United States v. Linda Ann Borden , 269 F. App'x 903 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                           [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT   U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________   ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    MARCH 13, 2008
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    No. 07-12821
    CLERK
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 05-00181-CR-ORL-18-31-DA
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    LINDA ANN BORDEN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (March 13, 2008)
    Before BIRCH, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Linda Ann Borden appeals her conviction and sentence for wilfully aiding
    and assisting in the preparation and presentation of false tax returns in violation of
    26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. She contends that the evidence presented
    at trial was insufficient to support her conviction on count fourteen of the
    indictment on the ground that the government did not present evidence showing
    that the disputed tax return was filed with the Internal Revenue Service.1 She also
    contends that the district court erred by: (1) incorrectly calculating the tax loss
    under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2T4.1 (Nov. 2006); and (2) finding
    that she was subject to an aggravating role enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
    3B1.1(c).
    I.
    We review de novo sufficiency of the evidence claims. United States v.
    Anderson, 
    289 F.3d 1321
    , 1325 (11th Cir. 2002). This “standard of review is
    stacked in the government’s favor.” United States v. Moore, 
    504 F.3d 1345
    , 1348
    (11th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Robertson, 
    493 F.3d 1322
    , 1329 (11th
    Cir. 2007) (“We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government
    and resolve all reasonable inferences and credibility evaluations in favor of the
    1
    Borden was convicted of twenty-seven counts of wilfully aiding and assisting in the
    preparation and presentation of false tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) and
    18 U.S.C. § 2. In her brief, she only raises issues regarding count fourteen. Accordingly, she
    has abandoned any arguments with respect to the twenty-six other counts. See Harris v. Plastics
    Mfg. Co., 
    617 F.2d 438
    , 440 (5th Cir. 1980).
    2
    jury’s verdict. The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
    innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt,
    provided that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
    The evidence is sufficient to support Borden’s conviction on count fourteen
    of the indictment. At trial, one of the government’s witnesses testified that the
    amended tax return was prepared by Borden and was mailed to the IRS. Although
    that witnesses testified that he contacted the IRS and asked it to disregard the
    amended return, the fact that the return was mailed to and received by the IRS was
    enough for the jury to conclude that it was “filed.” In addition, a person may be
    convicted of assisting in the preparation and presentation of fraudulent tax returns
    under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) if that person either prepares or presents the relevant
    return. See 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (“Any person who . . . [w]illfully aids or assists in
    . . . the preparation or presentation under . . . the internal revenue laws, of a return,
    . . . which is fraudulent or is false as to any material matter, . . . shall be guilty of a
    felony . . . .”). Borden does not dispute her involvement in the preparation of the
    return in question. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to sustain her
    conviction.
    3
    II.
    We review a district court’s factual determination of offense level
    enhancement related to tax offenses for clear error. United States v. Paradies,
    
    98 F.3d 1266
    , 1292 (11th Cir. 1996). Likewise, a district court’s determination of
    a defendant’s role in the offense is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Mesa,
    
    247 F.3d 1165
    , 1168 (2001). Clear error is present only if we are “left with a
    definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” by the district
    court. United States v. Crawford, 
    407 F.3d 1174
    , 1177 (11th Cir. 2005) (citation
    omitted).
    The sentencing guidelines define tax loss as the total amount of loss that was
    the object of the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1(c). Where the tax loss to the
    government falls between $2,500,000.00 and $7,000,000.00, the offense level is
    24. U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1(J). The district court must support its loss calculation with
    reliable and specific evidence. See United States v. Renick, 
    273 F.3d 1009
    , 1025
    (11th Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, because loss calculations under the Guidelines are
    often not calculable “with precision,” we have noted that a sentencing court need
    only “make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available information.” See
    United States v. Orton, 
    73 F.3d 331
    , 335 (11th Cir. 1996).
    The district court did not clearly err in calculating the tax loss as $4,000,000.
    4
    At the sentence proceeding, the government presented documentary evidence and
    testimony showing that the tax loss was at least $4,378,463.00.
    The district court also did not clearly err by enhancing Borden’s sentence
    under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Under that guideline, a defendant’s offense level is
    increased by two levels if she was the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in
    any criminal activity involving at least one, but fewer than five participants. “A
    ‘participant’ is a person who is criminally responsible for the commission of the
    offense, but need not have been convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.1. The
    commentary further states that: “To qualify for an adjustment . . . , the defendant
    must have been the organizer . . . of one or more other participants.” U.S.S.G. §
    3B1.1 cmt. n.2. A defendant’s assertion of control or influence over only one
    individual is enough to support a § 3B1.1(c) enhancement. United States v.
    Jiminez, 
    224 F.3d 1243
    , 1251 (11th Cir. 2000).
    The testimony at trial showed that at least one other person was a participant
    in the criminal activity and was under Borden’s supervision. Mark Hayes was
    present during meetings where Borden made her tax presentations, and he
    promoted her tax return preparation services at those meetings. He described
    himself as an investor in one of her companies and told those in attendance that he
    was assisting her in making sales presentations. Because of this evidence, we are
    5
    not left with the definite and firm conviction necessary to set aside the district
    court’s finding.
    AFFIRMED.
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