Dormezil Jean Erick v. Border Patrol of FL State , 154 F. App'x 193 ( 2005 )


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    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT            FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    NOVEMBER 14, 2005
    No. 04-16276
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar
    CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 04-60941-CV-JIC
    DORMEZIL JEAN ERICK,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    BORDER PATROL OF FLORIDA STATE,
    Chief Patrol Agent,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (November 14, 2005)
    Before DUBINA, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Dormezil Jean Erick, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
    pauperis, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil action, brought pursuant
    to Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
    , 
    91 S. Ct. 1999
    , 
    29 L. Ed. 2d 619
     (1971). Erick sought monetary damages, in
    June of 2004, as compensation for his allegedly illegal detention by the Border
    Patrol for 39 days in 1997, following his order of release from jail on cocaine
    charges, and for his 1998 conviction and sentence for those charges, which he
    claims resulted from the fact that his Border Patrol detention was revealed to the
    jury at trial. The district court dismissed Erick’s complaint pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii), finding that his cause of action had accrued no later than his
    trial in 1998, beyond the four year limitations period that applied to Erick’s Bivens
    claim under Florida law.
    We review a § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissal de novo. Mitchell v. Farcass, 
    112 F.3d 1483
    , 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). Erick contends that his cause of action did not
    accrue until December of 2000, less than four years before he filed his complaint,
    when he received an information sheet from prison officials containing the reason
    for his 1997 detention. Erick also argues on appeal that his claim was brought
    under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 
    28 U.S.C. § 1346
    (b), rather than
    Bivens.
    2
    Federal officials can be held liable for injuries that they cause in violation of
    the Constitution. Bivens, 
    403 U.S. at 395
    , 
    91 S. Ct. at 2004
    . The statute of
    limitations applicable to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     actions applies to Bivens claims. Kelly
    v. Serna, 
    87 F.3d 1235
    , 1239 (11th Cir. 1996). State law governs the limitations
    period in § 1983 cases, and “§ 1983 claims are best characterized as personal
    injury actions.” Wilson v. Garcia, 
    471 U.S. 261
    , 280, 
    105 S. Ct. 1938
    , 1949, 
    85 L. Ed. 2d 254
     (1985). “[W]here state law provides multiple statutes of limitations for
    personal injury actions, courts considering § 1983 claims should borrow the
    general or residual statute for personal injury actions.” Owens v. Okure, 
    488 U.S. 235
    , 249-50, 
    109 S. Ct. 573
    , 582, 
    102 L. Ed. 2d 594
     (1989). Florida law provides
    multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, and a residual
    limitations period of four years. 
    Fla. Stat. § 95.11
    (3)(p); Baker v. Gulf & W.
    Indus., 
    850 F.2d 1480
    , 1481-83 (11th Cir. 1988). The method for determining the
    date when a cause of action accrued for purposes of the statute of limitations in
    § 1983 cases is also used for Bivens claims, and the plaintiff’s cause of action
    accrues when he knows or has reason to know of his injury and who has inflicted
    it. Kelly, 
    87 F.3d at 1238-39
    ; Mullinax v. McElhenney, 
    817 F.2d 711
    , 716 (11th
    Cir. 1987).
    3
    The FTCA imposes a two-year statute of limitations within which tort claims
    against the United States must be “presented in writing to the appropriate Federal
    agency.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2401
    (b). A claim under the FTCA accrues when the
    plaintiff has knowledge of his injury and its cause. United States v. Kubrick, 
    444 U.S. 111
    , 123, 
    100 S. Ct. 352
    , 360, 
    62 L. Ed. 2d 259
     (1979).
    Erick’s complaint indicates that the jury at his 1998 trial was made aware of
    his detention by the Border Patrol. As a result, we conclude that his cause of
    action accrued at that time, when he knew or had reason to know of any possible
    injury and its cause. The fact that the jury in Erick’s 1998 trial learned of his
    detention, which is at the very heart of his complaint, contradicts Erick’s assertion
    that he himself did not learn that the Border Patrol was responsible for his
    detention until 2000. Regardless of whether Erick’s complaint had been construed
    as a Bivens claim or a claim under the FTCA, his complaint was brought before the
    district court nearly six years after his claim accrued, well past the longest possible
    statutory limitations period of four years.
    Erick also argues, for the first time on appeal, that the district court should
    have applied equitable tolling to the statute of limitations in his case, because he
    was misled about the cause of his detention and had no reasonable way of
    discovering the cause. We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on
    4
    appeal unless one of five exceptions is met. Narey v. Dean, 
    32 F.3d 1521
    , 1526-27
    (11th Cir. 1994). No exception is found in this case so we decline to address this
    issue.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of dismissal.
    AFFIRMED.
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