USCA11 Case: 21-10561 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 12/19/2022 Page: 1 of 10
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-10561
____________________
SUSAN LYNNE ROHE
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WELLS FARGO BANK, NA,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-23805-RNS
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10561
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR, and GRANT, Cir-
cuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
For nearly a decade, across state and federal courts, Susan
Rohe has fought the foreclosure of her home by Wells Fargo. After
Wells Fargo initiated foreclosure proceedings and prevailed in a
Florida court, Rohe filed a bankruptcy petition in federal court and
objected to Wells Fargo’s claims as a creditor on the same grounds
that she had raised in state court. Rohe also attempted to remove
her appeal of the state judgment to federal court and to stay the
ongoing state proceedings. These efforts failed. The bankruptcy
court denied Rohe’s removal motion, lifted the stay of state pro-
ceedings, and concluded that Wells Fargo had a valid claim. Soon
after, a Florida court dismissed her appeal.
Rohe appealed the bankruptcy court’s orders to the district
court, which granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss. On appeal
to this Court, Rohe challenges the bankruptcy court’s procedural
rulings and the legitimacy of Wells Fargo’s proof of claim. Rohe’s
procedural objections lack merit, and because the state court ruled
that Wells Fargo is entitled to a judgment of foreclosure, Rohe’s
challenge to Wells Fargo’s proof of claim is barred by res judicata.
We affirm.
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21-10561 Opinion of the Court 3
I. BACKGROUND
In 2005, Susan Rohe and her husband purchased a home
with a mortgage of $448,000. When the Rohes stopped making
payments on the mortgage in 2012, the assignee of the mortgage,
Wells Fargo, instituted foreclosure proceedings in a Florida court.
In 2018, the state court found that Wells Fargo had authenticated
its assignment of the promissory note that secured the mortgage
and that the Rohes had defaulted on the mortgage. The state court
entered judgment in favor of Wells Fargo. The Rohes appealed to
the Florida Third District Court of Appeals.
While the state-court appeal was pending, Susan Rohe filed
a bankruptcy petition in federal court. Rohe moved to stay the state
court litigation based on the commencement of the bankruptcy
proceeding. See
11 U.S.C. § 362(a). But the state court denied her
motion. Soon after, the bankruptcy court formally lifted the stay.
Rohe then filed a flurry of motions and adversary complaints
in bankruptcy court to try to delay the sale of her home. Rohe chal-
lenged Wells Fargo’s proof of claim over the property; moved the
bankruptcy court to reconsider its order lifting the stay and allow-
ing the sale of her property; and filed a notice of a purported re-
moval of the state court appeal to federal court. The bankruptcy
court rejected these motions and dismissed Rohe’s new com-
plaints.
The Florida appeals court then affirmed the foreclosure
judgment, and the trial court set a date for the foreclosure sale.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-10561
Wells Fargo also sought relief from the bankruptcy court to pro-
ceed with the sale of the property, which the bankruptcy court
granted. Rohe appealed the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of her mo-
tions and adversary complaints to the district court. Rohe simulta-
neously commenced a collateral action under the All Writs Act, see
28 U.S.C. § 1651, which was dismissed by the district court and af-
firmed on appeal by this Court. See Rohe v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A.,
988 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2021).
The district court granted Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss
Rohe’s appeal. The court found that Rohe had improperly split re-
lated claims between the bankruptcy action and her All Writs peti-
tion. As to the remaining claims, the district court found they were
barred under the doctrine of issue preclusion because the underly-
ing bases of Rohe’s challenges had been adjudicated in state court.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Two standards govern our review. We review the bank-
ruptcy court’s factual findings for clear error. In re Brown,
746 F.3d
1236, 1239 (11th Cir. 2014). And we review the bankruptcy court
and district court’s legal conclusions de novo.
Id. We may affirm
on any ground supported by the record. In re Feshbach,
974 F.3d
1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2020).
III. DISCUSSION
We divide our discussion into three parts. First, we explain
that Rohe’s purported removal of the Florida court action was a
nullity that the state court correctly treated as ineffective. Second,
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21-10561 Opinion of the Court 5
we explain that Rohe’s claims against Wells Fargo are barred by res
judicata based on the state foreclosure judgment. Third, we explain
that no violation of the automatic stay provision occurred.
A. Rohe’s Removal of the State-Court Action Was a Nullity.
Rohe argues that the Florida appellate court erred in ignor-
ing her “notice of removal” of the proceedings to federal bank-
ruptcy court. Rohe contends that various filings by Wells Fargo
and orders by the state appellate and trial courts were void because
they were entered after the purported removal. We conclude the
state court proceedings were valid because the purported removal
was ineffective.
Before removing an action to federal court, the defendant
must comply with certain procedural requirements. A defendant
“desiring to remove any civil action from a State court shall file in
the district court of the United States for the district and division
within which such action is pending a notice of removal.”
28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(a). After a valid removal has occurred, the state court “shall
effect the removal and the State court shall proceed no further un-
less and until the case is remanded.”
Id. § 1446(d). So, before the
state court stays its proceedings, there must be a valid removal.
And for removal to be valid, there must be a “pending” state action
to remove. See also id. § 1452(a) (providing that in bankruptcy
cases, “a party may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil
action . . . to the district court for the district where such civil action
is pending”) (emphasis added).
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-10561
In this case, there was no pending civil action to be removed
under section 1446(a). By the time Rohe filed her notice of re-
moval, the state trial court had already issued its judgment in favor
of Wells Fargo. The underlying case was no longer awaiting deci-
sion, so there was no “claim” or “action . . . pending” that could be
removed. See id. §§ 1446(a), 1452(a). When Rohe filed her notice
of removal, she had already appealed to Florida’s Third District
Court of Appeals. The state trial court litigation had ended.
The state-court appeal could not qualify as a “pending” ac-
tion for purposes of removal. It is a basic principle of federal juris-
diction that a federal district court may not review the judgment of
a state court on an issue of state law on direct appeal. See generally
Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
14 U.S. 304 (1816); see also Rooker v.
Fid. Tr. Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rohe, 988 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine “reflects the fact that federal courts other
than the Supreme Court do not possess appellate jurisdiction over
state-court judgments”). Removal to federal court may not occur
after a state trial court has issued its judgment. As a result, the Flor-
ida appeal was not a “pending” action under section 1446(a) that
could support removal.
Rohe erroneously argues that even if her removal was inva-
lid, the state court had to stay its proceedings until a federal court
expressly decided if the removal was effective. The governing stat-
ute instructs the state court to “effect the removal,” which pre-
sumes that there is a valid removal to “effect.” In this case, the state
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21-10561 Opinion of the Court 7
appeals court correctly concluded that the removal was not valid
because it postdated the state trial court’s decision. So, a stay was
not warranted and the later state proceedings are valid.
B. The Doctrine of Res Judicata Bars Rohe’s Claims.
Because the state court proceedings were valid, the final
judgment entered by the state court is also entitled to preclusive
effect. Res judicata bars the relitigation of a prior cause of action
when the following four elements are satisfied: “(1) the prior deci-
sion must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(2) there must have been a final judgment on the merits; (3) both
cases must involve the same parties or their privies; and (4) both
cases must involve the same causes of action.” In re Piper Aircraft
Corp.,
244 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2001). “The court next deter-
mines whether the claim in the new suit was or could have been
raised in the prior action; if the answer is yes, res judicata applies.”
Id. Under this framework, the foreclosure judgment entered by the
state court against Rohe bars the claims that she raised in bank-
ruptcy court.
The applicability of res judicata turns on the final element.
It is indisputable that the Florida trial court litigation, which also
involved Rohe and Wells Fargo, satisfies the first three elements of
res judicata. To decide whether causes of action are the same, “a
court must compare the substance of the actions, not their form
. . . . [I]f a case arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact, or is
based upon the same factual predicate, as a former action, [then]
the two cases are really the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action’ for
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-10561
purposes of res judicata.”
Id. at 1297 (quoting Ragsdale v. Rubber-
maid, Inc.,
193 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Rohe’s federal claims arise out of the same nucleus of oper-
ative facts as the claims against her in state court. In both state and
federal court, Rohe argued that Wells Fargo’s proof of claim over
the mortgage was invalid. In state court, Rohe argued that foreclo-
sure was not proper because “Wells Fargo failed to provide suffi-
cient evidence to” authenticate the assignment of the promissory
note that secured the mortgage. Rohe also argued that Wells Fargo
had committed fraud in attempting to authenticate the promissory
note. The state trial court rejected both of Rohe’s arguments. It
found that the assignment was valid and that Wells Fargo cured
any deficiencies in the promissory note. It also found that Wells
Fargo did not commit fraud and “expressly rejected” Rohe’s argu-
ments to the contrary. The state court found that Wells Fargo was
“entitled to a judgment of foreclosure.”
In federal bankruptcy court, Rohe raised claims about the
same facts. She objected to Wells Fargo’s proof of claim on the ba-
sis that it failed to prove the transfer of the loan and had committed
fraud in authenticating the note. One of Rohe’s adversary com-
plaints rehearsed the same arguments. These claims all arise out of
the same nucleus of operative facts alleged in Florida state court.
The claims also raise the same legal theories Rohe raised in state
court to contest the validity of the mortgage. See Maldonado v.
U.S. Att’y Gen.,
664 F.3d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 2011) (“A new claim
is barred by res judicata if it is based on a legal theory that was . . .
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21-10561 Opinion of the Court 9
used in the prior action.”). So, res judicata bars Rohe from relitigat-
ing these claims.
C. The State Court Did Not Violate the Automatic Stay.
Rohe separately argues that the state appeals court violated
the automatic stay that occurs when a bankruptcy petition is filed.
Rohe argues that the state court’s decision was void because the
court did not have jurisdiction while the stay was in place. Her ar-
gument lacks merit.
When a bankruptcy action is filed, a stay of other relevant
proceedings—including “any act to obtain possession of property
of the estate”—goes into place.
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). In this case,
Rohe filed her bankruptcy petition on February 15, 2019, triggering
the stay. A few months later, on July 3, 2019, the bankruptcy court
granted Wells Fargo’s motion to lift the stay. Rohe then filed a mo-
tion for reconsideration of the court’s order. But, on August 19,
2019, the bankruptcy court dismissed her motion for reconsidera-
tion. Following that order, on August 21, 2019, the state appeals
court affirmed the trial court.
The state court did not violate the automatic stay. It issued
its substantive decision more than a month after the stay had been
lifted. The state court took no actions of consequence during the
gap. And the state court had jurisdiction to issue the order that has
res judicata effect on these proceedings.
Rohe points to three orders that the state court issued during
the time the stay was active and argues that they were void. But
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-10561
those orders only denied a “[m]isc[ellaneous] motion,” ordered a
response, and denied an extension of time. They were not substan-
tive. And Rohe was the party who sought the extension. The orders
do not affect the state court’s mandate, and withdrawing them
would afford Rohe no relief.
Rohe also argues that the automatic stay existed until Sep-
tember 2, 2019, thus extending beyond the state court decision on
August 21, 2019. Rohe correctly observes that the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure provide that a “stay does not expire until 14
days after the Order is entered, absent language in the Order to the
contrary.” (Citing FED. R. BANKR. P. 4001). But a motion for recon-
sideration does not toll the stay’s fourteen-day expiration date. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c). Therefore, the stay expired on July 17—not
September 2. As already noted, the state court took no actions of
consequence during this time.
Finally, Rohe contends that she should be awarded dam-
ages, attorney’s fees, or other costs because Wells Fargo filed mo-
tions in state court while the stay was in place. Federal law makes
such awards possible only when “an individual [is] injured by any
willful violation of a stay.”
11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). And the record
lacks evidence that Rohe was injured by any violation of the stay
or that Wells Fargo’s actions were willful.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the dismissal of Rohe’s appeal.
