Michael S. Anderson v. James E. Donald , 261 F. App'x 254 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                     [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT            FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-16322                   JAN 08 2008
    Non-Argument Calendar            THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 06-00115-CV-1-DHB
    MICHAEL S. ANDERSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    JAMES E. DONALD,
    Commissioner,
    VICTOR WALKER,
    Warden,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (January 8, 2008)
    Before ANDERSON, BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Michael Anderson, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
    sua sponte dismissal of his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     civil complaint for failure to exhaust
    his administrative remedies. In his complaint, Anderson alleged that he was
    deprived of his right of access to the law library and copier, that he was disciplined
    for asserting these rights, that he was subject to involuntary servitude and
    disciplined for not reporting to work, and that the prison food was poor. He also
    alleged that he informed the warden of his grievances, but that he did not appeal
    his claims to the highest administrative level. On appeal, in addition to his claims
    regarding adverse prison conditions, Anderson argues on the merits of a separate
    civil action. However, we will address only the issue of exhaustion in the present
    case.
    We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a § 1983 action for
    failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. Johnson v. Meadows, 
    418 F.3d 1152
    , 1155 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
    1266 S.Ct. 2978
     (2006). The
    Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “no action shall be brought
    with respect to prison conditions under [§ 1983] by a prisoner . . . until such
    administrative remedies as available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This
    exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they
    involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege
    2
    excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 
    534 U.S. 516
    , 532, 
    122 S.Ct. 983
    , 992, 
    152 L.Ed.2d 12
     (2002). “An inmate incarcerated in a state prison,
    thus, must first comply with the grievance procedures established by the state
    department of corrections before filing a federal lawsuit under section 1983.”
    Miller v. Tanner, 
    196 F.3d 1190
    , 1193 (11th Cir. 1999).
    We likewise review the district court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
    §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim de novo, taking as true the
    allegations in the complaint. Leal v. Georgia Dep’t of Corr., 
    254 F.3d 1276
    , 1278-
    79 (11th Cir. 2001) (reviewing dismissals under § 1915A); see Mitchell v. Farcass,
    
    112 F.3d 1483
    , 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (reviewing dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)).
    The PLRA instructs district courts to review “a complaint in a civil action in which
    a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
    governmental entity,” and to dismiss the complaint sua sponte if it “is frivolous,
    malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915A; see id § 1915(e)(2) (instructing courts to review in forma pauperis
    actions and dismiss on the same grounds). To that end, we have held that “a claim
    that fails to allege the requisite exhaustion of remedies is tantamount to one that
    fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Rivera v. Allin, 
    144 F.3d 719
    , 731 (11th Cir. 1998).
    3
    However, subsequent to the district court’s decision in this case, the
    Supreme Court held that “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the
    PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially plead or demonstrate
    exhaustion in their complaints.” Jones v. Bock, __ U.S. __, 
    127 S.Ct. 910
    , 921,
    166 L.Ed.2d. 798 (2007). The Court reasoned that because Congress did not
    specifically include exhaustion in the list of grounds for sua sponte dismissal under
    § 1915A, the normal pleading rules applied. Id. at __, 
    127 S.Ct. at 920
    . Under the
    normal pleading rules, “[a] complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a
    claim if the allegations, taken as true, show the plaintiff is not entitled to relief.”
    
    Id.
     As a result, a complaint may be dismissed if an affirmative defense, such as
    failure to exhaust, appears on the face of the complaint. See id at 920-21
    (cautioning that the conclusion that exhaustion is not a pleading requirement “is
    not to say that failure to exhaust cannot be the basis for dismissal for failure to
    state a claim.”). Otherwise, exhaustion and other affirmative defenses must be
    raised in a responsive pleading. See 
    id. at 919-21
    ; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c). The
    Supreme Court reiterated in Bock, however, that “[t]here is no question that
    exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be
    brought in court.” Bock, __ U.S. at __, 
    127 S.Ct. at 918-19
    .
    4
    Here, the district court found in part that Anderson “did not allege
    exhaustion of his claims.” To the extent that the district court dismissed
    Anderson’s complaint on these grounds, the district court erred in light of the
    Supreme Court’s holding in Bock that “inmates are not required to specially plead
    or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” However, the court also found that
    Anderson’s complaint was “subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust his
    administrative remedies.” Assuming Anderson’s allegations are true, he clearly
    stated in his complaint that he neither appealed his grievable claims after
    presenting them to the proper grievance committee, nor appealed his disciplinary
    claim after presenting it to the warden, as provided in the Department of
    Corrections Standard Operating Procedure. Accordingly, Anderson failed to
    comply with the PLRA’s mandatory exhaustion requirement.
    Upon careful review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs,
    we discern no reversible error. The allegations in Anderson’s complaint sufficed
    to establish that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and thus, the
    district court properly dismissed his complaint.
    AFFIRMED.        1
    1
    Anderson’s motion for oral argument is denied.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-16322

Citation Numbers: 261 F. App'x 254

Judges: Anderson, Black, Marcus, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 1/8/2008

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023