United States v. Robinson , 426 F. App'x 849 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 18, 2011
No. 10-12497 JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:06-cr-00095-BAE-GRS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KEVIN LAVOY ROBINSON,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(May 18, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, CARNES and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Kevin Lavoy Robinson appeals pro se from the district court’s denial of his
“Motion to Compel Specific Performance,” which requested that the court order
the government to consider moving for a reduction in his prison sentence under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) based on his substantial assistance. He
also appeals the denial of his motion for reconsideration and for an evidentiary
hearing.
I.
In February 2007 Robinson pleaded guilty under a written plea agreement to
one count of possession with intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine
hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). In the plea
agreement the government agreed to “consider whether” Robinson’s cooperation
“qualifies as ‘substantial assistance’ pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and Rule 35,”
but that agreement also made clear that “the determination as to whether the
defendant has provided ‘substantial assistance’ rests solely with the government.”
In August 2009, Robinson filed what he styled as a “Motion to Compel
Specific Performance,” which relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1361 and discussed law
relating to mandamus relief and law relating to Rule 35 motions for substantial
assistance. On February 2, 2010, the district court denied the motion, reasoning
that “in essence” Robinson was merely seeking to have the government file a Rule
35(b) motion but that the decision to do so “rests solely within the discretion of the
government.” The court did not issue a separate judgment on its order.
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On April 30, 2010, Robinson filed a motion for reconsideration of the
district court’s February 2 order. The court denied that motion on May 6, 2010,
and on May 21, 2010, Robinson mailed a notice of appeal as to both the denial of
his original motion and to the denial of his motion for reconsideration.
The government moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction,
arguing that it was an untimely criminal appeal. We issued an order denying the
government’s motion to dismiss, holding that Robinson’s notice of appeal was
timely at least with respect to the district court’s denial of his motion for
reconsideration. We reasoned that because Robinson was requesting mandamus
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1361, the civil appeal filing deadline applied, not the
deadline for criminal appeals. We carried with the case the issue of whether
Robinson’s notice of appeal was timely with respect to the district court’s denial
of Robinson’s motion to compel specific performance of the plea agreement. We
now consider that issue before turning to the merits.
III.
Under Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, every civil judgment
must be set out in a separate document. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). But that rule also
includes five exceptions: “a separate document is not required for an order
disposing of a motion” under Rule 50(b), 52(b), 54, 59, or 60. Id. If the entry of a
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separate document is required, the time to appeal runs from the earlier of either (1)
the entry of a separate Rule 58 judgment or (2) when “150 days have run from
entry of the judgment or order in the civil docket under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 79(a).” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, 79(a). In
a civil case where the United States is a party, a notice of appeal must be filed
within 60 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered. Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a)(1)(B).
Whether Robinson’s May 21st notice of appeal was timely with respect to
the court’s February 2nd order denying mandamus relief thus turns on the question
of whether the court needed to set out its judgment in a separate document.
Because the court did not in fact set out its order in a separate document, and
because none of the exceptions in Rule 58(a) apply, we assume for purposes of
this appeal that Robinson had 150 days from entry of the court’s February 2nd
order to file his notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(A)(ii). Because he
mailed that notice on May 21, 2010, well within the 150 day period, we conclude
that his notice was timely with respect to both the court’s original order denying
mandamus relief and its order denying his motion for reconsideration. We now
turn to the merits.
III.
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We may review the government’s failure to file a Rule 35(b) motion only if
there is a substantial showing that the refusal was based on an unconstitutional
motive. United States v. McNeese, 547 F.3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008).
Whether the government breached a plea agreement is reviewed de novo. United
States v. Mahique, 150 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 1998). A district court’s
decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing is reviewed only for an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 972 (11th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a Rule 35
motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing). Likewise, denial of a motion
for reconsideration is reviewed only for abuse of discretion. Corwin v. Walt
Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1254 (11th Cir. 2007).
The Supreme Court has held that Rule 35(b) gives the government “a
power, not a duty, to file a motion when a defendant has substantially assisted.”
Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 1843 (1992)
(considering motions filed under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1). The
Supreme Court also made clear in Wade that the government’s discretion is such
that federal district courts may review the government’s refusal to file a substantial
assistance motion only if the defendant first makes a “substantial threshold
showing” that the refusal was based upon an unconstitutional motive, such as the
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defendant’s race or religion. Id. at 185–86, 112 S.Ct. at 1843–44. We have held
that arguments that the government had motivations beyond the defendant’s
failure to provide substantial assistance do not satisfy the Supreme Court’s
unconstitutional-motive standard for review. See United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d
825, 831 (11th Cir. 2000).
In United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492 (11th Cir. 1993), we also noted,
with respect to an argument regarding an alleged breach of a plea agreement, that
where the government promised “to consider” filing a substantial-assistance
motion, and where there was no evidence that the government did not consider the
defendant’s assistance, there was no basis for finding that the agreement had been
breached. Id. at 1498, 1500 n.2. The government was required only to consider
the defendant’s substantial assistance, and, absent a showing that it did not
consider it, there was no breach. Id.Robinson has not alleged any unconstitutional motives for why the
government did not file a substantial assistance motion. Further, there is no
evidence that the government failed to consider Robinson’s assistance and
whether it should file a Rule 35 motion on that basis. As a result, the district court
did not err in denying Robinson’s motion to compel specific performance or abuse
its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing and denying Robinson’s
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motion for reconsideration.
AFFIRMED.
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