Kodjo v. Mukasey , 269 F. App'x 262 ( 2008 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 07-1578
    DANIEL DESIRE TEBA KODJO,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals. (A74-996-440)
    Submitted:   February 27, 2008              Decided:   March 10, 2008
    Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Petition dismissed in part and denied in part by unpublished per
    curiam opinion.
    Linda A. Dominguez, L A DOMINGUEZ LAW, LLC, Baltimore, Maryland,
    for Petitioner.   Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General,
    Michelle G. Latour, Assistant Director, Sunah Lee, Trial Attorney,
    Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
    JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Daniel Desire Teba Kodjo, a native and citizen of the
    Ivory Coast, petitions for review of a decision of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (“Board”) affirming the immigration judge’s
    finding that Kodjo is removable and denying his applications for
    cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b) (West 2005 &
    Supp. 2007).    We dismiss in part and deny in part Kodjo’s petition
    for review.
    Under 
    8 U.S.C.A. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B)(i) (West 2005), this
    court has no jurisdiction to review an administrative decision to
    grant or deny cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b).
    See Jean v. Gonzales, 
    435 F.3d 475
    , 479-80 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding
    that, under     § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D), court has no jurisdiction
    over   any   aspects   of   denial   of   relief   under   §    1229b   except
    constitutional claims or questions of law); Obioha v. Gonzales, 
    431 F.3d 400
    , 405 (4th Cir. 2005) (“It is quite clear that the
    gatekeeper provision bars our jurisdiction to review a decision of
    the B[oard] to actually deny a petition for cancellation of removal
    or the other enumerated forms of discretionary relief.”).               Whether
    an alien has proved the requisite degree of hardship under § 1229b
    is not a constitutional claim or question of law.              Barco-Sandoval
    v. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, __, 
    2008 WL 375988
    , at *4 (2d Cir. Jan.
    25, 2008); Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    446 F.3d 1219
    , 1221-22
    (11th Cir. 2006); Martinez-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 
    437 F.3d 679
    , 682
    - 2 -
    (7th Cir. 2006); Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 
    424 F.3d 926
    , 929-30
    (9th Cir. 2005). In fact, it is the precise discretionary decision
    that Congress has shielded from review.               Zacarias-Velasquez v.
    Mukasey,    
    509 F.3d 429
    ,   434    (8th   Cir.   2007);    Meraz-Reyes     v.
    Gonzales, 
    436 F.3d 842
    , 843 (8th Cir. 2006).                Therefore, we must
    dismiss    Kodjo’s   petition    for    review   to   the     extent    that    it
    challenges this decision.
    Under 
    8 U.S.C.A. § 1252
    (a)(2)(D), we do have jurisdiction
    over constitutional claims and questions of law.                   Kodjo asserts
    that he was denied due process of law because his counsel before
    the immigration judge rendered ineffective assistance.                  We find
    that Kodjo cannot state a colorable due process violation because
    he   has   no   property   or   liberty   interest     in    his    request    for
    cancellation of removal. See Dekoladenu v. Gonzales, 
    459 F.3d 500
    ,
    508 (4th Cir. 2006) (“No property or liberty interest can exist
    when the relief sought is discretionary.”), petition for cert.
    filed, 
    75 U.S.L.W. 3530
     (U.S. Mar. 22, 2007) (No. 06-1285); Smith
    v. Ashcroft, 
    295 F.3d 425
    , 430 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding absence of
    liberty or property interest in the discretionary relief of waiver
    of deportation is “fatal to [an alien’s] due process claim”).
    Cancellation of removal clearly is a form of discretionary relief,
    
    8 U.S.C.A. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B); Jean, 
    435 F.3d at 479, 482
    , and
    therefore, will not support a due process claim.
    - 3 -
    Accordingly, we dismiss Kodjo’s petition for review            to
    the extent it challenges the Board’s discretionary denial of
    cancellation of removal.      We deny the petition for review as to
    Kodjo’s due process claim.    We dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials   before   the   court   and     argument   would   not   aid   the
    decisional process.
    PETITION DISMISSED IN PART
    AND DENIED IN PART
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