United States v. Speagle , 285 F. App'x 90 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4648
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN ANDREW SPEAGLE, SR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees,
District Judge. (5:05-cr-00234-RLV)
Submitted: June 5, 2008 Decided: July 7, 2008
Before MICHAEL, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard E. Beam, Jr., HUBBARD & BEAM, Gastonia, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John Andrew Speagle, Sr., pled guilty pursuant to a
written plea agreement to one count of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute methamphetamine and crystal methamphetamine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). The court sentenced
Speagle to 292 months in prison, and Speagle timely appealed.
Speagle’s attorney filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 739 (1967), certifying that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the
district court abused its discretion by not imposing a lower
sentence. The Government did not file a reply brief. Speagle
submitted a pro se supplemental brief contending that the agents
involved in his case acted wrongfully, and that he is entitled to
a reduction in sentence for substantial assistance. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
Speagle suggests that the 292-month term of imprisonment
imposed by the district court was unreasonable. After United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a district court is no
longer bound by the range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines.
However, in imposing a sentence post-Booker, courts still must
calculate the applicable guidelines range after making the
appropriate findings of fact, and consider the range in conjunction
with other relevant factors under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). Gall v. United States, 128 S.
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Ct. 586, 596 (2007). The court must give both parties an
opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate,
and the district judge “may not presume that the Guidelines range
is reasonable.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596-97. This court will
affirm a post-Booker sentence if it “is within the statutorily
prescribed range and is reasonable.” Id. at 433 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). On appellate review, we may
presume that a sentence within the properly calculated advisory
guidelines range is reasonable. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct.
2456, 2462, 2465 (2007).
Here, the district court sentenced Speagle after considering
and examining the sentencing guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors,
as instructed by Booker, and treated the guidelines as advisory.
Speagle admitted in his validly entered guilty plea that he was
involved in the distribution of more than fifteen kilograms of
methamphetamine. He also agreed in the plea agreement to the
offense level of 38, and he received a three—level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. With a total offense level of 35 and
a criminal history score of VI, due to the 21 U.S.C. § 851 (2000)
enhancement for a prior drug felony, the applicable advisory
guidelines range was 292 to 365 months in prison. Speagle admitted
he had the requisite prior conviction to enhance his sentence
pursuant to § 851. Speagle’s 292-month sentence is the bottom of
the advisory guidelines range, and is below the life statutory
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maximum sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. Moreover, the court
explained that it had taken the sentencing guidelines and § 3553(a)
factors into account, and the record reflects no factors warranting
a departure. Accordingly, we conclude that Speagle’s sentence was
reasonable.
In his pro se supplemental brief, Speagle alleged that
the agents involved in his case were dismissed for wrongful
conduct. Speagle does not explain what this wrongful conduct
entailed, nor is it of import, as Speagle’s voluntary plea of
guilty to the charges for which he was convicted waived the right
to challenge antecedent, non-jurisdictional defects. See Tollett
v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); Hall v. McKenzie, 575 F.2d
481 (4th Cir. 1978). Speagle also argued that he has provided
substantial assistance and should qualify for a sentence reduction
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. However, Speagle agreed in his
validly entered plea agreement that moving for a reduction of
sentence under § 5K1.1 would be solely within the Government’s
discretion, and the decision of whether his assistance is
“substantial” remains with the Government.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Speagle’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Speagle, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
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If Speagle requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Speagle.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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