v. Copenhaver, Bell & Assocs., M.D.’s, P.A., 
    104 F.3d 1256
    , 1261 (11th Cir. 1997)).
    Plaintiffs contend that each of them has standing; Defend-
    ants counter that none do. We need not parse each Plaintiff’s
    standing, however, because one—GALEO—has standing, under a
    diversion of resources theory, to assert all of the claims in the sec-
    ond amended complaint. “Because of the presence of this plaintiff,
    we need not consider whether the other individual and [organiza-
    tional] plaintiffs have standing to maintain the suit.” See Village of
    Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 
    429 U.S. 252
    , 264
    n.9 (1977).
    1. Injury In Fact
    To establish an injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he
    “suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘con-
    crete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural
    or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 
    578 U.S. 330
    , 339 (2016)
    (quoting Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 560
    ). A “concrete” injury is one that
    actually exists—it is “real,” as opposed to “abstract.” Id. at 340
    (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 479 (9th ed. 2009); Webster’s
    Third New International Dictionary 472 (1971); and Random
    House Dictionary of the English Language 305 (1967)). Intangible
    harms, such as those created by statute, can nevertheless be
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540           Date Filed: 06/08/2022         Page: 19 of 50
    20-14540                   Opinion of the Court                              19
    concrete. 3 Id. at 340. The Supreme Court has “long recognized
    that a person’s right to vote is ‘individual and personal in nature’”
    and “‘voters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves
    as individuals have standing to sue’” as they have alleged a concrete
    and particularized injury. Gill v. Whitford, 
    138 S. Ct. 1916
    , 1929
    (2018) (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 
    377 U.S. 533
    , 561 (1964) and
    quoting Baker v. Carr, 
    369 U.S. 186
    , 206 (1962)).
    Future injuries can also be concrete. A plaintiff seeking pro-
    spective relief to prevent future injuries must prove that their
    threatened injuries are “certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty
    Int’l USA, 
    568 U.S. 398
    , 401 (2013). In other words, “the mere risk
    of future harm, standing alone, cannot qualify as a concrete harm—
    at least unless the exposure to the risk of future harm itself causes
    a separate concrete harm.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 
    141 S. Ct. 2190
    , 2210–11 (2021).
    An organization can establish standing in two ways: (1)
    through its members (i.e., associational standing) and (2) through
    its own injury in fact that satisfies the traceability and redressability
    elements. As relevant to this appeal, an organization can establish
    its own injury in fact under a diversion of resources theory. See
    Jacobson v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 
    974 F.3d 1236
    , 1249–50 (11th Cir.
    3 However, “Congress’ role   in identifying and elevating intangible harms does
    not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement
    whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize
    that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341.
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 20 of 50
    20                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14540
    2020) (analyzing both methods of establishing an injury). Under
    this theory, an organization has standing “if the defendant’s illegal
    acts impair its ability to engage in its projects by forcing the organ-
    ization to divert resources to counteract those illegal acts.” Id. at
    1250 (quoting Fla. State Conf. of NAACP v. Browning, 
    522 F.3d 1153
    , 1165 (11th Cir. 2008)). To establish standing under a diver-
    sion of resources theory, an organizational plaintiff must explain
    where it would have to “divert resources away from in order to
    spend additional resources on combating” the effects of the defend-
    ant’s alleged conduct. Id.; cf. Browning, 
    522 F.3d at 1166
     (“These
    resources would otherwise be spent on registration drives and elec-
    tion-day education and monitoring.”); See Common Cause/Ga. v.
    Billups, 
    554 F.3d 1340
    , 1350 (11th Cir. 2009) (explaining that re-
    sources would be diverted “from ‘getting voters to the polls’ to
    helping them obtain acceptable photo identification” (alteration
    adopted)); Ga. Latino All. for Hum. Rights v. Governor of Ga., 
    691 F.3d 1250
    , 1260 (11th Cir. 2012) (observing that an immigration or-
    ganization “cancelled citizenship classes to focus on” increased in-
    quiries about a new law).
    As alleged in the second amended complaint, GALEO was
    founded in 2003, is headquartered in Georgia, and is “one of the
    oldest, largest, and most significant organizations promoting and
    protecting the civil rights” of Georgia’s Latino community. Plain-
    tiffs also allege that a “substantial amount of GALEO’s civic en-
    gagement, voter registration and get out the vote work takes place
    in Gwinnett County.” GALEO generally alleges that it has diverted
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022      Page: 21 of 50
    20-14540                Opinion of the Court                         21
    resources on an ongoing basis from these activities because Secre-
    tary Raffensperger and the Gwinnet County Board of Elections
    provide English-only election materials to limited-English profi-
    cient, Spanish-speaking voters in Gwinnett County. GALEO also
    specifically alleges that it “is reaching out to and educating [limited-
    English proficient,] Spanish-speaking voters about how to navigate
    the mail voting process and how to complete the application, as
    well as other aspects of the electoral process” and that “GALEO
    staff members such as Darrick Alvarez are assisting [limited-English
    proficient] voters who received English-only applications such as
    his parents and Nelson Romero with navigating the absentee vot-
    ing process.”
    At this procedural stage, we must accept GALEO’s allega-
    tions as true, Tsao v. Captiva MVP Rest. Partners, LLC, 
    986 F.3d 1332
    , 1337 (11th Cir. 2021), and we are satisfied that those allega-
    tions sufficiently plead the injury in fact element of standing. First,
    GALEO’s broad allegation of diversion of resources is enough at
    the pleading stage. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 
    455 U.S. 363
    ,
    379 (1982) (holding that an allegation in the complaint that the
    plaintiff organization “has had to devote significant resources to
    identify and counteract the defendant’s” illegal practices was suffi-
    cient to confer standing to the organization in its own right at the
    pleading stage). Second, even if those allegations were not enough,
    GALEO’s more specific allegations identifying the steps it is taking
    in response to Defendants’ alleged illegal activities and the person-
    nel it has assigned to help limited-English proficient, Spanish-
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540         Date Filed: 06/08/2022      Page: 22 of 50
    22                       Opinion of the Court                   20-14540
    speaking voters who received English-only materials satisfy this el-
    ement of standing. See Browning, 
    522 F.3d at
    1165–66 (holding
    that organizations “made a sufficient showing that they will suffer
    a concrete injury” because they “reasonably anticipate[d] that they
    will have to divert personnel and time to educating volunteers and
    voters on compliance” with the challenged law). We therefore
    conclude that Plaintiffs have established a concrete injury sufficient
    to confer standing to challenge the Defendants’ conduct.
    However, even if a plaintiff suffers an injury in fact, that does
    not end the standing inquiry. We now must address whether Plain-
    tiffs satisfy the traceability and redressability elements necessary for
    standing to pursue their claims.
    2. Traceability and Redressability
    The injury must be “fairly traceable to the challenged action
    of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of
    some third party not before the court.” Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 560-61
    (alterations adopted) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
    
    426 U.S. 26
    , 41–42 (1976)). Moreover, “it must be ‘likely,’ as op-
    posed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by
    a favorable decision’” of the court. Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 
    426 U.S. at 38, 43
    ).
    Plaintiffs claim that Defendants failed to provide bilingual
    voting materials and information to voters in Gwinnett County in
    violation of §§ 203 and 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act. As discussed
    above, at this stage of the case, GALEO sufficiently pleaded an
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540       Date Filed: 06/08/2022    Page: 23 of 50
    20-14540               Opinion of the Court                       23
    injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing—it had to divert
    resources to educate limited-English proficient voters in Gwinnett
    County about the English-only materials and information provided
    by Defendants. That injury is sufficiently traceable to Defendants’
    alleged violations of the Voting Rights Act and redressable by a fa-
    vorable decision that Defendants must provide bilingual voting
    materials in future elections.
    The district court, however, concluded that Plaintiffs’ inju-
    ries, if they existed, could not be redressed by a favorable ruling
    because there “was . . . no legal obligation to provide the materials
    Plaintiffs request[ed].” In reaching that conclusion, the district
    court committed two errors.
    First, whether Defendants have an obligation to provide cer-
    tain bilingual materials to voters in Gwinnett County is the legal
    question at the center of this case. And in determining that Plain-
    tiffs lacked standing on that basis, the district court improperly
    equated “weakness on the merits with the absence of Article III
    standing.” Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
    Comm’n, 
    576 U.S. 787
    , 800 (2015) (quoting Davis v. United States,
    
    564 U.S. 229
    , 249 n.10 (2011)). “To establish causation [for purposes
    of standing], a plaintiff need only demonstrate, as a matter of fact,
    ‘a fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff’s injury and the
    complained of conduct of the defendant,’” Charles H. Wesley
    Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox, 
    408 F.3d 1349
    , 1352 (11th Cir. 2005) (em-
    phasis in original) (quoting Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc.,
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540       Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 24 of 50
    24                     Opinion of the Court                 20-14540
    
    386 F.3d 993
    , 1003 (11th Cir. 2004)), and an organizational plaintiff
    need only allege “a drain on an organization’s resources” that
    “arises from ‘the organization’s need to “counteract” the defend-
    ants’ assertedly illegal practices,’” Browning, 
    522 F.3d at 1166
    (quoting Fair Emp. Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg.
    Corp., 
    28 F.3d 1268
    , 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Here, GALEO alleged
    that the Secretary and the Gwinnett Board of Elections engaged in
    illegal conduct and that their conduct—failing to provide bilingual
    voting materials and information—caused GALEO to divert re-
    sources. Those allegations satisfy the traceability requirement of
    standing.
    Second, the district court held that GALEO failed to estab-
    lish standing under a diversion of resources theory based on our
    decision in Jacobson v. Florida Secretary of State, 974 F.3d at 1250.
    In Jacobson, this Court said that the plaintiffs did not “explain[]
    what activities [they] divert[ed] resources away from in order to
    spend additional resources on combatting” the alleged illegal con-
    duct, “as precedent requires.” Id. (emphasis omitted). The district
    court here reasoned that “there is no indication that GALEO would
    in fact be diverting any resources away from the core activities it
    already engages in by continuing to educate and inform Latino vot-
    ers.”
    But the district court did not take into account the signifi-
    cance of Jacobson’s procedural posture. In Jacobson, the district
    court concluded that the organizational plaintiffs failed to establish
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 25 of 50
    20-14540                Opinion of the Court                        25
    injuries based on a diversion of resources theory after holding a
    bench trial during which the witnesses’ testimony did not provide
    evidence about which organizational activities were impaired by
    the allegedly illegal conduct. See id. at 1243, 1250. In contrast, this
    case comes before us at the pleading stage, and “[a]t the pleading
    stage, ‘general factual allegations of injury’ are enough.” Tsao, 986
    F.3d at 1337 (quoting Lujan, 
    504 U.S. at 561
    ). As already discussed,
    GALEO’s allegations exceed the allegations considered in Havens
    and, as this Court noted in Jacobson, Havens “concluded that these
    allegations were sufficient to establish standing at the pleading
    stage, but . . . [the Supreme Court] warned that at trial the organi-
    zation would have to prove ‘that it has indeed suffered impair-
    ment.’” Jacobson, 974 F.3d at 1249 (quoting Havens, 
    455 U.S. at
    379 & n.21). Jacobson’s affirmance that the allegations were not
    proved at trial does not mean that GALEO’s allegations were in-
    sufficient at the pleading stage.
    We conclude therefore that GALEO had standing under a
    diversion of resources theory. Although we find the Plaintiffs had
    standing when the operative complaint was filed to pursue their
    Voting Rights Act claims, we must now determine whether their
    claims have been mooted.
    3. Mootness
    Mootness, like standing, is jurisdictional, as Article III’s case
    and controversy requirement does not expire upon the filing of a
    pleading. If a case “no longer presents a live controversy with
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540             Date Filed: 06/08/2022         Page: 26 of 50
    26                          Opinion of the Court                        20-14540
    respect to which the court can give meaningful relief,” the case is
    moot and must be dismissed. 4 Friends of Everglades, 570 F.3d at
    1216 (quoting Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, 
    225 F.3d at 1217
    ).
    Plaintiffs concede that their challenges to the Secretary’s
    mailing of English-only absentee ballot applications and the Gwin-
    nett County Board of Elections’ failure to translate those applica-
    tions were mooted by the passage of Georgia Senate Bill 202. But
    other aspects of this case remain live. “Where one of the several
    issues presented becomes moot, the remaining live issues supply
    the constitutional requirement of a case or controversy.” Powell
    v. McCormack, 
    395 U.S. 486
    , 497 (1969).
    At this stage of the litigation, in which we must accept Plain-
    tiffs’ well-pleaded factual allegations as true, Plaintiffs allege that
    Defendants continue to violate §§ 203 and 4(e) by “disseminating
    English-only press releases and all other election-related infor-
    mation published on the Secretary of State’s website, English-only
    voter precinct cards accessible to individuals logging on to the
    Georgia My Voter Page, and English-only election-related notices,
    instructions, and supplies to nursing homes, among other items.”
    4 There is an exception to the mootness doctrine, not applicable here, for cases
    that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Murphy v. Hunt, 
    455 U.S. 478
    , 482 (1982). The exception is limited to situations where “(1) the chal-
    lenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its ces-
    sation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same
    complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Ill. Elections Bd. v. Socialist Workers Party, 
    440 U.S. 173
    , 187 (1979)).
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022      Page: 27 of 50
    20-14540                Opinion of the Court                          27
    And Plaintiffs’ requested relief regarding these alleged ongoing
    statutory violations include an order requiring Defendants to
    “[p]rovide bilingual versions of press releases and all other election-
    related information published on the Secretary of State’s website,
    bilingual voter precinct cards accessible to Gwinnett County voters
    logging on to the Georgia My Voter Page, and bilingual election-
    related notices, instructions, and supplies to nursing homes in
    Gwinnett County.” These remaining claims present “a live contro-
    versy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief, ”
    and therefore are not moot. Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 
    273 F.3d 1330
    ,
    1336 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fla. Ass’n of Rehab Facilities, 
    225 F.3d at 1217
    )). Because we hold that Plaintiffs have standing to
    pursue their claims and the claims are not moot, we turn to address
    the merits.
    B. Merits
    To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a com-
    plaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
    ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. at 678
     (quoting Twombly, 
    550 U.S. at 570
    ). A claim is facially plau-
    sible when the alleged factual content “allows the court to draw
    the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the miscon-
    duct alleged.” 
    Id.
     “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
    of action, supported by mere conclusory statements[] do not suf-
    fice” to satisfy a plaintiff’s burden to support the elements of his
    claim. 
    Id.
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 28 of 50
    28                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14540
    While the district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for lack
    of jurisdiction, it alternatively concluded that they failed to state a
    claim upon which relief can be granted, finding that “[e]ven if Plain-
    tiffs have standing, Plaintiffs still lose on the merits.” For the rea-
    sons set forth below, we agree.
    1. Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act
    Pursuant to § 203(b), “no covered State or political subdivi-
    sion shall provide voting materials only in the English language.”
    
    52 U.S.C. § 10503
    (b)(1). “A State or political subdivision is a cov-
    ered State or political subdivision for the purposes of [subsection
    (b)] if the Director of the Census determines” that certain language
    minority population thresholds are met and “the illiteracy rate of
    the citizens in the language minority as a group is higher than the
    national illiteracy rate.” 
    Id.
     § 10503(b)(2)(A)–(B). Section 203(b)
    defines “voting materials” as “registration or voting notices, forms,
    instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating
    to the electoral process, including ballots.” Id. § 10503(b)(3)(A).
    Section 203(b) establishes what a “covered State or political
    subdivision” cannot do. It does not, however, mandate any action.
    That is left to § 203(c), which provides:
    Whenever any State or political subdivision subject to
    the prohibition of subsection (b) of this section pro-
    vides any registration or voting notices, forms, in-
    structions, assistance, or other materials or infor-
    mation relating to the electoral process, including
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 29 of 50
    20-14540                Opinion of the Court                        29
    ballots, it shall provide them in the language of the
    applicable minority group as well as in the English
    language . . . .
    
    52 U.S.C. § 10503
    (c) (emphasis added).
    Sections 203(b) and 203(c) use slightly different language to
    identify the entities subject to their requirements—“covered State
    or political subdivision” and “any State or political subdivision sub-
    ject to the prohibition of subsection (b),” respectively. Whether
    Plaintiffs have a cause of action under § 203 depends on whether
    those terms refer to different entities.
    It is undisputed that Gwinnett County is a “covered . . . po-
    litical subdivision” under § 203(b), and that the applicable “lan-
    guage minority” is Spanish. 
    52 U.S.C. § 10503
    (b)(1). Thus, Gwin-
    nett County cannot “provide voting materials only in the English
    language.” It is also undisputed that Gwinnett County is governed
    by § 203(c)’s mandate such that whenever Gwinnett County pro-
    vides the materials identified in that subsection, those materials
    must be in English and Spanish. Finally, it is undisputed that the
    State of Georgia is not a “covered State” under § 203(b), for Spanish
    or any other language minority. See 
    81 Fed. Reg. 87,532
    . Thus,
    § 203(b) does not prohibit Georgia from providing “voting materi-
    als only in the English language.”
    Plaintiffs assert, however, that § 203(c)’s mandate nonethe-
    less applies to Georgia. Under Plaintiffs’ reading, a State is “subject
    to the prohibition of subsection (b)” if it has within its borders a
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 30 of 50
    30                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14540
    “covered . . . political subdivision” even though the State itself is
    not a covered jurisdiction under § 203(b). In that circumstance,
    Plaintiffs contend that a State must provide bilingual voting mate-
    rials to voters in any covered political subdivision within its bor-
    ders, in this case Gwinnett County. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue that
    the State of Georgia must provide bilingual voting materials to vot-
    ers in Gwinnett County.
    In support of their reading of § 203(c), Plaintiffs argue that
    Congress could have used the “covered State or political subdivi-
    sions” language from subsection (b) if it had intended for subsec-
    tion (c) to cover the same entities. Plaintiffs also note that “subject
    to” is defined as “affected by or possibly affected by (something).”
    Subject to, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-web-
    ster.com/dictionary/subject%20to. Plaintiffs claim that the phrase
    “subject to,” combined with the drafters’ failure to use the identical
    language found in § 203(b), makes it clear that the statute requires
    noncovered States to provide bilingual election materials to voters
    in a covered political subdivision. According to Plaintiffs, the
    meaning is “so plain that this Court has already assumed” in Del-
    gado v. Smith, 
    861 F.2d 1489
     (11th Cir. 1988) “that the statute ap-
    plies in these particular circumstances.”
    In Delgado, this Court affirmed the district court’s denial of
    an injunction seeking to enjoin Florida state officials from conduct-
    ing an election of a citizen initiative to amend the Florida state con-
    stitution. Opponents of the petition contended that the proposed
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 31 of 50
    20-14540                Opinion of the Court                        31
    amendment was improperly on the ballot because the English-only
    petition circulated by its proponents failed to include a bilingual
    translation in § 203-covered political subdivisions. Id. at 1491. Be-
    cause we held that the Voting Rights Act did not apply to citizen
    initiative petitions and that the involvement of state officials in the
    initiative process did not constitute state action, id. at 1490–91, we
    did not address whether § 203 requires a noncovered State to pro-
    vide bilingual election materials to voters in a covered political sub-
    division.
    Plaintiffs contend, however, that the following language in
    the introductory paragraph of Delgado supports their position:
    “[t]he controlling provision of the Voting Rights Act requires a
    state which distributes ‘materials or information relating to the
    electoral process’ to certain bilingual political subdivisions to pro-
    vide them ‘in the language of the applicable language minority
    group as well as in the English language.’” Id. at 1490 (quoting 42
    U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4) (1981)). We disagree. This language in Del-
    gado regarding the scope of § 203’s mandate is dicta. Dicta are de-
    fined as “those portions of an opinion that are not necessary to de-
    ciding the case then before us.” See Fresh Results, LLC v. ASF Hol-
    land, B.V., 
    921 F.3d 1043
    , 1049 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting United
    States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 
    866 F.3d 1233
    , 1244 (11th Cir. 2017)).
    “Although our holdings are precedential, our dicta are not.” 
    Id.
    “The holding of a case comprises both ‘the result of the case and
    those portions of the opinion necessary to that result.’ But the
    ‘holding’ of a prior decision can reach only as far as the facts and
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 32 of 50
    32                      Opinion of the Court                 20-14540
    circumstances presented to the Court in the case which produced
    that decision.” Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d at 1244 (citations
    omitted). The prefatory statement in Delgado that Plaintiffs rely
    on was not necessary to our holding that the Voting Rights Act did
    not apply to the facts and circumstances presented in that case. It
    is dicta, and we are not bound by it. See id.; see also McNely v.
    Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 
    99 F.3d 1068
    , 1077 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e
    are not required to follow dicta contained in our own precedents”).
    We thus turn to the issue before us—an issue which this
    Court has not previously addressed—whether Sections 203(b) and
    203(c) of the Voting Rights Act apply to different entities. Our role
    in this endeavor is to give the statute a “fair reading.” See Antonin
    Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 3 (2012) (“In an age when
    democratically prescribed texts (such as statutes. . . ) are the rule,
    the judge’s principal function is to give those texts their fair mean-
    ing.”); see also Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 
    138 S. Ct. 1134
    ,
    1143 (2018) (“Even if Congress did not foresee all of the applica-
    tions of the statute, that is no reason not to give the statutory text
    a fair reading.”).
    We start, as always, with the language of the statute itself.
    United States v. Forey-Quintero, 
    626 F.3d 1323
    , 1325 (11th Cir.
    2010) (“Because this is solely a matter of statutory interpretation,
    we must start with the language of the statute itself.”). “If the stat-
    ute’s meaning is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for fur-
    ther inquiry.” United States v. One 1990 Beechcraft, 1900 C Twin
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022      Page: 33 of 50
    20-14540                Opinion of the Court                          33
    Engine Turbo-Prop Aircraft, 
    619 F.3d 1275
    , 1278 (11th Cir. 2010)
    (quoting United States v. Silva, 
    443 F.3d 795
    , 797–98 (11th
    Cir.2006)).
    “When examining the plain and ordinary meaning of a stat-
    ute, ‘one of the ways to figure out that meaning is by looking at
    dictionaries in existence around the time of enactment.’” United
    States v. Chinchilla, 
    987 F.3d 1303
    , 1308 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting
    EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 
    852 F.3d 1018
    , 1026 (11th Cir.
    2016)). Moreover, “[i]n ascertaining the plain meaning of the stat-
    ute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at is-
    sue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.”
    K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 
    486 U.S. 281
    , 291 (1988); see also
    Scalia & Garner, supra at 167 (“Perhaps no interpretive fault is
    more common than the failure to follow the whole-text canon
    which calls on the judicial interpreter to consider the entire text, in
    view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its
    many parts.”). “Under the whole-text canon, courts should ‘con-
    sider the entire text [of a statute], in view of its structure and of the
    physical and logical relation of its many parts,’ when interpreting
    any particular part of the text.” In re Cumbess, 
    960 F.3d 1325
    ,
    1333–34 (11th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Regions
    Bank v. Legal Outsource PA, 
    936 F.3d 1184
    , 1192 (11th Cir. 2019)).
    The plain and ordinary language of the statute, read in light
    of this well-accepted canon, leads us to conclude that § 203 cannot
    be read in the way suggested by Plaintiffs. Turning first to
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540              Date Filed: 06/08/2022        Page: 34 of 50
    34                           Opinion of the Court                      20-14540
    dictionaries in existence around the time of § 203’s enactment,
    “subject to” means: “[i]n a state of subjection or dependence; under
    the control, rule, or influence of something; subordinate . . . to the
    power, law, command, etc. of another”5; “[u]nder the power or au-
    thority of another”6; and “[l]iable, subordinate, subservient, infe-
    rior, obedient to; governed or affected by.” 7
    With these definitions in mind, a State that is “subject to the
    prohibition of” § 203(b) is one that is “subordinate to” the prohibi-
    tion, “under the power or authority” of the prohibition, and “gov-
    erned or affected” by the prohibition—in other words, a State that
    itself must directly comply with § 203(b)’s prohibition. Plaintiffs’
    reading that the State of Georgia is “affected by” § 203(b) because
    it has within its borders a county that must comply with § 203(b)’s
    prohibition fails to take into account this sense: “subject to” means
    that the State itself must be under or governed by the statute’s com-
    mand because it meets the statutory criteria established by Con-
    gress in § 203(b). While the drafters used slightly different language
    in subsections (b) and (c), the language refers to the same entities.
    That is, the only entities “subject to the prohibition” of § 203(b) are
    the “covered” States or political subdivisions themselves, and
    therefore only those entities must comply with the mandate of
    5 Subject,   Oxford English Dictionary (1st ed. 1933) (reprinted in 1978).
    6 Subject,   American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1976).
    7 Subject   To, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968) and (5th ed. 1979).
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 35 of 50
    20-14540                Opinion of the Court                        35
    § 203(c). It is undisputed that the State of Georgia is not a “covered
    State” for purposes of § 203(b). As a result, Plaintiffs cannot state a
    cause of action against the Secretary under § 203.
    Although the plain and unambiguous meaning of the lan-
    guage used by Congress answers the question, we note that the
    statutory structure, when considered as a whole, further militates
    against Plaintiffs’ reading. Section 203(c) mandates that voting ma-
    terials be provided “in the language of the applicable minority
    group as well as in the English language.” But § 203(c) does not
    itself indicate what that additional language is. Instead, that is left
    to § 203(b), which provides a language-specific formula to deter-
    mine whether a jurisdiction is “covered” based on specific popula-
    tion and literacy criteria. Section 203(b)’s formula is necessary for
    determining the existence of “a single language minority,” which,
    in turn, is necessary for determining the “language of the applicable
    minority group” under § 203(c). 
    52 U.S.C. § 10503
    (b)–(c) (emphasis
    added). Indeed, § 203(c) expressly refers back to “subsection (b) of
    this section,” providing a further clue to the reader that the States,
    political subdivisions, and language of the applicable minority
    groups referred to in § 203(c) are the same “covered” jurisdictions
    and “single language” minority groups outlined in § 203(b). Simply
    put, § 203(c), either expressly or by natural implication, repeatedly
    refers the reader back to § 203(b), further confirming our conclu-
    sion that Subsections (b) and (c) can only plausibly be read together
    to apply to the same entities.
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540         Date Filed: 06/08/2022      Page: 36 of 50
    36                       Opinion of the Court                   20-14540
    If Plaintiffs’ reading were correct, Congress’ express limita-
    tion of § 203(b)’s prohibition to “covered” jurisdictions would be
    meaningless, or at least something very different from what the
    statute’s plain language provides. Under § 203(b), the prohibition
    on providing English-only materials applies only to States or polit-
    ical subdivisions that meet the statutory formula’s criteria. If a
    State or political subdivision does not meet those criteria, Congress
    has imposed no limitation under § 203(b) on that entity’s ability to
    provide voting materials only in English. But under Plaintiffs’ read-
    ing of § 203(c), there is now some in-between status: a State that
    does not meet § 203(b)’s statutory criteria but nevertheless is pro-
    hibited from providing “voting materials only in the English lan-
    guage” in some parts of its territory. That reading cannot be
    squared with the statutory text of § 203(b) and provides further
    confirmation that Plaintiffs’ reading of § 203(c) as sweeping in ju-
    risdictions on a broader basis than § 203(b) is incorrect.
    Plaintiffs cite the United States Attorney General’s interpre-
    tations of § 203 in support of their reading of the statute, noting
    that the Supreme Court has said that the Attorney General’s “in-
    terpretation of the Voting Rights Act is entitled to considerable def-
    erence.” See City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 
    479 U.S. 462
    ,
    468 (1987). Specifically, Plaintiffs cite 
    28 C.F.R. § 55.9
    , which pro-
    vides that “[w]here a political subdivision (e.g., a county) is deter-
    mined to be subject to . . . section 203(c), all political units that hold
    elections within that political subdivision (e.g., cities, school
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540           Date Filed: 06/08/2022         Page: 37 of 50
    20-14540                   Opinion of the Court                              37
    districts) are subject to the same requirements.” 8 This regulatory
    interpretation cannot, however, be construed as reading the statute
    in the way Plaintiffs propose. It merely says that when a covered
    political subdivision itself contains smaller political units, such as
    cities and school districts, those smaller political units must also
    provide bilingual voting materials if they hold elections. That is,
    the greater includes the lesser. But Plaintiffs ask us to assume that
    because the greater includes the lesser, the lesser—here, Gwinnett
    County—includes the greater—the State of Georgia. Neither the
    statute nor the Attorney General’s interpretation support this con-
    clusion.
    Applying the facts of this case to § 203, only Gwinnett
    County is prohibited, under § 203(b), from providing materials
    “only in the English language,” and only Gwinnett County is re-
    quired, under § 203(c), to provide bilingual voting materials in Eng-
    lish and Spanish. Section 203(c) does not apply to the State of Geor-
    gia unless and until it becomes a “covered” jurisdiction pursuant to
    the formula set forth in § 203(b). Further, § 203(c) only applies to
    Gwinnett County when it “provides” voting materials, i.e., when
    8 Plaintiffs
    also cite 
    28 C.F.R. § 55.19
    (a), which provides that “[a] jurisdiction
    required to provide minority language materials is only required to publish in
    the language of the applicable language minority group materials distributed
    to or provided for the use of the electorate generally.” That regulation, how-
    ever, merely identifies what materials must be distributed in the relevant lan-
    guage; it does not address what entity is subject to § 203(c).
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540            Date Filed: 06/08/2022      Page: 38 of 50
    38                          Opinion of the Court                  20-14540
    it furnishes or supplies 9 the materials. Nothing in the statute re-
    quires Gwinnett County to translate voting materials provided by
    another entity. See 
    52 U.S.C. § 10503
    (c). Thus, Secretary Raffen-
    sperger does not violate § 203 by maintaining English-only voting
    materials and information on his website because the State of Geor-
    gia is not a “covered” jurisdiction under § 203(b). And the Gwin-
    nett County Board of Elections does not violate § 203 by failing to
    translate voting materials and other information provided by the
    Secretary of State.
    In addition to their allegations regarding voting materials
    provided by Secretary Raffensperger, Plaintiffs also allege that the
    Gwinnett County Board of Elections’ website provides inadequate
    access to a bilingual absentee ballot application. While Plaintiffs
    concede that the Gwinnett County Board of Elections’ website al-
    lows users to translate the application into Spanish, they allege that
    accessing the translation function is not obvious and that the trans-
    lations themselves are not accurate enough.
    As a preliminary matter, it is unclear from the pleadings
    whether these allegations form the basis of Plaintiffs’ claim under
    § 203. The Gwinnett County Board of Elections’ website is not it-
    self referenced in Count I. The allegations in Count I that relate to
    9Provide, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1976) (“To
    furnish; supply.”); Provide, Black’s Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1968) (“To sup-
    ply.”); Provide, Oxford English Dictionary (1st ed. 1933) (reprinted in 1978)
    (“To supply or furnish for use; to yield, afford.”).
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540             Date Filed: 06/08/2022         Page: 39 of 50
    20-14540                    Opinion of the Court                                39
    absentee ballot applications refer only to the two rounds of appli-
    cations mailed by Secretary Raffensperger, the alleged ongoing vi-
    olations of § 203 refer only to voting materials and information pro-
    vided by the Secretary, and Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief does not refer
    to the Gwinnett County Board of Elections’ website.               10
    Nonetheless, assuming that some part of Plaintiffs’ claim un-
    der § 203 relates to the alleged deficiencies in the Gwinnett County
    Board of Elections website’s Spanish translation of the absentee
    ballot application, Plaintiffs fail to plead facts to support their con-
    clusions. That Spanish-speaking voters have to click a button to
    translate the webpage from English to Spanish does not render the
    website “only in the English language.”                 See 
    52 U.S.C. § 10503
    (b)(1). We take judicial notice that the website offers Gwin-
    nett County voters fifteen languages other than English in which
    to view its website, including Spanish. See Gwinnett Elections,
    https://www.gwinnettcounty.com/web/gwinnett/Depart-
    ments/Elections (last visited May 10, 2022). The “English >” but-
    ton, which is a commonly used indicator of a website translation
    option, clearly represents the language in which the webpage ap-
    pears upon initially visiting the page and invites the viewer to see
    what other languages are available.
    10The same is true for Count II, Plaintiffs’ claim asserting a violation of § 4(e),
    and Plaintiffs’ prayer for relief as it relates to § 4(e).
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540          Date Filed: 06/08/2022        Page: 40 of 50
    40                        Opinion of the Court                    20-14540
    In summary, because the State of Georgia is not a covered
    jurisdiction under § 203(b), Secretary Raffensperger is not required
    to provide bilingual voting materials under § 203(c). While § 203(c)
    requires Gwinnett County to provide its voting materials in both
    English and Spanish, it does not require Gwinnett County to trans-
    late voting materials provided by the Secretary. And Plaintiffs
    failed to plead facts to support its conclusory allegations that the
    Gwinnett County Board of Elections provides English-only voting
    materials, specifically absentee ballot applications, on its website.
    For these reasons, the district court correctly concluded that Plain-
    tiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
    2. Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act
    Section 4(e) was enacted as part of the Voting Rights Act in
    1965. In § 4(e)(1), Congress invoked its enforcement power under
    § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
    tion, and declared that in order to secure the rights of “persons
    11
    educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant class-
    room language was other than English, it is necessary to prohibit
    the States from conditioning the right to vote of such persons on
    ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the
    English language.” 
    52 U.S.C. § 10303
    (e)(1). Section 4(e)(2), in turn,
    sets forth that prohibition:
    11 “The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
    the provisions of this article.” U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 5.
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 41 of 50
    20-14540                Opinion of the Court                        41
    No person who demonstrates that he has successfully
    completed the sixth primary grade in a public school
    in, or a private school accredited by . . . the Common-
    wealth of Puerto Rico in which the predominant
    classroom language was other than English, shall be
    denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local
    election because of his inability to read, write, under-
    stand, or interpret any matter in the English lan-
    guage . . . .
    Id. § 10303(e)(2).
    The district court determined that Plaintiffs’ § 4(e) claim
    failed on the merits as to Gwinnett County because: (i) Gwinnett
    County consistently provided all voting materials in Spanish and
    was under no duty to translate the voting materials provided by a
    noncovered jurisdiction, here, the State of Georgia, (ii) “Gwinnett
    County provided Plaintiffs with absentee-ballot applications in bi-
    lingual form after the Secretary's distribution,” and (iii) “Plaintiffs
    have been unable to establish that Gwinnett County is otherwise
    preventing its voters from voting in person on Spanish ballots in
    any future elections.” The district court determined that Plaintiffs’
    § 4(e) claim failed on the merits as to the Secretary because Secre-
    tary Raffensperger’s actions “d[id] not amount to ‘conditioning the
    right to vote’ on being able to read or understand English.”
    Like § 203, § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act has not been con-
    strued by this Court or the Supreme Court in a case involving fac-
    tual allegations similar to the allegations present here. We start, as
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540       Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 42 of 50
    42                     Opinion of the Court                 20-14540
    we must, with the statutory text. The relevant text at issue in this
    case states that no person described in § 4(e)(2) “shall be denied the
    right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his
    inability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the
    English language.” 
    52 U.S.C. § 10303
    (e)(2) (emphasis added). Un-
    like § 203, the text of § 4(e) contains an express causation require-
    ment. “The words ‘because of’ mean ‘by reason of: on account
    of.’” Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 
    557 U.S. 167
    , 176 (2009) (quot-
    ing 1 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 194 (1966))
    (interpreting the words “but for” in 
    29 U.S.C. § 623
    (a)(1)). “Thus,
    the ordinary meaning of” § 4(e)(2)’s prohibition on depriving a per-
    son protected by that statute of his right to vote “because of” his
    inability to read, write, or understand English “is that [such inabil-
    ity] was the ‘reason’” he was denied the right to vote. See id. “It
    follows, then” that under § 4(e)(2) “the plaintiff retains the burden
    of persuasion to establish that” inability to read, write, understand,
    or interpret English “was the ‘but-for’ cause of the” State’s denial
    of his right to vote. See id. at 177.
    At the outset, and for the reasons discussed in our consider-
    ation of standing, see supra, Section III.A., the allegations relating
    to the Secretary’s mailings of English-only absentee ballot applica-
    tions, and the Gwinnett County Board of Elections’ failure to trans-
    late them into Spanish, are moot. We therefore consider whether
    the allegations of ongoing violations of § 4(e) sufficiently establish
    a cause of action under the statute.
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540       Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 43 of 50
    20-14540               Opinion of the Court                        43
    Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violate § 4(e) on an ongoing
    basis by disseminating: “English-only press releases and all other
    election-related information published on the Secretary of State’s
    website, English-only voter precinct cards accessible to individuals
    logging on to the Georgia My Voter Page, and the English-only
    election-related notices, instructions, and supplies to nursing
    homes, among other items” provided by the Secretary of State.
    Plaintiffs further allege that these activities violate § 4(e) because
    the right to vote under § 4(e) “encompasses the right to an effective
    vote” and that this “requires that jurisdictions provide instructions,
    ballots, and ‘any other material which forms part of this official
    communication to registered voters prior to an election’ in [the]
    Spanish language.”
    As Plaintiffs point out, courts have described the right to
    vote under § 4(e) as encompassing “the right to an effective vote,”
    i.e., “the right to cast effective votes for the candidate of [the
    voter’s] choice.” See, e.g., Puerto Rican Org. for Pol. Action v.
    Kusper, 
    490 F.2d 575
    , 580 (7th Cir. 1973) (quoting United States v.
    Post, 
    297 F. Supp. 46
    , 51 (W.D. La. 1969)). In Kusper, the Seventh
    Circuit affirmed a district court’s preliminary injunction ordering
    local elections commissioners “to print Spanish translations of di-
    rections for using voting machines to be pasted over English in-
    structions on specimen ballots,” to put up Spanish-language posters
    advising about the availability of assistance, and to provide Spanish-
    language instruction cards for model voting machines in certain
    polling places located within precincts in eleven wards. 
    Id.
     at 576–
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540       Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 44 of 50
    44                     Opinion of the Court                 20-14540
    77, 580. In addition, the elections commissioners were ordered to
    “make all reasonable efforts” to recruit and place bilingual elections
    judges at those same polling places. Id. at 577. The district court
    ordered relief under § 4(e) after finding that protected voters in
    those polling places did “not understand enough English to be able
    to vote effectively unless they ha[d] written instructions or verbal
    assistance in Spanish.” Id. at 576. In affirming the injunction, the
    Seventh Circuit looked at district court decisions considering what
    the right to vote under § 4(e) entailed. Id. at 579. Analogizing it to
    the situation of an illiterate voter, the court noted that it was im-
    plausible that such voter has the right to “pull the lever of a voting
    machine, but not the right to know for whom he pulls the lever.”
    Id. at 579 (quoting United States v. Louisiana, 
    265 F. Supp. 703
    , 708
    (E.D. La. 1966)), aff’d sub nom. Louisiana v. United States, 
    386 U.S. 270
     (1967)). Thus, by analogy, under § 4(e), “a Spanish-speaking
    Puerto Rican is entitled to assistance in the language he can read or
    understand.” Id. at 580.
    This case does not require us to delineate the boundaries of
    permissible and impermissible conduct under § 4(e). For while the
    right to vote protected by § 4(e) involves not only the mechanics
    of casting one’s ballot but also the ability to understand what is on
    the ballot, that does not mean that § 4(e) requires all voting-related
    materials or information to be provided in both English and Span-
    ish, nor does it relieve a party from pleading the causation element
    required by § 4(e)’s text.
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540       Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 45 of 50
    20-14540               Opinion of the Court                        45
    Here, Plaintiffs allege that the Secretary provides press re-
    leases and all other voting-related information on his website, as
    well as voter precinct cards on the Georgia My Voter Page, only in
    English. At the same time, however, Plaintiffs allege that the
    Gwinnett County Board of Elections mailed the individual Plain-
    tiffs bilingual absentee ballot applications, which they were able to
    complete, that the Gwinnett County Board of Elections provides a
    bilingual absentee ballot application on its website, that the website
    itself has an English-to-Spanish translation function, and that
    county boards of registration and elections separately provide vot-
    ers with precinct cards when they register to vote. Additionally,
    Plaintiffs allege that the “Defendants have provided bilingual ab-
    sentee ballots to Gwinnett County voters for the June 9, 2020 pri-
    mary election.” Read together, Plaintiffs’ allegations relating to the
    Secretary’s website and voter precinct cards are insufficient to
    plead that, but for the Secretary’s English-only materials and infor-
    mation, a Gwinnett County voter protected by § 4(e) was or will
    be denied the ability to vote.
    Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding nursing homes located in
    Gwinnett County are a closer call. Plaintiffs allege that the Secre-
    tary is responsible for providing nursing homes with certain elec-
    tion-related training and materials, and that the “election-related
    notices, instructions, and supplies . . . among other items” provided
    by the Secretary are only in English. There are no allegations re-
    garding what, if any, voting materials (e.g., registration materials,
    absentee ballot applications) the Gwinnett County Board of
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022      Page: 46 of 50
    46                      Opinion of the Court                  20-14540
    Elections provides to residents in those nursing homes. But even
    assuming that some of the residents of those nursing homes are
    protected by § 4(e), Plaintiffs’ allegations suffer from the same de-
    ficiency as their allegations relating to the quality of the English-to-
    Spanish translation function of the Gwinnett County Board of Elec-
    tions’ website. We have no way of knowing what the “notices,
    instructions, and supplies”—much less the “other items”—referred
    to in Plaintiffs’ pleading consist of in order to determine whether
    they are the kinds of materials that, because they are in English
    only, could plausibly be the reason a voter protected by § 4(e) was
    or will be unable to cast his vote. In contrast, we do know from
    Plaintiffs’ allegations that materials unquestionably necessary to
    vote—absentee ballots—were provided in both English and Span-
    ish to all of Gwinnett County’s voters. And there is no allegation
    that a voter protected by § 4(e) was or will be unable to cast his
    absentee ballot because of the English-only materials provided to
    his nursing home. Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the materials
    provided by the Secretary to nursing homes in Gwinnett County
    are simply too general and conclusory to allege a violation of § 4(e).
    See Gill, 941 F.3d at 515.
    In summary, there are no allegations that Gwinnett County
    voters protected by § 4(e) were or plausibly will be unable to vote
    because of or on account of the Secretary’s English-only infor-
    mation posted on his website and the English-only precinct cards
    available on the Georgia My Voter Page. Additionally, Plaintiffs
    failed to plead facts to support their general allegations regarding
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540       Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 47 of 50
    20-14540               Opinion of the Court                        47
    election-related items provided by the Secretary to nursing homes
    in Gwinnett County. For these reasons, the district court correctly
    concluded that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under § 4(e).
    C. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File a Supplemental Com-
    plaint.
    The decision whether to grant a motion for leave to file sup-
    plemental pleadings is generally within the discretion of the district
    court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). We review a district court’s denial
    of a motion for leave only for abuse of discretion, Schwarz v. City
    of Treasure Island, 
    544 F.3d 1201
    , 1211 (11th Cir. 2008), but we re-
    view de novo whether a supplemental pleading would be futile, see
    Cockrell v. Sparks, 
    510 F.3d 1307
    , 1310 (11th Cir. 2007). A supple-
    mental pleading is futile “when the claim, as amended, would still
    be subject to dismissal.” Boyd v. Warden, Holman Corr. Facility,
    
    856 F.3d 853
    , 864 (11th Cir. 2017).
    Before the district court ruled on Defendants’ motions to
    dismiss, Plaintiffs sought leave to file a supplemental complaint
    with additional factual allegations relating to two developments:
    (1) Secretary Raffensperger had unveiled a new, English-only ab-
    sentee ballot application portal, which the Gwinnett County Board
    of Elections was encouraging voters to use through a link on its
    website, and (2) the Gwinnett County Board of Commissioners re-
    jected a proposal, which had been supported by the Gwinnett
    County Board of Elections, to mail bilingual absentee ballot appli-
    cations to active voters in Gwinnett County. Together, Plaintiffs
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540       Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 48 of 50
    48                     Opinion of the Court                 20-14540
    asserted, that these developments constituted further violations of
    §§ 203 and 4(e). In its order granting the motions to dismiss, the
    district court concluded that “[n]othing in Plaintiffs’ Motion to File
    a Supplemental Complaint alter[ed]” its conclusions.
    We cannot conclude that the district court abused its discre-
    tion in denying the motion for leave to file a supplemental com-
    plaint. For the reasons previously discussed, the Secretary is not
    subject to the requirements of § 203, and § 203 does not require the
    Gwinnett County Board of Elections to translate into Spanish vot-
    ing-related materials provided by the Secretary.
    Turning to § 4(e), there is no question that using the Secre-
    tary’s portal to file an absentee ballot application may be more con-
    venient for many voters, and Plaintiffs also allege that the portal
    provides a voter with a printed confirmation that his application
    was filed. But that is not enough to state a cause of action for vio-
    lation of § 4(e). This supplemental allegation does not demonstrate
    that the additional resources provided on the Secretary’s website
    amount to effectively conditioning the right to vote on the ability
    to read and understand English. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ proposed
    supplemental complaint does not deny that the Gwinnett County
    Board of Elections provides a bilingual absentee ballot application
    on its own website and that the website also has an English-to-
    Spanish translation function. Because those allegations would re-
    main part of Plaintiffs’ pleadings even if the motion for leave had
    been granted, Plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege that certain
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022     Page: 49 of 50
    20-14540                Opinion of the Court                        49
    voters were denied the right to vote based on their inability to read
    and understand English. And, as already discussed above, even as-
    suming that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the website’s deficien-
    cies form part of their claim under § 4(e), those allegations are in-
    sufficient to support a cause of action. Thus, Plaintiffs have not
    pleaded the causation required by § 4(e) between the Secretary’s
    English-only absentee ballot application portal and the denial of the
    right to vote.
    Finally, neither § 203 nor § 4(e) require the Gwinnett
    County Board of Commissioners or the Gwinnett County Board of
    Elections to provide absentee ballot applications, or any particular
    voting material for that matter, only that those voting materials
    that are provided comply with the statutory mandates. Signifi-
    cantly, the proposed supplemental complaint does not allege that
    the Gwinnett County Board of Elections (or Board of Commission-
    ers) mailed English-only absentee ballot applications. Absent any
    statutory mandate that the Gwinnett Board of Elections mail bilin-
    gual ballot applications, there is no claim under either § 203 or
    § 4(e) for its failure to do so.
    Because the additional allegations in Plaintiffs’ proposed
    supplemental complaint would not have stated causes of action un-
    der either § 203 or § 4(e), the amendment would have been futile.
    The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in failing to
    grant Plaintiffs leave to file.
    USCA11 Case: 20-14540        Date Filed: 06/08/2022    Page: 50 of 50
    50                     Opinion of the Court                 20-14540
    IV.    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons discussed above, the district court erred in
    concluding that Plaintiffs lacked standing—GALEO sufficiently
    pleaded standing under a diversion of resources theory, and while
    some of Plaintiffs’ claims were moot, others remained live and
    amenable to meaningful relief from the court. We therefore vacate
    the district court’s dismissal of the suit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).
    The district court was correct, however, in concluding that Plain-
    tiffs failed to state causes of action under either § 203 or § 4(e) of
    the Voting Rights Act and in not granting Plaintiffs leave to file
    their proposed supplemental complaint. We therefore affirm the
    district court’s dismissal of the suit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and
    its denial of leave for Plaintiffs to file the supplemental complaint
    pursuant to Rule 15(d).
    VACATED in part, AFFIRMED in part.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-14540

Filed Date: 6/8/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/8/2022

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Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc. v. Bmc ... , 28 F.3d 1268 ( 1994 )

Puerto Rican Organization for Political Action v. Stanley T.... , 490 F.2d 575 ( 1973 )

David L. Morrison v. Amway Corporation, N.K.A. Alticor, Inc.... , 323 F.3d 920 ( 2003 )

United States v. Forey-Quintero , 626 F.3d 1323 ( 2010 )

United States v. State of Louisiana , 265 F. Supp. 703 ( 1966 )

United States v. Post , 297 F. Supp. 46 ( 1969 )

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