United States v. Dumas , 216 F. App'x 298 ( 2007 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-4788
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    RODDIE PHILLIP DUMAS, SR.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.  William L. Osteen,
    District Judge. (CR-04-83)
    Submitted:   December 29, 2006             Decided:   February 7, 2007
    Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
    Appellant.   Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney,
    Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Roddie Phillip Dumas, Sr. appeals his convictions and
    resulting sentence for possession with intent to distribute cocaine
    base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (b), 851, possession of a
    firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or a drug
    trafficking crime, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c), possession
    of firearms and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g),     and    forcibly       opposing,     intimidating,     and
    interfering with a United States Postal employee, in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 111
    .        Dumas asserts that:         (1) the search of his home
    was   illegal;     (2)    there    was    insufficient         evidence   to   prove
    possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in
    violation     of   
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c);      and   (3)    his   sentence   was
    unreasonable.      We affirm.
    Dumas first contends that the district court erred in
    denying his motion to suppress evidence gathered as a result of the
    search of his residence.          This court reviews the district court’s
    factual findings underlying such a denial for clear error, and the
    district court’s legal determinations de novo.*                  Ornelas v. United
    States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    , 699 (1996); United States v. Bush, 
    404 F.3d 263
    , 275 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 289
     (2005).                      When a
    *
    The Government contends that Dumas has not previously raised
    the issue of the officers’ use of the term “secure” versus “search”
    in the consent form, and thus it should be reviewed for plain
    error. However, it is clear from the record that the issue was
    discussed at both suppression hearings.
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    suppression motion has been denied, this court reviews the evidence
    in the light most favorable to the Government.      United States v.
    Grossman, 
    400 F.3d 212
    , 216 (4th Cir. 2005).             Despite Dumas’
    contention that the officers’ search was outside the scope of what
    was necessary to “secure the property,” the signed consent form
    clearly gave consent to “go on the property, house and building(s)
    and inside the vehicle(s).”    Once inside the house, Dumas does not
    dispute that the officers found firearms and drugs in plain view.
    Accordingly, we find the district court did not err in denying the
    suppression motion.
    Dumas next contends there was insufficient evidence to
    sustain a conviction under 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c).       To determine if
    there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction, this court
    considers whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable
    to the Government, substantial evidence supports the verdict.
    Glasser v. United States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942).            The court
    reviews both direct and circumstantial evidence and permits the
    “[G]overnment the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the
    facts proven to those sought to be established.”     United States v.
    Tresvant, 
    677 F.2d 1018
    , 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).
    This   court   has   “defined   ‘substantial    evidence’   as
    ‘evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate
    and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt
    beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Smith, 
    451 F.3d 209
    ,
    - 3 -
    216 (4th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 
    94 F.3d 849
    , 862
    (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)), cert. denied, 
    127 S. Ct. 197
     (2006).
    We find the evidence was sufficient to support Dumas’ conviction.
    Contrary to Dumas’ contention that the gun was merely present in a
    room with drugs, the evidence shows that a loaded shotgun, which
    was possessed illegally, was located in close proximity to large
    amounts of cocaine and cash.         Moreover, other indicia of drug
    trafficking were found in the room.            We therefore affirm this
    conviction.
    Finally, we will affirm a post-Booker variance sentence
    provided that the sentence, “falls within the statutory limits for
    the underlying offense and is ‘reasonable.’”                United States v.
    Moreland, 
    437 F.3d 424
    , 432 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2054
     (2006); see United States v. Green, 
    436 F.3d 449
     (4th Cir.),
    cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2309
     (2006).         A sentence that exceeds the
    advisory guideline range will generally be deemed reasonable “if
    the   reasons   justifying   the   variance    are   tied    to   [18   U.S.C.]
    § 3553(a) and are plausible.”      Moreland, 
    437 F.3d at 434
    .           We find
    the record reflects that the district court here adequately and
    properly considered all of the sentencing factors and the statutory
    sentencing limits.    Moreover, the court’s extensive reasoning was
    tied to § 3553(a) and plausibly justified the variance.                     We
    therefore find Dumas’ sentence was reasonable.
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    Accordingly, we affirm Dumas’ convictions and sentence.
    We   dispense   with   oral   argument   because   the   facts   and   legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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