United States v. Talbin D. Andrews , 288 F. App'x 623 ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 30, 2008
No. 07-15920 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00015-CR-01-BBM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TALBIN D. ANDREWS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(July 30, 2008)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Talbin Andrews appeals his sentence of imprisonment for 46 months for
bank robbery. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d). Andrews argues that his sentence is
unreasonable. We affirm in part but vacate and remand in part with instructions to
correct a clerical error.
When we review a sentence for reasonableness, we apply a deferential
standard of review for abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. __,
128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007). We reverse only if we conclude “that the district court
has made a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191
(11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). The party challenging the sentence “bears the
burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of [the] record
and the factors in section 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788
(11th Cir. 2005); 28 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Although we do not apply a presumption of
reasonableness, we ordinarily expect a sentence that falls within the guidelines
range to be reasonable. See Talley, 431 F.3d at 787-88.
Andrews’s sentence is reasonable. His sentence is at the low-end of the
guidelines range. The district court considered the relevant sentencing factors,
including the purposes of sentencing and Andrews’s history and characteristics,
and it determined, without any clear error in judgment, that a sentence of
imprisonment for 46 months was sufficient but not greater than necessary. We
affirm that decision.
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The government raises an issue regarding the inconsistencies between the
term of supervised release imposed by the district court at sentencing and the term
of supervised release specified in the judgment and commitment order. We have
explained that “purely clerical errors may be corrected by the district court
pursuant to Rule 36, and it is always the oral sentence that controls.” United States
v. Morrison, 204 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2000). We may sua sponte notice a clerical
error in the judgment and remand with instructions to correct the error. See United
States v. Anderton, 136 F.3d 747, 751 (11th Cir. 1998). Because the judgment and
commitment order does not accurately reflect the term of supervised release
imposed by the district court, a remand is ordered for the limited purpose of
correcting the judgment and commitment order to reflect the correct period of
supervised release announced at sentencing.
We affirm Andrews’s sentence but remand for the limited purpose of
correcting the clerical error in the judgment.
AFFIRMED in PART; VACATED and REMANDED in PART.
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