United States v. Theartis Daniels , 218 F. App'x 974 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                             [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                      FILED
    ________________________          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    February 28, 2007
    No. 06-13243                   THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                  CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 04-00367-CR-T-30-MAP
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    THEARTIS DANIELS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (February 28, 2007)
    Before TJOFLAT, HULL and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Theartis Daniels appeals his convictions for conspiracy to possess with
    intent to distribute cocaine, 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , and possession of a firearm in
    furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c). Daniels argues that the
    evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Daniels knew of
    the conspiracy to rob a stash house of eight to ten kilograms of cocaine and
    intended to participate in it. We affirm.
    “We review a defendant’s challenge to sufficiency of the evidence de
    novo.” United States v. Klopf, 
    423 F.3d 1228
    , 1236 (11th Cir. 2005). We “view
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, with all reasonable
    inferences and credibility choices made in the government’s favor.” United States
    v. Martinez, 
    83 F.3d 371
    , 373-74 (11th Cir. 1996).
    “To convict a defendant for conspiracy under 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , the evidence
    must show (1) that a conspiracy existed, (2) that the defendant knew of it, and (3)
    that the defendant, with knowledge, voluntarily joined it.” United States v. Perez-
    Tosta, 
    36 F.3d 1552
    , 1557 (11th Cir. 1994). A defendant can be guilty of
    conspiracy even though the defendant only played a minor role and was not aware
    of “all the details of the conspiracy.” 
    Id.
     “The test for sufficiency of evidence is
    identical regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, and ‘no
    distinction is to be made between the weight given to either direct or circumstantial
    evidence.’” United States v. Mieres-Borges, 
    919 F.2d 652
    , 656-57 (11th Cir.
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    1990) (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 
    719 F.2d 1516
    , 1521 (11th Cir. 1983)).
    Daniels argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for
    judgment of acquittal because no evidence introduced at trial showed that he knew
    of the existence of the conspiracy or agreed to participate in it, but we disagree.
    The government presented substantial evidence from which the jury could have
    concluded that Daniels was a knowing and voluntary member of the conspiracy.
    First, the government presented the testimony of an undercover agent, who
    testified that he asked Daniels if they would split the proceeds of the robbery
    evenly and heard Daniels reply “yeah.” The undercover agent also testified that he
    told Daniels there were eight to ten bricks in response to which Daniels said
    nothing, giving rise to an inference that Daniels understood the meaning of the
    agent. Second, the government presented the testimony of Daniels’s codefendant
    Timothy Williams, who testified that Daniels was a knowing participant in the
    conspiracy and that Williams was carrying a firearm for use in the conspiracy.
    Although Williams had testified at a previous hearing that Daniels did not know
    anything about the conspiracy, the jury was free to credit the testimony of Williams
    that he had lied at the previous hearing. We will not disturb the credibility findings
    of the jury. See United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 
    289 F.3d 744
    , 749 (11th Cir.
    2002). Third, Daniels testified in his defense that he did not know anything about
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    the conspiracy, he did not hear the police sirens when he fled, and he did not see
    the police vehicle before he crashed into it. The jury was free to disbelieve
    Daniels’s testimony and consider that testimony as substantive evidence of guilt.
    United States v. Brown, 
    53 F.3d 312
    , 315 (11th Cir. 1995). This deference to the
    findings of the jury is especially appropriate “where the elements to be proved for a
    conviction include highly subjective elements: for example, the defendant’s intent
    or knowledge.” 
    Id.
    Daniels’s convictions are
    AFFIRMED.
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