Sarah C. Scott vs Commissionier of Social Security , 428 F. App'x 925 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                  FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-13765                ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Non-Argument Calendar               JUNE 3, 2011
    ________________________               JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-00102-MP-AK
    SARAH C. SCOTT,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    versus
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (June 3, 2011)
    Before EDMONDSON, PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Sarah Scott appeals the district court’s order affirming the Commissioner’s
    denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
    security income benefits. Scott argues the hypothetical questions posed by the
    Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to the vocational expert (VE) regarding her
    ability to work failed to address the full extent of her mental impairments or
    limitations. Specifically, Scott contends the ALJ’s hypothetical failed to include
    her moderate inability to: maintain attention and concentration for extended
    periods, complete a normal workday or workweek without interruptions from
    psychologically based symptoms, and perform at a consistent pace without an
    unreasonable number and length of rest periods. After review, we affirm the
    ALJ’s decision.1
    The Social Security regulations establish a five-step, sequential evaluation
    process to determine disability for both SSI and disability insurance benefits
    claims. See 
    20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520
    , 416.920. The last two steps are relevant to
    this appeal: whether the claimant has the Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) to
    perform her past relevant work, and whether, in light of the claimant’s RFC, age,
    1
    “We review the [ALJ’s] decision to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence
    and based on proper legal standards.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    363 F.3d 1155
    , 1158
    (11th Cir. 2004). “This limited review precludes deciding the facts anew, making credibility
    determinations, or re-weighing the evidence.” Moore v. Barnhart, 
    405 F.3d 1208
    , 1211 (11th
    Cir. 2005).
    2
    education, and work experience, there are other jobs the claimant can perform. 
    Id.
    If a claimant proves she can no longer perform her past relevant work, at the final
    step, “the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show the existence of other jobs in
    the national economy which, given the claimant’s impairments, the claimant can
    perform.” Jones v. Apfel, 
    190 F.3d 1224
    , 1228 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation
    omitted). An ALJ may rely solely on the testimony of a VE in determining
    whether there are other jobs the claimant can perform; however, “the ALJ must
    pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant’s impairments.”
    
    Id.
     at 1229–30.
    The record here demonstrates that the ALJ posed hypothetical questions
    which encompassed all of Scott’s impairments. The ALJ asked the VE to assume
    “moderate limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence, and pace” in
    addition to the physical limitations discussed in the initial hypothetical. The
    specific limitations noted in Scott’s argument are a subset of “sustained
    concentration and persistence” concerns in the Mental RFC Assessment. The
    VE’s testimony constituted substantial evidence that Scott was not disabled.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-13765

Citation Numbers: 428 F. App'x 925

Judges: Black, Edmondson, Per Curiam, Pryor

Filed Date: 6/3/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023