Claire Lambert v. Signature Healthcare, LLC ( 2022 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 19-11900    Date Filed: 07/08/2022   Page: 1 of 21
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 19-11900
    ____________________
    CLAIRE LAMBERT,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    SIGNATURE HEALTHCARE, LLC,
    LP MANAGER, LLC,
    LPMM, INC.,
    STAKEHOLDER PAYROLL SERVICES, LLC,
    f.k.a. Signature Payroll Services, LLC,
    LP LAKE WORTH, LLC,
    SIGNATURE HEALTHCARE CONSULTING SERVICES, LLC,
    d.b.a. Signature HealthCARE of Palm Beach, LLC,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900      Date Filed: 07/08/2022   Page: 2 of 21
    2                     Opinion of the Court               19-11900
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    D.C. Docket No. 9:18-cv-81439-DMM
    ____________________
    Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
    BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
    This case requires us to decide whether an arbitration
    agreement was unconscionable under Florida law. Claire Lambert
    was unemployed and had been searching for a job for
    approximately six months before she accepted a position at
    Signature Healthcare, LLC (“Signature”). As a condition of her
    employment with Signature, Lambert signed an arbitration
    agreement. She also signed an acknowledgment that she had
    received Signature’s employee handbook. After Signature fired
    Lambert, she sued Signature. Signature moved to dismiss and
    compel arbitration, but the district court denied the motion
    because it determined that the arbitration agreement was
    unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable. The district court
    reasoned that the arbitration agreement was procedurally
    unconscionable because Lambert lacked a meaningful choice when
    she signed the agreement and substantively unconscionable
    because the handbook acknowledgment form reserved to
    Signature the right to unilaterally modify the terms of the
    arbitration agreement. After careful consideration of Florida law
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900       Date Filed: 07/08/2022     Page: 3 of 21
    19-11900               Opinion of the Court                        3
    and with the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the
    arbitration agreement was not unconscionable, and thus is
    enforceable. Accordingly, we reverse.
    I.     BACKGROUND
    In June 2012, Lambert was 57 years old and had been
    unemployed for approximately six months. During that time, she
    had applied to at least two jobs each week without success.
    Lambert believed that if she did not find a job, she would have to
    retire early to cover her expenses. And if she retired early, she
    would incur financial penalties on her retirement accounts.
    Signature, a healthcare provider for nursing homes and
    assisted living communities, contacted Lambert about applying to
    be an activities director for a senior assisted living community.
    Lambert applied and was hired. As a condition of employment,
    Lambert was required to sign Signature’s arbitration agreement
    (“Arbitration Agreement”). She was also required to sign
    Signature’s      “Stakeholder    Handbook       Acknowledgment”
    (“Handbook Acknowledgment”), which stated that she had
    received and would familiarize herself with Signature’s “Employee
    Handbook” (“Handbook”). Lambert signed both documents.
    According to Lambert, she “felt pressured to sign all of the
    documents in the stack of papers because of [her] financial situation
    and unsuccessful job search even though [she] did not understand
    them.”
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900       Date Filed: 07/08/2022      Page: 4 of 21
    4                      Opinion of the Court                 19-11900
    The Arbitration Agreement provided that:
    All claims relating to your recruitment, employment
    with, or termination of employment from [Signature]
    shall be deemed waived unless submitted to final and
    binding arbitration in accordance with the Federal
    Arbitration Act (“FAA”) or, if a court determines the
    FAA does not apply, by any applicable state
    arbitration act, in accordance with the rules of the
    American Health Lawyers Association (“AHLA”). . . .
    If AHLA ceases providing dispute resolution services,
    the arbitration proceeding shall be governed by the
    rules of the American Arbitration Association. The
    arbitrator and not a court shall decide whether a
    dispute is arbitrable, including all claims that fraud or
    misrepresentation induced the employee to sign this
    Agreement.
    The Arbitration Agreement explicitly covered claims relating to
    “recruitment, employment, or termination of employment”;
    claims arising under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the
    Fair Labor Standards Act; and “any and all claims under federal,
    state, and local laws and common law.” And the Arbitration
    Agreement contained a severability clause: “In the event any
    portion of this Agreement shall be determined by a court to be
    invalid, the remainder of this Agreement shall remain in full force
    and effect, and this provision shall survive such determination.”
    Finally, the Arbitration Agreement advised that:
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900         Date Filed: 07/08/2022   Page: 5 of 21
    19-11900                 Opinion of the Court                     5
    YOU MAY WISH TO CONSULT AN ATTORNEY
    PRIOR TO SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT. IF SO,
    TAKE A COPY OF THIS FORM WITH YOU.
    HOWEVER, YOU WILL NOT BE OFFERED
    EMPLOYMENT UNTIL THIS FORM IS SIGNED
    AND RETURNED BY YOU.
    PLEASE READ THESE PROVISIONS CAREFULLY.
    BY SIGNING BELOW, YOU ARE ATTESTING
    THAT YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD
    THIS DOCUMENT AND ARE KNOWINGLY AND
    VOLUNTARILY AGREEING TO ITS TERMS.
    BOTH PARTIES WAIVE TRIAL BY JURY.
    The Handbook Acknowledgment that Lambert signed
    stated:
    I understand that this Stakeholder Handbook is not
    intended to, nor does it constitute a contract of
    employment or a promise or guarantee of benefits or
    policies stated in it.
    I also understand that this Stakeholder Handbook is
    only a brief summary of the policies and procedures
    of this company and an overview of the rules and
    practices.
    *      *     *
    I further understand that the company may, on its
    own, change or discontinue any policy in the
    stakeholder handbook or other writing, without
    having to consult anyone and without anyone’s
    agreement and at any time.
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900      Date Filed: 07/08/2022    Page: 6 of 21
    6                     Opinion of the Court               19-11900
    The Handbook—a separate document from the Handbook
    Acknowledgment—contained Signature’s written policies and
    procedures. Relevant here, the Handbook contained a “Conflict
    Resolution” policy.       Under that policy, the Handbook
    “encourage[d] [employees] to discuss work related problems or
    issues with Supervisors at any time.” It also explained that
    employees “have the right to present a complaint[.]” But “[i]f the
    conflict is not resolved, or if the [employee] is not comfortable
    approaching the individual(s) involved, then the [employee] should
    follow the complaint procedure below.” That “complaint
    procedure” was arbitration.
    The Handbook then summarized the basic terms of the
    Arbitration Agreement:
    All disputes between [employees] and the company
    or its management, which are not resolved through
    the Conflict Resolution procedure, must be
    submitted to binding arbitration. This means that
    claims of any kind concerning your employment with
    the Company will be decided by a neutral
    third[]party, and not in a court of law. The third
    party’s decision will be final and [an employee] may
    not file a lawsuit or pursue any administrative
    remedies unless otherwise permitted by law. As a
    condition of employment, applicants and
    [employees] must sign an Arbitration Agreement.
    Signed acknowledgment of receipt of the Stakeholder
    Handbook shall serve as acceptance and
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900                Date Filed: 07/08/2022          Page: 7 of 21
    19-11900                      Opinion of the Court                               7
    understanding of this condition of employment,
    thereby binding [employees] to the Arbitration
    Agreement.
    Lambert was ultimately fired by Signature.
    After Lambert was fired, she sued Signature in Florida state
    court, bringing claims under the Family and Medical Leave Act, the
    Fair Labor Standards Act, and state law. 1 Signature removed the
    case to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction and
    moved to dismiss and compel arbitration under the Federal
    Arbitration Act (“FAA”), arguing that the Arbitration Agreement
    was valid and covered Lambert’s claims. 2 Lambert opposed the
    motion to dismiss and compel arbitration. She argued that the
    Arbitration Agreement was unenforceable because there was no
    meeting of the minds and the Arbitration Agreement lacked
    consideration. Relevant here, concerning the lack of consideration,
    1
    Lambert also sued LP Manager, LLC; LPMM, Inc.; Signature Payroll, LP;
    Lake Worth, LLC; and Signature Healthcare Consulting Services, LLC.
    2
    The Federal Arbitration Act provides that:
    A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of
    another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration
    may petition any United States district court which, save for
    such agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28, in a
    civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising
    out of the controversy between the parties, for an order
    directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided
    for in such agreement.
    
    9 U.S.C. § 4
    .
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900          Date Filed: 07/08/2022       Page: 8 of 21
    8                        Opinion of the Court                    19-11900
    Lambert argued that the Arbitration Agreement lacked mutuality
    of obligation because the three documents that she signed gave
    Signature the unilateral ability to modify the terms of the
    Arbitration Agreement. Thus, Lambert argued that the Arbitration
    Agreement was unconscionable. After Lambert amended her
    complaint to add a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
    Signature renewed its motion to dismiss the amended complaint
    and compel arbitration.
    The parties then filed a joint discovery plan. Signature
    moved to stay discovery on the merits to avoid potentially waiving
    its right to arbitration. Signature maintained that any discovery the
    district court permitted should “be limited to the issue of
    enforceability of the arbitration issue.” Signature then asked
    Lambert’s counsel “to advise as to what discovery Plaintiff felt
    would be necessary that is directed and relevant to the pending
    arbitration issue.” Lambert’s counsel did not answer Signature’s
    motion to stay discovery, but instead moved to compel discovery
    on the merits of the case. Lambert then filed an opposition to
    Signature’s renewed motion to dismiss and compel arbitration and
    incorporated her previous arguments.
    The district court denied Signature’s motion to dismiss and
    compel arbitration. 3 It denied the motion because it identified a
    “threshold issue” of “whether a valid written agreement to
    3
    The district court simultaneously dismissed as moot Signature’s motion to
    stay discovery.
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900           Date Filed: 07/08/2022       Page: 9 of 21
    19-11900                  Opinion of the Court                             9
    arbitrate was ever formed.” The district court found that no valid
    written agreement to arbitrate was ever formed because the
    Arbitration Agreement was unconscionable, both procedurally and
    substantively. 4
    First, the district court determined that the Arbitration
    Agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it was a
    “contract of adhesion.” The district court reasoned that the
    Arbitration Agreement was a condition of employment and
    presented on a “take it or leave it” basis. And given Lambert’s
    financial situation, she “did not have a meaningful option” to refuse
    to sign it.
    Second, the district court found that the Arbitration
    Agreement was substantively unconscionable. The district court
    focused on the Handbook Acknowledgment’s language that
    Signature “may, on its own, change or discontinue any policy in
    the stakeholder handbook or other writing, without having to
    consult anyone and without anyone’s agreement and at any time.”
    It concluded that the Arbitration Agreement and the Handbook
    Acknowledgment should be read together because they were “part
    of the same transaction—the formation of the employer-employee
    4
    The district court noted that, because it “found that the Arbitration
    Agreement is unenforceable for unconscionability,” it did not need to address
    Plaintiff’s other arguments about its alleged invalidity—no meeting of the
    minds, lack of consideration, and contrary to public policy. However, “having
    considered Plaintiff’s additional arguments,” the court found “that they are
    without merit.”
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900            Date Filed: 07/08/2022         Page: 10 of 21
    10                         Opinion of the Court                       19-11900
    relationship” and because the Handbook explicitly referenced the
    Arbitration Agreement. Reading the documents together, the
    district court concluded that the parties lacked mutuality of
    obligation because Lambert was bound by the terms of the
    Agreement, while the Handbook Acknowledgment allowed
    Signature “to modify [the Agreement’s] terms at its pleasure.”
    Having concluded that both elements of unconscionability
    were met, the district court held that the Arbitration Agreement
    was unenforceable under Florida law. Signature timely appealed.
    II.      STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review the denial of a motion to dismiss and compel
    arbitration de novo. Gutierrez v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 
    889 F.3d 1230
    , 1235 (11th Cir. 2018).
    III.    DISCUSSION
    Signature argues that the district court erred when it
    determined that the Arbitration Agreement was both procedurally
    and substantively unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable.5
    5
    We note that Signature also argues on appeal that the “delegation” clause in
    the Arbitration Agreement requires that an arbitrator decide whether the
    arbitration agreement is unconscionable. In the proceedings below, however,
    Signature did not invoke the delegation clause, electing instead to challenge
    Lambert’s unconscionability argument on its merits. Only now, after an
    adverse decision in the district court, does Signature suggest that an arbitrator
    must decide the unconscionability issue. Accordingly, we find that Signature
    forfeited the delegation issue. See, e.g., Johnson v. Keybank Nat’l Ass’n, 754
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900           Date Filed: 07/08/2022        Page: 11 of 21
    19-11900                  Opinion of the Court                              11
    For the reasons that follow, we agree with Signature that the
    Arbitration Agreement is not unconscionable. Accordingly, we
    reverse the district court’s order denying Signature’s motion to
    dismiss and to compel arbitration.
    The Arbitration Agreement provided that “[a]ll claims
    relating to [Lambert’s] recruitment, employment with, or
    termination of employment from [Signature] shall be deemed
    waived unless submitted to final and binding arbitration in
    accordance with the [FAA].” See Given v. M&T Bank Corp., 
    674 F.3d 1252
    , 1255 (11th Cir. 2012) (“The Federal Arbitration Act . . .
    ‘places arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other
    contracts[] and requires courts to enforce them according to their
    terms.’” (quoting Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 
    561 U.S. 63
    , 67
    (2010)). And under the FAA, “a written agreement to arbitrate is
    ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
    exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’”
    Lambert v. Austin Ind., 
    544 F.3d 1192
    , 1195 (11th Cir. 2008)
    (quoting 
    9 U.S.C. § 2
    ). “[G]enerally applicable contract defenses,
    such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to
    invalidate arbitration agreements.” Dale v. Comcast Corp., 
    498 F.3d 1290
    , 1298 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that defendant “waived its delegation
    clause argument when it waited to raise the issue until after it had asked the
    district court to decide arbitrability”). Signature has similarly forfeited its
    argument on severability by failing to raise it below.
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900       Date Filed: 07/08/2022    Page: 12 of 21
    12                     Opinion of the Court                19-
    11900 F.3d 1216
    , 1219 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v.
    Casarotto, 
    517 U.S. 681
    , 687 (1996)). Thus, the FAA “requires a
    court to either stay or dismiss a lawsuit and to compel arbitration
    upon a showing that (a) the plaintiff entered into a written
    arbitration agreement that is enforceable ‘under ordinary state-law’
    contract principles and (b) the claims before the court fall within
    the scope of that agreement.” Lambert, 
    544 F.3d at 1195
     (quotation
    omitted); see also Attix v. Carrington Mortg. Servs., LLC, 
    35 F.4th 1284
    , 1294 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Before enforcing an arbitration
    agreement, the court should ensure that the agreement was
    formed and that it applies to the dispute at hand,” and “should also
    determine whether” there are any grounds “that invalidate the
    arbitration agreement or permit it to be declared unenforceable”
    (quotations omitted and alterations adopted)).
    Under Florida law, “[a]rbitration is a matter of contract, and
    agreements to arbitrate are thus subject to state law defenses to the
    enforcement of contracts.” Fla. Holdings III, LLC v. Duerst ex rel.
    Duerst, 
    198 So. 3d 834
    , 838 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
    Unconscionability is one such defense. Basulto v. Hialeah Auto.,
    
    141 So. 3d 1145
    , 1158–59 (Fla. 2014). To assert the defense of
    unconscionability, the party challenging an agreement “must
    establish that the arbitration agreement is both procedurally and
    substantively unconscionable.” 
    Id. at 1158
    . Florida courts apply a
    “balancing” or “sliding scale” approach, which requires that both
    aspects “be evaluated interdependently rather than as independent
    elements.” 
    Id. at 1161
    . “[B]oth the procedural and substantive
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900       Date Filed: 07/08/2022     Page: 13 of 21
    19-11900               Opinion of the Court                        13
    aspects of unconscionability must be present, although not
    necessarily to the same degree[.]” 
    Id.
     Thus, “one prong [may]
    outweigh another provided that there is at least a modicum of the
    weaker prong.” 
    Id. at 1159
     (quoting VoiceStream Wireless Corp.
    v. U.S. Commc’ns, Inc., 
    912 So. 2d 34
    , 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
    2005)). And “the more substantively oppressive the contract term,
    the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to
    come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice
    versa.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc.,
    
    861 So. 2d 59
    , 62 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
    Florida courts apply the doctrine of unconscionability “with
    great caution[.]” Gainesville Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Weston, 
    857 So. 2d 278
    , 284 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003). They have warned
    that the doctrine is not a mechanism that allows a party to “avoid
    the consequences of a contract freely entered into simply because
    he or she elected not to read and understand its terms before
    executing it, or because, in retrospect, the bargain turns out to be
    disadvantageous.” 
    Id. at 288
    ; Spring Lake NC, LLC v. Beloff, 
    110 So. 3d 52
    , 55 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (same); Murphy v.
    Courtesy Ford, L.L.C., 
    944 So. 2d 1131
    , 1134 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
    2006) (same). An “unreasonable” contract, or a contract “which
    may lead to hardship on one side[,]” is not unconscionable.
    Gainesville Health Care, 
    857 So. 2d at 284
     (quoting Steinhardt v.
    Rudolph, 
    422 So. 2d 884
    , 890 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)). A
    contract is unconscionable only when “it turns out that one side
    . . . is to be penalized by the enforcement of the terms of a contract
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900      Date Filed: 07/08/2022     Page: 14 of 21
    14                     Opinion of the Court               19-11900
    so unconscionable that no decent, fair[-]minded person would
    view the ensuing result without being possessed of a profound
    sense of injustice[.]” Steinhardt, 
    422 So. 2d at 890
     (quotation
    omitted).
    With this general framework in mind, we turn first to the
    issue of procedural unconscionability.
    The district court concluded that the Arbitration Agreement
    was procedurally unconscionable because Lambert lacked a
    meaningful choice when she signed the Arbitration Agreement. It
    reasoned that the Arbitration Agreement was presented on a take-
    it-or-leave-it basis as a condition of employment and that Lambert
    lacked alternative employment options. Because the district court
    misapprehended procedural unconscionability under Florida law,
    we reverse.
    “The procedural component of unconscionability relates to
    the manner in which the contract was entered and it involves
    consideration of such issues as the relative bargaining power of the
    parties and their ability to know and understand the disputed
    contract terms.” Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 
    743 So. 2d 570
    , 574 (Fla.
    1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999). “The central question in the procedural
    unconscionability analysis is whether the complaining party lacked
    a meaningful choice when entering into the contract.” Basulto, 141
    So. 3d at 1157 n.3.
    In determining whether a party lacked a meaningful choice,
    Florida courts look to “the totality of the circumstances.” Fla.
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    19-11900                Opinion of the Court                         15
    Holdings, 198 So. 3d at 839. That analysis considers such factors
    as:
    (1) the manner in which the contract was entered
    into; (2) the relative bargaining power of the parties
    and whether the complaining party had a meaningful
    choice at the time the contract was entered into;
    (3) whether the terms were merely presented on a
    “take-it-or-leave-it” basis; and (4) the complaining
    party’s ability and opportunity to understand the
    disputed terms of the contract.
    Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Cole, 
    287 So. 3d 1272
    , 1275 (Fla. 5th
    Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp.,
    
    592 F.3d 1119
    , 1135 (11th Cir. 2010)).
    The fact that an arbitration agreement is presented on a
    take-it-or-leave-it basis (a contract of adhesion) “is not dispositive.”
    Id.; see also Kendall Imports, LLC v. Diaz, 
    215 So. 3d 95
    , 110–11
    (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (same); cf. AT&T Mobility LLC v.
    Concepcion, 
    563 U.S. 333
    , 346–47 (2011) (“[T]he times in which
    consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long
    past.”). Florida courts define a contract of adhesion as a
    “[s]tandardized contract form offered to consumers of goods and
    services on essentially a ‘take it or leave it’ basis without affording
    the consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain and under such
    conditions that the consumer cannot obtain [the] desired product
    or services except by acquiescing in [the] form contract.” See
    Powertel, 
    743 So. 2d at 574
     (alterations accepted) (emphasis added)
    (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)). Thus, Florida
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900        Date Filed: 07/08/2022     Page: 16 of 21
    16                      Opinion of the Court                 19-11900
    courts have made it clear that two of the relevant factors that
    Florida courts have identified in determining procedural
    unconscionability—the relative bargaining power and the take-it-
    or-leave-it nature of an arbitration agreement—are not dispositive
    without more.
    Nevertheless, even when an arbitration agreement is a
    condition of employment or obtaining goods or services, “courts
    should explore the circumstances surrounding the execution of an
    arbitration agreement before concluding it is procedurally
    unconscionable.” Hobby Lobby Stores, 287 So. 3d at 1276. In such
    circumstances, Florida courts focus on the other two factors: the
    manner in which the contract was entered into and the
    complaining party’s ability and opportunity to understand the
    disputed terms of the contract. Typically, that inquiry concerns:
    (1) a plaintiff’s ability to understand an arbitration agreement; (2) a
    defendant’s efforts to pressure a plaintiff or discourage a plaintiff
    from asking questions; and (3) the presentation of the agreement
    and the size of the print. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, 287 So. 3d
    at 1276 (an arbitration agreement was not procedurally
    unconscionable because the employee made “no allegation that he
    lacked a full and fair opportunity to inquire into the Agreement’s
    terms or to enlist help if confused” and the “operative terms [were]
    not hidden, minimized, or buried in fine print”); Kendall Imports,
    215 So. 3d at 110 (an arbitration agreement was not procedurally
    unconscionable when a dealership failed to explain the agreement
    in Spanish); Murphy, 
    944 So. 2d at 1135
     (an arbitration agreement
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900        Date Filed: 07/08/2022     Page: 17 of 21
    19-11900                Opinion of the Court                        17
    was not procedurally unconscionable because a dealership did not
    “actively discourage[] or prevent[]” the plaintiff from
    understanding the agreement and the plaintiff “chose not to review
    the terms of her agreement”); cf. Palm Beach Motor Cars Ltd., Inc.
    v. Jeffries, 
    885 So. 2d 990
    , 991 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (an
    arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable because it was
    located on the back of a purchase agreement in fine print).
    Here, the district court reasoned that the Arbitration
    Agreement was procedurally unconscionable because it was
    presented to Lambert on a take-it-or-leave-it basis as a condition of
    employment. To support its conclusion, the district court cited a
    single Florida case, Powertel, 
    743 So. 2d 570
    , to establish the
    definition of a contract of adhesion. However, the district court
    neglected to mention that Powertel explained that a contract of
    adhesion is not dispositive in the procedural unconscionability
    analysis. See 
    id. at 574
     (“Although not dispositive of [the
    procedural unconscionability analysis], it is significant that the
    arbitration clause is an adhesion contract.”). As we have explained,
    the fact that a contract is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis is
    insufficient by itself to show procedural unconscionability under
    Florida law. See Hobby Lobby Stores, 287 So. 3d at 1275 (“In
    Florida, . . . the take-it-or-leave-it nature of arbitration agreements
    is not dispositive.”); Kendall Imports, 215 So. 3d at 110–11 (same).
    That fact is only the beginning of the analysis. We must then
    “explore the circumstances surrounding the execution of an
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900          Date Filed: 07/08/2022       Page: 18 of 21
    18                       Opinion of the Court                    19-11900
    arbitration agreement before concluding it is procedurally
    unconscionable.” Hobby Lobby Stores, 287 So. 3d at 1276.
    Next, the district court reasoned that the Arbitration
    Agreement was procedurally unconscionable because Lambert
    lacked alternative employment options and, therefore, had no
    meaningful choice to refuse to sign the Arbitration Agreement.6
    But as we have just explained, a lack of alternatives is an essential
    part of a contract of adhesion which, by itself, cannot establish
    procedural unconscionability under Florida law. See Powertel, 
    743 So. 2d at 574
    . Lambert must show something more.
    Following our independent review of the record, we cannot
    identify any additional factors that weigh in favor of procedural
    unconscionability. Lambert’s declaration stated that “[n]o one
    explained to [her] the meaning of the terms and conditions in the
    documents [she] was required to sign,” and that she was “confused
    and unsure of the meaning of the terms and conditions” in those
    documents. But the record establishes that Lambert had the
    6
    We note that Florida courts have not required plaintiffs to show that they
    lacked alternative employment options when an arbitration agreement was
    presented as a condition of employment. That said, the lack of alternative
    employment options may be a relevant factor when considering “the relative
    bargaining power of the parties and whether the complaining party had a
    meaningful choice at the time the contract was entered into[.]” Hobby Lobby
    Stores, 287 So. 3d at 1275 (quotation omitted). Moreover, inquiring into
    whether a plaintiff had alternative employment opportunities is consistent
    with our duty under Florida law to evaluate the “the totality of the
    circumstances.” Fla. Holdings, 198 So. 3d at 839.
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900           Date Filed: 07/08/2022         Page: 19 of 21
    19-11900                   Opinion of the Court                              19
    opportunity to ask questions about the arbitration agreement and
    consult with an attorney before signing the arbitration agreement,7
    and she elected not to do so. Thus, her statements that she did not
    understand that agreement’s terms are insufficient under the
    circumstances to show procedural unconscionability. See, e.g.,
    Hobby Lobby Stores, 287 So. 3d at 1276 (an arbitration agreement
    was not procedurally unconscionable because the employee made
    “no allegation that he lacked a full and fair opportunity to inquire
    into the Agreement’s terms or to enlist help if confused”);
    Gainesville Health Care, 
    857 So. 2d at 287
     (finding that although
    the plaintiff “did not understand the arbitration provision” she had
    “ample opportunity” to examine the document and consult with
    advisors or a lawyer); cf. Woebse v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of
    Am., 
    977 So. 2d 630
    , 633–34 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (holding
    that an arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable
    when the plaintiff was not given a copy of the agreement or an
    opportunity to read the agreement and “was merely directed
    where to sign”).
    Lambert’s declaration also stated that she “felt pressured to
    sign all of the documents in the stack of papers because of [her]
    financial situation and unsuccessful job search even though [she]
    7
    The Arbitration Agreement advised Lambert that she “may wish to consult
    an attorney prior to signing this Agreement.” It further advised that by signing
    the Arbitration Agreement, Lambert was “attesting that [she had] read and
    understood this document and [was] knowingly and voluntarily agreeing to
    its terms.”
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900       Date Filed: 07/08/2022    Page: 20 of 21
    20                     Opinion of the Court                19-11900
    did not understand them.” However, Lambert provided “no
    evidence indicating that [Signature] actively discouraged or
    prevented [her] from knowing and understanding the disputed
    contract terms.” Murphy, 
    944 So. 2d at 1135
    . And “pressure” that
    is “self-imposed” does not weigh in favor of procedural
    unconscionability. Spring Lake, 
    110 So. 3d at 55
    . Finally, the
    Arbitration Agreement was not hidden among other documents or
    presented in fine print. See Palm Beach Motor Cars, 
    885 So. 2d at 991
    . The one-page Arbitration Agreement was presented in the
    same font size as other documents such as the Handbook
    Acknowledgment.
    For these reasons, we decline to hold that under Florida law
    an individual who was seeking employment for six months, applied
    to approximately two jobs per week during that period, and faced
    the difficult potential choice to retire early and incur penalties on
    retirement savings lacked a meaningful choice when she signed an
    arbitration agreement as a condition of employment. Florida
    courts recognize that contracts of adhesion are ubiquitous, and
    nothing in their decisions forecasts that some difficulty in securing
    employment combined with the signing of an arbitration
    agreement as a condition of employment renders that agreement
    procedurally unconscionable. To the contrary, Florida courts warn
    us to proceed “with great caution” when applying the doctrine of
    unconscionability. Gainesville Health Care, 
    857 So. 2d at 284
    . We
    are attentive to that warning especially when, as is the case here,
    there are scant details about the nature of Lambert’s job search and
    USCA11 Case: 19-11900        Date Filed: 07/08/2022   Page: 21 of 21
    19-11900              Opinion of the Court                       21
    her future employment prospects. We cannot say that Lambert
    lacked a meaningful choice when she applied to two jobs per week
    and could draw on her retirement funds during her job search. To
    be sure, drawing on those funds would be a difficult personal
    choice. But that choice remained available to her. Thus, Lambert
    has not shown that the arbitration agreement was procedurally
    unconscionable.       And because Lambert’s unconscionability
    challenge thus fails, we need not consider whether the arbitration
    agreement was substantively unconscionable. See Basulto, 141 So.
    3d at 1158–59.
    *     *      *
    Lambert has not met her burden to show that the
    Arbitration Agreement is unconscionable. Thus, the Arbitration
    Agreement is enforceable, and she may not “avoid the
    consequences of a contract freely entered into . . . because in
    retrospect, the bargain turns out to be disadvantageous.” Murphy,
    
    944 So. 2d at 1134
     (quotation omitted).
    IV.     CONCLUSION
    For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s denial of
    Signature’s motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration.
    REVERSED.