Wendell Harper Smith v. Warden Don Jarriel , 429 F. App'x 936 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                      [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________           FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-12862         ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Non-Argument Calendar        JUNE 13, 2011
    ________________________        JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 1:07-cv-00010-WLS-RLH
    WENDELL HARPER SMITH,
    lllllllllllllllllllll                                                  Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    WARDEN DON JARRIEL,
    lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (June 13, 2011)
    Before EDMONDSON, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Wendell Smith, a Georgia state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
    district court’s denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     petition. We granted a COA on the
    following issue:
    Whether the district court committed a procedural error by declining to
    review the merits of Smith’s claim concerning the state trial court’s
    admission into evidence of two photographs of the victim’s dead body.
    We now hold that the district court committed procedural error, and as a result we
    reverse.
    We review a district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition de novo. Digsby v.
    McNeil, 
    627 F.3d 823
    , 830 (11th Cir. 2010). When a district court fails to address
    all of the claims presented by the petitioner, however, we “will vacate the district
    court’s judgment without prejudice and remand the case for consideration of all
    remaining claims.” Clisby v. Jones, 
    960 F.2d 925
    , 938 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
    Of course not all errors in state trial proceedings support claims for habeas
    relief. As relevant here, a federal court reviewing a state prisoner’s habeas
    petition may not “reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions,”
    Estelle v. McGuire, 
    502 U.S. 62
    , 67–68, 
    112 S. Ct. 475
    , 480 (1991), but it may
    review state evidentiary rulings to determine whether the rulings violated the
    petitioner’s due process rights. Felker v. Turpin, 
    83 F.3d 1303
    , 1311-12 (11th Cir.
    1996). In such instances, the inquiry is limited to determining whether evidentiary
    2
    errors “‘so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law.’”
    Felker, 
    83 F.3d at 1311
     (quoting Lisenba v. California, 
    314 U.S. 219
    , 228, 
    62 S. Ct. 280
    , 286 (1941)) (citations omitted).
    Adhering to these rules, the district court accepted and adopted the
    Magistrate Judge’s Report, which dismissed the claim underlying this appeal –
    Ground 7 in Smith’s underlying habeas petition – because that claim failed “to
    present [a] proper ground[] for habeas corpus relief.” According to the Magistrate
    Judge, this is so because:
    Evidentiary errors in the admission of photographs, which are matters
    of state law, ordinarily will not support the granting of habeas relief.
    Smith v. Newsom, 
    876 F.2d 1461
    , 1468 (11th Cir. 1989). “It is not the
    province of a federal habeas Court to reexamine state-court
    determinations on state-law questions.” [Estelle, 
    502 U.S. at
    67–68, 
    112 S. Ct. at 480
    ].
    We take from this discussion that the Magistrate Judge concluded that Smith
    failed to plead a federal constitutional violation in his petition, and as a result
    denied Smith’s claim as one seeking habeas relief premised upon state evidentiary
    errors.1
    1
    Similarly, by describing the Report and Recommendation as “[finding Ground 7] to be
    [an] inapplicable ground[] for federal habeas relief,” the District Court appears to have reached
    the same conclusion that Ground 7 did not present a claim for relief premised upon the
    Constitution. Thus, because neither the Magistrate Judge nor the District Court inquired into the
    merits of Smith’s due process claim, the record belies the Respondent’s contention that the
    District Court “by implication” ruled on the merits of Smith’s due process claim, and we
    therefore reject that argument.
    3
    We think, however, that the Magistrate Judge failed to afford Smith’s pro se
    petition the liberal construction to which it is entitled. Our longstanding rule is
    that the pleadings of a pro se litigant are liberally construed. Bellizia v. Florida,
    Dep’t of Corr., 
    614 F.3d 1326
    , 1329 (11th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, courts must
    show leniency to pro se litigants, even as they should not serve as de facto counsel
    or rewrite a pleading in order to sustain an action. GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of
    Escambia, Fla., 
    132 F.3d 1359
    , 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds
    as recognized in, Randall v. Scott, 
    610 F.3d 701
    , 709 (11th Cir. 2010).
    A liberal construction of Smith’s petition compels the conclusion that Smith
    pled a federal due process violation. Smith’s habeas pleadings described “Ground
    Seven” as “Trial court abused its discretion by admitting Two photographs[] . . .
    that were highly prejudicial.” Smith later supplemented his petition, explaining in
    his “Brief in Support of petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254” that the prejudice
    from the photographs “violated Due Process.” And petitioner’s objections to the
    magistrate’s report and recommendation stated that the magistrate erred by not
    concluding that the challenged photographs prejudiced his right to a fair trial in
    violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. As clarified in these filings, petitioner’s
    evidentiary claim was a constitutional due process claim that prejudice from the
    4
    offending photographs so infected the integrity of his trial as to warrant habeas
    relief.
    Because we need not rewrite petitioner’s assertions or otherwise act as
    counsel for Smith to conclude he is invoking his constitutional right to due
    process, see GJR Invs., 132 F.3d at 1369, his habeas petition should be construed
    to raise a claim for habeas relief premised on the Due Process Clause of the United
    States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Therefore, we hold that Smith has
    presented a proper ground for federal habeas relief.
    The upshot of this holding is that Smith has raised a potentially viable claim
    for habeas relief that was not passed upon by the district court’s initial Order
    disposing of his habeas petition.2 For this reason, we must vacate the Order below
    and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Clisby, 
    960 F.2d at 938
    .
    REVERSED and REMANDED.
    2
    We hold only that Smith has pled a federal claim, but take no position as to the merits of
    that claim.
    5