United States v. Spinks , 185 F. App'x 256 ( 2006 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4810
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
WAYNE EDWARD SPINKS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. Frank W. Bullock, Jr.,
District Judge. (CR-04-426)
Submitted: May 31, 2006 Decided: June 14, 2006
Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas N. Cochran, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States
Attorney, Michael F. Joseph, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:
Wayne Edward Spinks was convicted by a jury on two counts
each of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000); possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(2000); and possession of a firearm in connection with drug
trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (2000).
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2000), Spinks was sentenced as
an armed career criminal. After calculating each of his offenses,
the presentence report set a range of 595 to 653 months’
imprisonment under the advisory sentencing guidelines. The
district court sentenced Spinks to the shortest term possible under
the applicable statutes, 540 months’ imprisonment, determining this
sentence to be reasonable given Spinks’ age. Spinks now appeals
his convictions and sentence.
Spinks contends the district court erred in denying his
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal on all
counts but the fifth, to which he admitted his guilt at trial. We
review the district court’s decision to deny a Rule 29 motion de
novo. United States v. Lentz, 383 F.3d 191, 199 (4th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1828 (2005). Where, as here, the motion
was based on insufficient evidence, “[t]he verdict of a jury must
be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most
favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United
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States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). We have “defined ‘substantial
evidence,’ in the context of a criminal action, as that evidence
which ‘a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 333
(4th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849,
862-63 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)).
With these principles in mind, we find a reasonable
factfinder would find the evidence sufficient to support Spinks’
convictions. For his part, Spinks characterizes the officers who
testified at trial as unreliable and urges a finding that his
testimony was credible. However, in evaluating the sufficiency of
the evidence, we do not “weigh the evidence or review the
credibility of the witnesses.” United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d
228, 234 (4th Cir. 1997). Where the evidence supports differing
reasonable interpretations, the jury decides which interpretation
to believe. Id.. In this case, the jury found the testimony of
the officers to be credible and Spinks’ testimony to lack
credibility. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the Government, we find the district court did not err in denying
Spinks’ Rule 29 motion.
Spinks also contends his sentence as an armed career
criminal violates the Sixth Amendment. However, he acknowledges
this argument is foreclosed by United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d
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278 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1463 (2006) (holding
that the use of prior offenses to invoke the statutory armed career
criminal enhancement under 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2000 & Supp.
2005) is permissible without indictment presentment or jury
submission so long as no facts extraneous to the facts necessary to
support the enhancement need be decided to invoke the enhancement).
Accordingly, we affirm Spinks’ convictions and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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