Edith Peterson v. Domingo Oscar Ramirez , 428 F. App'x 908 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________           FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-12692         ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Non-Argument Calendar        JUNE 2, 2011
    ________________________        JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 9:09-cv-81425-KLR
    EDITH PETERSON,
    lllllllllllllllllllll                                          Plaintiff–Appellant,
    versus
    DOMINGO OSCAR RAMIREZ,
    DIEGO RAMIREZ,
    RICHARD ROGERSON,
    JANET GOODENOW,
    AFFORDABLE HOMES OF PALM BEACH, INC., et al,
    lllllllllllllllllllll                                          Defendants–Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (June 2, 2011)
    Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Edith Peterson, proceeding pro se, filed a lawsuit against numerous
    defendants stating several causes of action under state law and claims under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . The district court dismissed her suit because it found that it did not
    have subject-matter jurisdiction on any of the grounds Peterson alleged in her
    complaint. Peterson appeals and asks that we reinstate her lawsuit. Because we
    agree with the district court that there is no basis for subject-matter jurisdiction,
    we affirm.
    We review an order dismissing a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
    de novo. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 
    578 F.3d 1252
    , 1260 (11th Cir. 2009).
    And we liberally construe pro se pleadings. H & R Block E. Enters. v. Morris, 
    606 F.3d 1285
    , 1288 n.1 (11th Cir. 2010).
    Peterson alleges two bases for federal jurisdiction. She first contends that
    federal jurisdiction exists because the parties have diverse citizenship and the
    amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    . Second, she alleges
    federal-question jurisdiction based on her § 1983 claims. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    .
    In order for diversity jurisdiction to exist, there must be complete diversity
    of citizenship. Legg v. Wyeth, 
    428 F.3d 1317
    , 1320 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). That
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    means that the plaintiff’s citizenship must be different from that of each of the
    defendants. If even one defendant’s citizenship is the same as the plaintiff’s there
    can be no diversity jurisdiction. Peterson acknowledges that a number of the
    defendants are (like her) citizens of Florida. Accordingly, because Peterson and
    some of the defendants share the same citizenship there was not diversity
    jurisdiction.
    Peterson also claims that there is federal-question jurisdiction as she has
    sued several of the defendants under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     for violating her 14th
    Amendment rights.
    Merely asserting a federal cause of action is not enough to establish federal-
    question jurisdiction. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. Kraus-Anderson
    Constr. Co., 
    607 F.3d 1268
    , 1273 (11th Cir. 2010). Sometimes, a case may be
    dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction if it is clear the claims on which
    jurisdiction is based are patently without merit. McGinnis v. Ingram Equip., Co.,
    
    918 F.2d 1491
    , 1494 (11th Cir. 1990) (en banc). This is such a case.
    Section 1983 claims can only be asserted against state actors. Am. Mfgs.
    Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 
    526 U.S. 40
    , 50 (1999). But it is not clear from
    Peterson’s complaint that any of the defendants in this case are state actors.
    Indeed, nothing in the complaint that suggests that they are. As the Supreme
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    Court has said, “the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its
    reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.” Id.
    (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here there is no suggestion of
    anything other than merely private conduct, thus even were Peterson’s claims
    viable under some state law theory of recovery, they are not viable under § 1983.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Peterson’s suit
    because there was no basis for subject-matter jurisdiction.
    AFFIRMED.
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