Leslie S. Osborne v. Denise J. Dumoulin , 428 F. App'x 871 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                          [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                 FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 08-15355                ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    MAY 10, 2011
    Non-Argument Calendar
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 08-60686-CV-AJ,
    BKCY No. 07-17750-BKC-JK
    DENISE J. DUMOULIN,
    Debtor,
    __________________________________________________________________
    LESLIE S. OSBORNE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    DENISE J. DUMOULIN,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (May 10, 2011)
    Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    The question presented on appeal is whether a debtor who elects not to claim
    a homestead exemption and indicates an intent to surrender the property is entitled
    to the additional exemptions for personal property under 
    Fla. Stat. § 222.25
    (4).
    Chapter 222 of the Florida Statutes addresses what real and personal
    property a Florida resident may claim as exempt during certain legal proceedings
    including bankruptcy. Section 222.25 exempts personal property other than a
    homestead.1 In 2007, subparagraph 4 was added to permit a debtor to increase the
    amount of personal exemptions “if the debtor does not claim or receive the benefits
    of a homestead exemption.” 
    Fla. Stat. § 222.25
    (4).
    In this case, Denise Dumoulin filed a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy
    petition. Although she initially filed a schedule of assets claiming an exemption
    for her homestead along with a notice indicating her intent to surrender the
    property, she later amended the schedule of assets to remove the homestead
    exemption, indicate her intent to surrender the property, and seek additional
    personal property exemptions under 
    Fla. Stat. § 222.25
    (4). Trustee Leslie Osborne
    objected to the additional exemptions on the ground that Dumoulin was not
    entitled to claim exemptions under § 222.25(4).
    1
    Generally, homestead exemptions arise under the Florida Constitution, Art. X, § 4.
    2
    The bankruptcy court overruled the objection, concluding Dumoulin had not
    “received the benefit” of the homestead exemption under § 222.25(4) because she
    amended the schedule of assets to remove the homestead exemption and had
    indicated her intent to surrender the property, and thus she was entitled to
    additional exemptions.
    The trustee appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy
    court’s order overruling the objection to the claim of exemption, and the trustee
    appealed.2 Because the Florida courts were split on the interpretation of
    § 222.25(4), we certified the controlling question to the Florida Supreme Court,
    which rephrased the question as follows:
    Whether for the purpose of the statutory personal property exemption
    in section 222.25(4), a debtor in bankruptcy receives the benefits of
    Florida’s article X, section 4, constitutional homestead exemption
    where the debtor owns homestead property but does not claim the
    homestead exemption in bankruptcy and the trustee’s administration
    of the property is not otherwise impeded by the existence of the
    homestead exemption.
    Osborne v. Dumoulin, – So.3d –, 
    2011 WL 320986
     (Fla. Feb. 3, 2011).
    II. Standard of Review
    In the bankruptcy context, we sit as a “second court of review” and thus
    “examine[] independently the factual and legal determinations of the bankruptcy
    2
    We note that the debtor is now deceased. See Osborne, 
    2011 WL 320986
    , at *11 n.1.
    Under Bankruptcy Rule 1016, the death of the debtor does not abate a Chapter 7 petition.
    3
    court and employ[] the same standards of review as the district court.” In re
    Optical Technologies, Inc., 
    425 F.3d 1294
    , 1299-1300 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Issac
    Leaseco, Inc., 
    389 F.3d 1205
    , 1209 (11th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks and citation
    omitted). Generally, we review legal conclusions by either the bankruptcy court or
    the district court de novo.3 In re Financial Federated Title & Trust, Inc., 
    309 F.3d 1325
    , 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2002).
    III. Analysis
    Section 222.25 exempts personal property other than a homestead, but
    allows for an expanded personal property exemption to qualified debtors, i.e., those
    who did not claim any homestead exemption. 
    Fla. Stat. § 222.25
    (4). “The intent
    of the statute appears to be to give a debtor who lacks homestead protections some
    extra personal exemptions.” In re Rogers, 
    396 B.R. 100
    , 102 (M.D. Fla. 2008)
    Under the terms of the statute, the extra personal exemptions are not
    available to debtors who either (1) claim a homestead exemption under the Florida
    Constitution, or (2) receive the benefits of a homestead exemption under the
    Florida Constitution. 
    Id. at 102-03
    . The second clause applies to debtors who do
    not affirmatively claim a homestead exemption. The statute prevents such debtors
    3
    Although we generally review factual findings for clear error, In re Financial Federated
    Title & Trust, Inc., 
    309 F.3d 1325
    , 1329 (11th Cir. 2002), in this case the parties stipulated to the
    facts and the bankruptcy court made no factual findings.
    4
    from claiming the additional personal property exemption if they indirectly
    “receive the benefits of” the homestead exemption. 
    Id.
     Thus, the issue is what
    constitutes “receiving the benefits” of the homestead exemption.
    The trustee argues that both the terms “claim” and “receive the benefits” in
    § 222.25(4) must be given meaning. According to the trustee, every person who
    owns a homestead receives the benefits of that homestead and would be precluded
    from claiming the exemption. The trustee further explains that the definition of
    benefit includes those interests which are never realized.4
    The Florida Supreme Court has read the personal property exemption
    liberally. Osborne v. Dumoulin, __ So.3d __ 
    2011 WL 320986
    , at *7 (Fla. Feb. 3,
    2011). Benefits, according to the state supreme court, are the protection of the
    homestead from creditors. 
    Id. at *8
    . To “claim or receive” the benefits within the
    meaning of the § 222.25(4) gives the debtor the option to claim the homestead
    exemption. When the debtor elects not to do so, thus surrendering the home to the
    4
    The trustee also argues that the court ignored the bankruptcy rules limiting the time in
    which a debtor can amend the schedule of assets or the statement of intention. Courts have no
    “discretion to deny amendments to claims of exemption, unless a showing of bad faith by the debtor
    or prejudice to a creditor is made by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Jordan, 
    332 B.R. 472
    ,
    475 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (citing Doan v. Hudgins (In re Doan), 
    672 F.2d 831
    , 833 (11th Cir.
    1982); In re Talmo, 
    185 B.R. 637
    , 645 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995)). Here, there is no claim that the
    debtor acted in bad faith in amending her schedules or that any creditor has been prejudiced. Thus,
    trustee’s argument regarding the timeliness of the amended schedules is without merit.
    5
    bankruptcy trustee, the debtor has lost the benefits of the homestead exemption.5
    Id. at *9.
    In addressing our certified question, the Florida Supreme Court has held that
    where a debtor in bankruptcy elects not to claim the constitutional
    homestead exemption and the trustee’s administration of the
    bankruptcy estate is not otherwise obstructed by the existence of the
    homestead exemption, the debtor does not receive the benefits of the
    homestead exemption and may claim the section 222.25(4) personal
    property exemption of $4000.
    Id. at *11. Accordingly, because the debtor in this case amended her election and
    did not take the homestead exemption and indicated her intent to surrender the
    property, she was entitled to the personal property exemption. We therefore affirm
    the bankruptcy court.
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    The debtor need not actually abandon the homestead under this analysis. Osborne, 
    2011 WL 320986
    , at *9. But the state supreme court noted that the analysis depended on the facts of the
    case and conceded that there could be circumstances in which a debtor elected the personal property
    exemption instead of the homestead but continued to receive the benefits of the homestead
    exemption. For example, if a husband filed for bankruptcy individually while the nondebtor spouse
    retained the homestead exemption. 
    Id. at *10
    . That is not the factual scenario in this case.
    6