Kaster v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America , 82 F. App'x 28 ( 2003 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                  F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 3 2003
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    JAMES KASTER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                     No. 02-3386
    (D.C. No. 01-CV-2190-JWL)
    SAFECO INSURANCE COMPANY                                (D. Kan.)
    OF AMERICA,                                       (
    212 F. Supp. 2d 1264
    )
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT             *
    Before TYMKOVICH , HOLLOWAY , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Plaintiff seeks review of the district court’s order granting defendant’s
    motion for summary judgment.       See Kaster v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am.      ,
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    
    212 F. Supp. 2d 1264
    , 1279 (D. Kan. 2002). We have jurisdiction under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and we affirm. We review the district court’s decision de
    novo, employing the same standard as the district court.    Amro v. Boeing Co. ,
    
    232 F.3d 790
    , 796 (10th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate if no
    genuine issue as to any material fact is in dispute and the moving party is entitled
    to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
    Plaintiff sued his former employer, Safeco, for employment discrimination
    in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
    29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
    .
    He contends that Safeco failed to promote or transfer him to an open position
    after Safeco acquired plaintiff’s previous employer, American Insurance Co. of
    America. Ultimately, Safeco closed the office at which plaintiff worked and
    terminated his employment.
    In an age-discrimination action, the court follows the familiar
    burden-shifting requirements of    McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green      , 
    411 U.S. 792
     (1973). Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
    case of discrimination.   
    Id. at 802
    . Once plaintiff does so, the defendant must
    provide nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.     See Anaeme v. Diagnostek,
    Inc., 
    164 F.3d 1275
    , 1279 (10th Cir. 1999). At that stage, plaintiff may resist
    summary judgment only if he can present evidence that the defendant’s reasons
    are pretextual (unworthy of belief) or can introduce evidence of discriminatory
    -2-
    motive. Danville v. Reg’l Lab. Corp. , 
    292 F.3d 1246
    , 1250 (10th Cir. 2002).
    “Pretext can be shown by such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
    incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for
    its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of
    credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-
    discriminatory reasons.”    
    Id.
     (quoting Morgan v. Hilti, Inc. , 
    108 F.3d 1319
    , 1323
    (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation omitted)). In evaluating his showing of
    pretext, the Court considers the evidence as a whole.   
    Id.
    Plaintiff alleges that he was not promoted (1) to any of Safeco’s thirteen
    Regional Personal Business Manager (PBM) positions in 1997, (2) to any of three
    later PBM positions in 1998 and 1999, or (3) to an administrative services
    manager position in 1999. He further contends that Safeco failed to place him in
    any available position, although he does not specify a particular position he
    claims should have been his. Plaintiff also challenges Safeco’s failure to transfer
    him to any Territory Manager position (again without naming a specific position),
    even though transfer to Territory Manager would have been a demotion. Finally,
    plaintiff claims Safeco terminated him on the basis of his age.
    The district court fully considered all of plaintiff’s arguments. The court
    found that claims regarding promotion and selection decisions prior to November
    of 1998 were time-barred because plaintiff failed to file timely an administrative
    -3-
    charge with the EEOC.      Kaster , 
    212 F. Supp. 2d at 1268-69
    . The court further
    determined that plaintiff was not entitled to an additional period of time under the
    doctrine of equitable tolling because there was no evidence that any of Safeco’s
    actions were intended to delay plaintiff’s filing of a discrimination charge.    
    Id. at 1269-70
    .
    The district court held that plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie
    case of discrimination based on Safeco’s failure to transfer him to an unidentified
    “available” position or to a Territory Manager position.       
    Id. at 1271-73
    . The
    court assumed without deciding, however, that plaintiff had established a prima
    facie case of discrimination with respect to three specific post-November 1998
    selection decisions.   
    Id. at 1271
    . Considering Safeco’s reasons for the persons
    selected, the court determined Safeco had provided nondiscriminatory reasons for
    those selections.   
    Id. at 1273
    . The district court then determined that plaintiff had
    failed to demonstrate that the reasons offered by Safeco for its decisions were
    pretextual, i.e. , unworthy of belief.   
    Id. at 1274-78
    .
    With regard to plaintiff’s final contention, that Safeco terminated his
    employment based on his age, the district court found this claim duplicative of the
    earlier failure to transfer/failure to promote claims because plaintiff
    acknowledged that the closing of the office where he worked was a legitimate
    business decision, not an effort to eliminate plaintiff’s job or the jobs of older
    -4-
    workers. Thus, the court concluded plaintiff had failed to present evidence
    sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude Safeco’s employment decisions were
    age-related. 
    Id. at 1279
    .
    On appeal, plaintiff raises the same arguments considered and decided by
    the district court. Upon review of the district court’s thorough and careful
    consideration of the issues, we are in agreement with that court’s holdings.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED for substantially the
    same reasons stated by the district court. Safeco’s motion to dismiss the appeal is
    denied.
    Entered for the Court
    Timothy M. Tymkovich
    Circuit Judge
    -5-