Cassandra Williams v. State of Alabama Board of Ed , 182 F. App'x 868 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 9, 2006
No. 05-16514 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00621-CV-F-N
CASSANDRA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
B.W.
Minor,
Plaintiff,
versus
STATE OF ALABAMA BOARD OF EDUCATION,
MONTGOMERY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
P. MICHAEL COLE,
ERICA TATUM,
RUSTY BAKER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(May 9, 2006)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Cassandra Williams appeals, pro se, the dismissal of her complaint without
prejudice because Williams failed to comply with orders of the district court.
Williams argues on appeal that (1) the district court abused its discretion when it
dismissed her complaint for failure to comply with court orders; (2) the district
court and magistrate judges abused their discretion when they refused to recuse
themselves; and (3) the district court judge erroneously transferred the case to
another district court judge. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Williams filed a civil complaint pro se that alleged that the Montgomery
County Board of Education and various officials of the State of Alabama Board of
Education violated several federal laws and consent decrees regarding the
education of B.W., a disabled minor. Shortly after Williams filed her complaint,
Judge Myron H. Thompson transferred the case to Judge Mark E. Fuller. Judge
Fuller referred the case to Magistrate Judge Delores R. Boyd.
Williams filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, but Judge Boyd
denied the motion because the complaint failed to allege that B.W. was a minor
and describe the relationship between Williams and B.W. Judge Boyd ordered
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Williams to pay the $250 filing fee to the clerk or file a proper in forma pauperis
motion. Williams later filed a second in forma pauperis motion, which Judge Boyd
granted.
Judge Boyd also directed the clerk not to serve the defendants because the
complaint filed by Williams was deficient under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11. Judge Boyd found that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to
establish a violation and sought to recover from certain defendants that could not
be held liable as a matter of law. Judge Boyd advised Williams to seek the
assistance of a lawyer.
On August 3, 2005, Judge Boyd issued an order that set a hearing for August
16 to determine whether the complaint filed by Williams was sufficient under the
Federal Rules. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Judge Boyd
warned Williams that “failure to attend may result in the dismissal of” her
complaint. Judge Boyd instructed Williams to bring “any records or writings” to
establish her relationship with B.W., evidentiary support for her complaint, and the
role of each defendant in the alleged violations.
On August 12, Williams filed a motion to waive further evidentiary hearing
and included three documents about her complaints. On August 14, Williams filed
a motion for appointment of counsel. Judge Boyd found that the motion to waive
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the hearing was “inappropriate pending resolution of the scheduled hearing” on
August 16. Judge Boyd also denied Williams’s motion for appointment of
counsel. Judge Boyd again warned Williams that the “complaint will be
recommended for DISMISSAL if [Williams] fail[s] to appear” at the hearing on
August 16. Judge Boyd instructed the clerk to provide telephone notice as well as
notice by mail to Williams.
On the afternoon of August 15, an employee of the Clerk’s Office made
several unsuccessful attempts to contact Williams. The employee spoke with an
individual at Williams’s residence, but the phone call ended prematurely when
either the call was disconnected or the individual at Williams’s residence hung up
the phone. Williams failed to appear at the hearing on August 16.
Judge Boyd issued an order that found Williams knowingly and intentionally
failed to attend the hearing, Williams failed to establish her relationship to B.W.,
and the complaint was deficient and failed to establish a violation by the
defendants. Judge Boyd ordered Williams, by August 31, to show good cause for
her failure to appear and file an amended complaint that alleged sufficient facts to
establish a cause of action. Judge Boyd also advised Williams to seek legal
counsel, stated that the court would not appoint legal counsel to represent
Williams, and barred Williams from filing motions or pleadings until Williams
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filed an amended complaint. Judge Boyd warned Williams that “[f]ailure to file an
amended complaint by the August 31 deadline will result in a recommendation for
dismissal of this action.” Williams ignored the order and instead filed a notice of
appeal. We dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court
had not adopted the order of the magistrate judge.
On September 29, Judge Boyd recommended that the complaint be
dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with the orders of the court.
Williams objected to the recommendation made by Judge Boyd. Williams also
filed a motion that sought the recusal of District Court Judge Fuller and Magistrate
Judge Boyd because “the record does not support the illegal switch of judges” and
Judge Fuller “may be connected” to certain defendants.
The district court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge
because Williams made only general and conclusory arguments that “will not be
considered.” The district court also denied Williams’s motion for recusal because
Williams lacked standing to challenge the assignment of cases to judges and
Williams failed to establish that Judge Fuller had a conflict of interest with any
defendants.
Williams then filed a motion for reconsideration and reinstatement of Judge
Thompson, but the district court denied the motion.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a dismissal for failure to comply with an order of the court for
abuse of discretion. Gratton v. Great Amer. Commc’ns, 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th
Cir. 1999). We review the refusal to recuse by a district court judge for abuse of
discretion. Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
III. DISCUSSION
Williams first argues that the district court abused its discretion when it
dismissed her complaint for failure to comply with court orders. “Rule 41(b)
authorizes a district court to dismiss a complaint for failure to prosecute or failure
to comply with a court order or the federal rules.” Gratton, 178 F.3d at 1374; see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). “[T]he district court has the authority to dismiss . . . for
failure . . . to comply with its orders or rules of procedure.” Brown v. Thompson,
430 F.2d 1214, 1215 (5th Cir. 1970). Williams’s argument fails.
The district court did not abuse its discretion. Williams failed to comply
with Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to allege sufficient facts that establish her
relationship with B.W. and support the violations alleged in her complaint.
Williams also failed to comply with the orders of the magistrate judge. Although
Judge Boyd repeatedly warned Williams that failure to appear at the August 16
hearing would result in a dismissal, Williams failed to appear. Judge Boyd also
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warned Williams that her complaint would be dismissed if Williams failed to show
cause for her failure to appear and file a sufficient amended complaint by August
31. Williams failed to comply with both these orders.
The argument by Williams that Judge Fuller abused his discretion when he
refused to recuse himself also fails. A judge shall recuse himself where “the judge
. . . has a personal bias or prejudice either against [the moving party] or in favor of
any adverse party,” 28 U.S.C. § 144, or “his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned,” Christo, 223 F.3d at 1333 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)). “To warrant
recusal . . . , the moving party must allege facts that would convince a reasonable
person that bias actually exists.” Id. Williams failed to establish that either Judge
Boyd or Judge Fuller acted with bias in the proceedings. Judge Boyd provided
Williams with ample notice and opportunities to amend her complaint and advised
Williams to seek the advice of counsel. Although Williams argues that Judge
Fuller “may be connected” to certain defendants, she fails to allege any facts to
establish a connection. The district court did not abuse its discretion to deny her
motion for recusal.
Williams erroneously contends that the district court improperly transferred
her case from Judge Thompson to Judge Fuller. Because “[d]istrict judges may by
rule, order or consent transfer cases between themselves,” United States v. Stone,
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411 F.2d 697, 598 (5th Cir. 1969), this argument is without merit.
AFFIRMED.
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