Scott Ray Zabriskie v. Court Administration , 172 F. App'x 906 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
------------------------------------------- FILED
No. 04-16103 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar February 1, 2006
-------------------------------------------- THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 03-01856-CV-ORL-22-KRS
SCOTT RAY ZABRISKIE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COURT ADMINISTRATION, of the Ninth Judicial
Circuit in and for Orange County, FL,
MATT BENEFIELD, Administrator, Court Administration
of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County, FL,
CHUCK HYADOVITZ, employee, Court Administration of
Ninth Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County, FL
JANE DOES, employees, Court Administration of the Ninth
Judicial Circuit in and for Orange County, FL,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(February 1, 2006)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Scott Ray Zabriskie, a private citizen, filed a pro se
complaint, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, against the Court Administration of
the Ninth Judicial Circuit in Orange County, Florida, and some of its employees in
their official capacities, alleging that Defendants violated his right of access to the
courts. Plaintiff appeals the district court’s orders (1) dismissing his claims for
money damages as barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, and (2) granting
summary judgment in favor of Defendants on his claim for injunctive relief. No
reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
In his complaint, Plaintiff claimed that he was a pro se litigant in four civil
cases before the state circuit court. According to Plaintiff, Defendants, including
court administrator Matthew Benefiel and assistant court administrator Chuck
Hyadovitz, violated his constitutional rights, particularly his right to equal
protection and to due process, when they denied him continuing access to the
court’s Self Help Center, a facility in the courthouse provided to all pro se
litigants. Plaintiff contended that this denial prevented him from preparing for
hearings in his civil cases at the state circuit court. Defendants countered that
Plaintiff was barred from the Center because he repeatedly had engaged in
disruptive and inappropriate conduct.
2
We conclude that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for
money damages as barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Plaintiff argues
that the court administration is not an arm of the state of Florida but is a local
branch of government: he contends that funding for the court administration
predominantly is local and that its controlling officials are elected locally.
We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo; and we
take as true the facts as alleged in the complaint. Owens v. Samkle Auto., Inc.,
425 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 2005). “The Eleventh Amendment protects a State
from being sued in federal court without the State’s consent.” Manders v. Lee,
338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003)(en banc), cert. denied, 124 S.Ct. 1061(2004). Eleventh Amendment immunity also bars suits brought in federal court
against defendants acting as an “arm of the State,” which includes agents and
instrumentalities of the State even though these entities are not labeled a “state
officer” or “state official.” Id. To determine whether an entity is an “arm of the
State” for Eleventh Amendment purposes, this Court examines: “(1) how state law
defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over the entity;
(3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments
against the entity.” Id. at 1309.
3
At least three of the Manders elements weigh in favor of Eleventh
Amendment immunity for Defendants. First, Florida law addressing payment of
judgments against certain public employees defines “agency of the state” or “state
agency” as including the judicial branch. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 111.071(3).
Florida law also indicates that the court administration of a circuit court--and its
employees--are part of the “state courts system.” See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 25.382.
The first Manders element weighs in favor of Defendants: they are part of the
“state courts system,” which, as a component of the judicial branch, is a state
agency.
Second, the State exercises substantial control over Defendants. State court
administrators are appointed and terminated by the Chief Judge of the Circuit
Court, a state officer who is responsible to the Chief Justice of the Florida
Supreme Court, which, as part of the judicial branch, is considered a state agency.
See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 111.071(3); Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.050(d). Benefiel stated that
his salary is paid by the State of Florida, that he participates in the state retirement
system, that he receives no compensation from a county or municipality, and that
all directives and instructions for fulfilling his role as court administrator come
exclusively from the Chief Judge. And Hyadovitz, as assistant court
administrator, reports to Benefiel.
4
Third, the record is inconclusive about whether the Ninth Judicial Circuit
derived its funding from the state at the time Plaintiff filed his complaint. Benefiel
is paid by the state and participates in the state retirement program. But the record
is silent on who pays Hyadovitz’s salary. And by a constitutional amendment
occurring after Plaintiff filed suit, the State assumed some portions of court system
funding previously provided by counties. See Fla. Const. Art. 5, § 14(b), (c).
Given that, as the district court stated, “[f]unding for Florida’s judicial branch is in
flux,” we cannot determine on this record whether the third Manders element
favors immunity for Defendants.
Fourth, the record shows that the state treasury would be responsible for
money judgments against Defendants. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1327 n.51
(noting that, under Supreme Court precedent, “the state treasury factor is a ‘core
concern’ of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence”). Florida has a Risk
Management Trust Fund that provides insurance for, among other things, “federal
civil rights actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or other similar federal statutes.” See
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 284.30. This fund covers all state departments and their
employees. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 284.31. As we stated, under Florida law, the
judicial branch is a state agency. And the state court system--including employees
of the circuit courts--is part of the judicial branch. Thus, the Risk Management
5
Trust Fund would cover circuit court administrators and their staffs. Furthermore,
Benefiel and the circuit court’s counsel, Robin Berghorn, stated that, in their
experience, judgments rendered against the court administrator or his staff would
be paid by the State out of the Risk Management Trust Fund.
The Manders analysis weighs in favor of Eleventh Amendment immunity
for Defendants. The district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for money
damages was proper.
Plaintiff also challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Defendants on his claims for injunctive relief. He argues that Defendants,
in denying him access to the Self-Help Center, violated his due process rights by
not posting rules against some of the conduct for which he was banned from the
Center. Thus, he claims that he was denied meaningful access to the court system.
And he contends that his equal protection rights were violated when he was asked
to leave the Center and later issued a trespass warning. Plaintiff suggests that, as a
pro se litigant, he should be afforded the same status as prisoners.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo; we view
the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Kelley
v. Hicks, 400 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate
6
when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
We first conclude that Plaintiff suffered no due process violation: Plaintiff
has no constitutional right to be provided access to the Self-Help Center and its
resources. We are aware that the right of access to the courts is protected by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Tennessee v. Lane, 124
S.Ct. 1978, 1988 (2004). And the Supreme Court has written that, for prisoner
litigants, the right of access to the courts “requires prison authorities to assist
inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing
prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained
in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498 (1977). But Plaintiff is not a
prisoner or in custody of the state: he differs from prisoner litigants because he has
freedom to move about and to seek access to additional sources of information and
assistance apart from a prison law library.
We also observe that Plaintiff was not denied meaningful access to the
courthouse. Plaintiff did not assert that he was prevented from filing papers and
from attending hearings in his cases. Instead, Plaintiff alleged that he was denied
7
access to the Center, which he deemed necessary for his hearing preparation.1 But
we doubt that the Center, with its limited resources, is essential for assisting pro se
litigants in preparing for their hearings.2 Evidence in the record shows that a
nearby public library provided legal research materials. We are aware of no
constitutional requirement for government officials to provide non-prisoner, pro se
litigants with access to a facility like the Self-Help Center. We discern no due
process violation: the substantive constitutional right that Plaintiff seeks to enforce
does not exist.
We also reject Plaintiff’s claim that his equal protection rights as a pro se
litigant were violated. No fundamental constitutional right and no suspect
classification is involved: the Equal Protection Clause thus requires only that
Defendants’ treatment of Plaintiff be rationally related to a legitimate government
interest. See Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804,
818 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 869 (2005). Here, Defendants assert
that their exclusion of Plaintiff from the Center was rationally related to the
1
The trespass warning Plaintiff received did not ban him from the courthouse for official county
business.
2
The Center is a small room within the courthouse provided as a courtesy to the public. The
Center contains three computers with internet access, tables and cubicles, telephones, a facsimile
machine, and a copy machine supplied by the Orange County Bar Association. The computers do
not link to court files or to the court’s clerk’s office, and the Center does not provide unique access
to legal research.
8
legitimate interest of maintaining order and security at the Center. We agree with
Defendants.
Plaintiff disputes some of the misconduct that Defendants have proffered to
justify his exclusion from the Center. But he does not deny that he switched the
homepage of a Center computer from the Orange County website to www.hell.org
and that he left this address on the monitor. Plaintiff also does not dispute that
Defendants received complaints about his behavior from other Center patrons.3
Plaintiff’s later statement that he “did not curse at anyone” (emphasis added) does
not rebut this evidence. Plaintiff also admitted that he was involved in an
altercation with other Center users, although he claimed that he was not at fault.
And Plaintiff’s statements that his behavior never was “unacceptable,” or
“concerning or suspicious,” are too conclusory to create an issue of fact about
whether Defendants received complaints about his conduct from other Center
users. See Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000)
(stating that unsupported conclusory statements have no probative value in
opposing summary judgment).
3
Plaintiff stated in an affidavit “I am very sorry if I used profanity that other people heard and
were offended about. I don’t remember, sometimes I just think out loud[,] especially when there’s
noone [sic] else to talk to or bounce ideas off of.”
9
In sum, the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for money
damages as barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity;4 and the district court did
not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s claim
for injunctive relief.
AFFIRMED.
4
We reject Plaintiff’s argument that the district court erred in denying his motion to amend the
complaint to add claims against Benefiel and Hyadovitz in their individual capacities, filed after the
district court dismissed his claims for money damages against Defendants in their official capacities.
As Plaintiff showed no violation of his constitutional rights, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. See Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161,
1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that district court need not allow amendment where, among other
things, amendment would be futile).
10