United States v. Angela Cheek Montgomery , 165 F. App'x 840 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                             [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT            FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-13935                  FEBRUARY 7, 2006
    Non-Argument Calendar             THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 04-00307-CR-2-KOB-JEO
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ANGELA CHEEK MONTGOMERY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    _________________________
    (February 7, 2006)
    Before ANDERSON, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    The government appeals the district court’s sentence of eight months’
    imprisonment imposed on Angela Cheek Montgomery, following her conviction
    for bank fraud in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 1344
    (1). The government argues that the
    district court did not give sufficient reasons for the sentence it imposed in
    compliance with 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (c)(2) such that we cannot engage in meaningful
    appellate review and that Montgomery’s sentence is unreasonable in light of both
    the record and the sentencing factors contained in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a).1
    I.
    Under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (c)(2), a district court must state sufficiently specific
    reasons for its departure from the applicable guidelines range so that an appellate
    court can engage in meaningful review. United States v. Suarez, 
    939 F.2d 929
    ,
    933 (11th Cir. 1991). “When evaluating a district court’s reasons for imposing a
    particular sentence, [we] may consider the entire sentencing hearing and need not
    rely upon the district court’s summary statement made at the closing of the
    sentencing hearing.” 
    Id. at 934
    . We have long mandated sufficient findings to
    permit meaningful appellate review and have vacated with directions when that
    was not the case. See United States v. Butler, 
    41 F.3d 1435
    , 1437 (11th Cir. 1995)
    1
    Montgomery argues that we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal because the
    government did not submit evidence that it had obtained proper approval to prosecute this appeal
    pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (b). This argument is without merit. See United States v. Abbell,
    
    271 F.3d 1286
    , 1290 n.1 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that the requirement that the government
    obtain approval under § 3742(b) to prosecute an appeal is not jurisdictional).
    2
    (vacating sentences and remanding for further proceedings because the district
    court did not make sufficient factual findings to permit meaningful appellate
    review).
    United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 
    125 S.Ct. 738
    , 
    160 L.Ed.2d 621
    (2005), made the sentencing guidelines advisory and subjected sentences to an
    unreasonableness review on appeal. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 764-66. In sentencing,
    district courts must still consult the guidelines and correctly calculate the
    guidelines range. United States v. Crawford, 
    407 F.3d 1174
    , 1178 (11th Cir. 2005)
    (citing Booker). After doing this, the district court must consider the sentencing
    factors in § 3553(a) to determine a reasonable sentence, which may be more severe
    or more lenient than that provided for in the guidelines range. United States v.
    Talley, 
    431 F.3d 784
    , 788 (11th Cir. 2005); Crawford, 
    407 F.3d at 1179
    . Nothing
    in Booker altered the § 3553(c)(2) requirement that a district court state reasons for
    its departure from the applicable guidelines range. The district court is obligated to
    give reasons for its departure from the guidelines, but does not have to give
    specific reasons for each § 3553(a) factor it considered in arriving at a reasonable
    sentence. See United States v. Scott, 
    426 F.3d 1324
    , 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting
    that a district court’s statement that it considered the defendant’s arguments and the
    § 3553(a) factors alone is sufficient in a post-Booker sentence) (sentence imposed
    3
    within guideline range).
    Because the district court specifically identified the procedure it followed to
    determine Montgomery’s sentence and gave reasons for the sentence it imposed,
    we can engage in meaningful appellate review. The district court correctly
    calculated the guidelines range in compliance with Booker, took the range under
    advisement, rejected it, and instead imposed a discretionary sentence, which it
    found to be reasonable based on several specific factors in § 3553(a). In addition
    to the statement made by the district court, an examination of the sentencing
    transcript and the PSI allows us to review Montgomery’s sentence to determine if
    it is unreasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors. The district court made clear
    that it was going below the guideline range based on its post-Booker discretion and
    consideration of several factors in § 3553(a). Thus, the district court gave
    sufficient justifications for its sentence in compliance with § 3553(c)(2) and Scott,
    and we can engage in meaningful appellate review.
    II.
    After the district court has accurately calculated the guideline range, it “may
    impose a more severe or more lenient sentence” that we review for reasonableness.
    Crawford, 
    407 F.3d at 1178-79
    . Such review is deferential, requiring us to
    “evaluate whether the sentence imposed by the district court fails to achieve the
    4
    purposes of sentencing.” Talley, 
    431 F.3d at 788
    . Moreover, the reasonableness
    standard is applied to the ultimate sentence, not each individual decision made
    during the sentencing process. United States v. Winingear, 
    422 F.3d 1241
    , 1245
    (11th Cir. 2005).
    In reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, we should be guided by the
    factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). Winingear, 
    422 F.3d at 1246
    . Relevant factors
    include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
    characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence to reflect the
    seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for
    the offense, afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, protect the public from
    other crimes by the defendant, and the need to provide defendant with needed
    medical care; (3) the available sentences; and (4) the guidelines range. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(1)-(4). “[T]he party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of
    establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and
    the factors in § 3553(a).” Talley, 
    431 F.3d at 788
    .
    District courts do not need to establish the reasonableness of the sentences
    they impose by explicitly considering every factor from § 3553(a) on the record;
    some indication in the record that the court adequately and properly considered
    appropriate factors in conjunction with the sentence will be sufficient. Scott, 426
    5
    F.3d at 1329 (imposing sentence at low end of guidelines range).
    Here, the district court indicated that it considered several specific § 3553(a)
    factors in imposing Montgomery’s sentence, including the seriousness of the
    offense (which the court thought was overstated by the guidelines range), just
    punishment, adequate deterrence, the history and characteristics of Montgomery,
    the need to provide restitution, and the need to provide the defendant with needed
    medical care for her mental illness.
    Based on the § 3553(a) factors, Montgomery’s sentence is reasonable. For
    instance, this crime was Montgomery’s first and only offense. Restitution was an
    important component in providing punishment for the offense, and the district
    court recognized this in ordering Montgomery to pay a large amount of restitution
    and sentencing her to the maximum five years of supervised release in order to
    make restitution payments. Based on her lack of a criminal history, Montgomery
    is unlikely to commit further crimes in the future such that she would need a
    lengthy period of incarceration to protect the public. The record also indicates that
    Montgomery had a history of mental illness, which the district court took into
    account in fashioning its sentence. Finally, the eight-month sentence imposed was
    available after Booker because the district court was free to impose a sentence
    below the applicable guideline range after it had been calculated correctly.
    6
    Based on the foregoing, the sentence is reasonable and we affirm the district
    court.
    AFFIRMED.
    7