Hart v. U.S. Attorney General , 433 F. App'x 779 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT           FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-13628                    JULY 7, 2011
    JOHN LEY
    Non-Argument Calendar                  CLERK
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 5:09-cv-00257-RS-MD
    ROBERT WAYNE HART,
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (July 7, 2011)
    Before HULL, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Robert Wayne Hart, a white male, appeals the district court’s order granting
    summary judgment in favor of the government in this civil action alleging racial
    and gender discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
    (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16.1 Hart was employed with the Federal Bureau of
    Prisons as a Correctional Counselor when he requested a transfer from the Federal
    Correctional Institution in Marianna, Florida (“FCI Marianna”) to a nearby
    Federal Prison Camp (“Prison Camp”), but his request was denied, and an African-
    American female was assigned to the open position. Hart subsequently requested
    and was granted a transfer to a third facility at Marianna, called the Shawnee Unit.
    Hart argues that the district court erred in concluding that: (i) the refusal to
    transfer him to the Prison Camp was not sufficiently adverse, and (ii) his
    subsequent transfer to the Shawnee Unit was voluntary, and thus irrelevant when
    making his prima facie discrimination claim under Title VII.
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
    all evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
    party. Shiver v. Chertoff, 
    549 F.3d 1342
    , 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). Summary
    judgment is proper if the movant shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
    Id. A court
    must
    1
    Hart also alleged retaliation and other discrimination-based claims. The district
    court granted summary judgment on the retaliation and other claims for the same reasons it
    rejected his race and gender discrimination claims. Because Hart does not mention his retaliation
    or other claims on appeal, and does not expressly challenge the disposition of those claims in his
    brief to this Court, they are abandoned. Carmichael v. Kellog, Brown & Root Serv., Inc., 
    572 F.3d 1271
    , 1293 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
    130 S. Ct. 3499
    (2010).
    2
    enter “summary judgment against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
    establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which
    that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” 
    Id. at 1344
    (quoting Celotex
    Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322, 
    106 S. Ct. 2548
    , 2552 (1986)).
    A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination through direct
    evidence or circumstantial evidence. Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 
    627 F.3d 849
    , 854-
    55 (11th Cir. 2010). When a plaintiff lacks direct evidence and must prove
    discrimination circumstantially, we evaluate the claims using the framework
    established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
    
    411 U.S. 792
    , 
    93 S. Ct. 1817
    (1973), and Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v.
    Burdine, 
    450 U.S. 248
    , 
    101 S. Ct. 1089
    (1981). Alvarez v. Royal Atlantic
    Developers, Inc., 
    610 F.3d 1253
    , 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). Under the applicable
    prima facie formulation, as cited by Hart in his brief, a plaintiff may establish
    discrimination circumstantially by showing, among other things, that he was
    subjected to an adverse employment action. Id.; see also Van Voorhis v.
    Hillsborough County Bd. of County Com'rs, 
    512 F.3d 1296
    , 1300 (11th Cir. 2008)
    (requiring proof of adverse employment action for a prima facie discrimination
    claim using direct evidence).
    3
    To prove an adverse employment action under Title VII’s
    anti-discrimination clause, an employee must show “a serious and material change
    in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Town of Lake
    Park, Fla., 
    245 F.3d 1232
    , 1239 (11th Cir. 2001). Under this standard, the
    employee’s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer’s
    action is not controlling. 
    Id. Instead, the
    employment action must be materially
    adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances. 
    Id. An adverse
    employment action is a “significant change in employment
    status such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
    different responsibilities or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”
    Webb-Edwards v. Orange County Sheriff's Office, 
    525 F.3d 1013
    , 1031
    (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 
    524 U.S. 742
    , 761,
    
    118 S. Ct. 2257
    (1998)). An involuntary transfer to a different position may also
    be an adverse employment action if it “involves a reduction in pay, prestige, or
    responsibility.” Hinson v. Clinch County, Ga. Bd. of Educ., 
    231 F.3d 821
    , 829
    (11th Cir. 2000). Additionally, transfers that are a form of demotion or that
    disrupt investment in education, training, or seniority may qualify as an adverse
    employment action. Doe v. Dekalb County School Dist., 
    145 F.3d 1441
    , 1452
    (11th Cir. 1998). It is not enough that a transfer imposes some de minimis
    4
    inconvenience or alteration of responsibilities, however, because all transfers
    generally require an employee to engage in some learning, work with new people,
    and accept new responsibilities. 
    Id. at 1453.
    Essentially, Hart is challenging two actions by the government: (1) the
    refusal to transfer him to the Prison Camp and (2) his later transfer to the Shawnee
    unit. First, Hart failed to show that the denial of his request to transfer to the
    Prison Camp, standing alone, resulted in an adverse employment action. The
    evidence showed that the positions at FCI Marianna and the Prison Camp had the
    same salary, same pay grade, same responsibilities, same hours, and the same
    benefits. Additionally, Hart admitted that the Prison Camp position was only
    “slightly different” from his position at FCI Marianna. Thus, the refusal of his
    transfer request, on its own, was not materially adverse to Hart.
    Second, even assuming Hart’s subsequent transfer to Shawnee unit was
    involuntary and thus potentially relevant to his discrimination claims, he failed to
    show that the transfer was materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person.
    Hart does not dispute that the positions at the Prison Camp and Shawnee Unit
    have the same salary, pay grade, and benefits. The only differences shown by Hart
    were that he was required to accept additional responsibilities at the Shawnee unit
    related to security, inmate transfers, inventory of inmate clothing and property,
    5
    monitoring inmate mail, and additional weekend coverage for inmate visitations.
    Although Hart demonstrated differences between the positions, some changes in
    responsibilities should be expected with any transfer. See 
    Doe, 145 F.3d at 1453
    .
    None of the differences highlighted by Hart show that his transfer was a form of
    demotion or undermined his seniority or investment in training or education. 
    Id. Furthermore, Hart
    did not show that the transfer to Shawnee resulted in any
    change in compensation, affected the prestige of his position, or reduced his
    responsibilities. See 
    Hinson, 231 F.3d at 829
    . Accordingly, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.2
    2
    Hart’s request for oral argument is denied.
    6