John Hamatie v. Louisville Ladder, Inc. , 293 F. App'x 681 ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUG 28, 2008
No. 08-10569 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00817-CV-ORL-18-KRS
JOHN HAMATIE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
MONIQUE HAMATIE,
Plaintiff,
versus
LOUISVILLE LADDER, INC.,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(August 28, 2008)
Before BARKETT, PRYOR and HILL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John Hamatie sued Louisville Ladder, Inc. for damages allegedly caused by
its negligent design and manufacture of an extension ladder that collapsed resulting
in Hamatie falling and injuring himself. The jury returned a verdict for Hamatie.
The district court denied defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or for
a new trial, and defendant brought this appeal. For the following reasons, we shall
affirm.
I.
John Hamatie was stringing Christmas lights on a window in the dining
room of his house when the extension ladder on which he was standing partially
collapsed, causing him to fall. He sued Louisville Ladder, Inc. (“Louisville”),
claiming that the fly – the upper extension of the ladder – was negligently designed
and manufactured causing it to separate from the base and collapse. The case was
tried on both the negligent design and manufacture theories, but Hamatie withdrew
the design claim prior to the jury receiving the case.
1. The Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
Louisville contends that judgment as a matter of law is required in this case
because Hamatie failed to present evidence sufficient to establish that its
manufacture of the ladder caused Hamatie’s fall and injuries. Specifically,
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Louisville argues that Hamatie failed to prove that “but for” the alleged
manufacturing defects, his accident more likely than not would have been
prevented. Rather, since Hamatie’s expert testified that Louisville was negligent in
both the design and the manufacture of the ladder, he could not say, and the jury
could not conclude, that “but for” the manufacturing negligence the accident would
not have occurred.
This, however, mistakes the standard for establishing “but for” causation in
Florida. In Florida, the defendant is liable for “injury produced or substantially
produced in a natural and continuous sequence by his conduct, such that ‘but for’
such conduct, the injury would not have occurred.” Jones v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co.,
463 So. 2d 1153, 1156 (Fla. 1985). However, “[s]uch liability is not escaped in the
recognition that the injury would not have occurred ‘but for’ the occurrence or
intervention of some other cause as well.” Id. The defendant is liable for his own
negligence even when it combines with some other intervening cause since “but
for” the other cause as well, injury would not have occurred. Id.
Louisville recognizes that this is the law, but contends that it does not apply
to this case because the alleged design and manufacturing defects “are not part of a
natural and continuous sequence of events but are instead mutually exclusive
theories of recovery.” Louisville, however, offers no authority for this proposition,
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because there is none. The evidence indicates that the design and manufacturing
defects were concurrent in this case.
Plaintiff’s expert testified that there were both design and manufacturing
defects in the ladder. But he did not testify that but for the design defect the
accident would not have occurred. Rather he testified each defect, concurring with
the other, was sufficient to cause the failure of the ladder. This is the very
definition of concurrent causes. Jones, 436 So. 2d at 1156. The defendant is liable
for the defect resulting from his own negligence, even when it combines with some
other intervening cause. Id. This is especially true, when, as here, the same
defendant is the author of both defects causing injury.
Accordingly, the defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Motion for a New Trial
There was more than ample evidence presented at trial from which the jury
could conclude that the ladder was negligently manufactured. Defendant’s
contentions to the contrary, we do not substitute our own credibility choices and
judgment for those of the jury. This verdict was not against the great weight of the
evidence.
Louisville also argues that it was denied a fair trial because plaintiff
presented evidence regarding Louisville’s relocation of its ladder plant to Mexico
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and because plaintiff suggested in closing that the damages calculation should
factor in the amount saved by plaintiff due to the foreign relocation of its plant.
While this court does not condone the not so subtle attempt to influence the jury in
this way, we cannot conclude that any prejudice occurred in this case. First, the
location of the plant and the manufacturing guidelines there were relevant to the
liability issue in the case. Second, the jury only awarded plaintiff $200,000 for his
pain and suffering, far below the amount that would have been awarded by
factoring in the savings due to the relocation of the plant.
Accordingly, Louisville is not entitled to a new trial.
II.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court denying
Louisville’s motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial is due to be
AFFIRMED.
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