Gun Chung v. Loretta E. Lynch , 620 F. App'x 637 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    OCT 22 2015
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    GUN HO CHUNG,                                    No. 12-71330
    Petitioner,                        Agency No. A095-696-578
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Submitted October 20, 2015**
    Pasadena, California
    Before: IKUTA and OWENS, Circuit Judges and SESSIONS,*** District Judge.
    Gun Ho Chung, a native and citizen of South Korea, petitions for review of
    the Board of Immigration Appeals’s (BIA) discretionary denial of his application
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    ***
    The Honorable William K. Sessions III, District Judge for the U.S.
    District Court for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation.
    for adjustment of status. We lack jurisdiction to review discretionary denials of
    adjustment of status except to the extent that the petitioner raises constitutional
    claims or questions of law. 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1252
    (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(D).
    The admission of Agent Ballard’s testimony did not deprive Chung of his
    due process right to a fundamentally fair hearing. See Zetino v. Holder, 
    622 F.3d 1007
    , 1013 (9th Cir. 2010). Agent Ballard arrested Chung and questioned him
    about the package delivery scheme, so Chung knew the general content of Agent
    Ballard’s testimony. Agent Ballard’s testimony concerned Chung’s past conduct,
    so it was probative and relevant to the determination whether Chung merited a
    favorable exercise of discretion. Chung’s counsel learned in July 2008 that the
    government planned to call Agent Ballard as a witness, and Agent Ballard did not
    testify until September 2009, so Chung had ample time to prepare to cross-examine
    Agent Ballard. Given that Chung was represented by counsel, was able to present
    his version of the events, and was able to cross-examine Agent Ballard, the
    admission of Agent Ballard’s testimony was fundamentally fair. See
    Vargas-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 
    497 F.3d 919
    , 926–27 (9th Cir. 2007); Hammad v.
    Holder, 
    603 F.3d 536
    , 545–46 (9th Cir. 2010); cf. Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 
    339 F.3d 814
    , 823–24 (9th Cir. 2003). Because the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
    apply to Chung’s immigration proceeding, see Cinapian v. Holder, 
    567 F.3d 1067
    ,
    2
    1074 (9th Cir. 2009), Chung’s reliance on United States v. Vega, 
    188 F.3d 1150
    (9th Cir. 1999), is misplaced.
    Chung’s reliance on Rules 3.3(g) and 4.15 of the Immigration Court Practice
    Manual is also misplaced, because these rules are not binding where the
    Immigration Judge (IJ) “directs otherwise,” see Rule 1.1. Here, the IJ gave such
    direction by denying Chung’s request that the Department of Homeland Security
    (DHS) disclose the content of Agent Ballard’s testimony in more detail and
    continuing the hearing to give Chung’s counsel sufficient time to prepare for Agent
    Ballard’s testimony. In any event, any procedural error was harmless. Chung
    admitted most of the facts on which the IJ and BIA relied, and he has failed to
    explain how DHS’s failure to give him a written summary of Agent Ballard’s
    testimony (which included Agent Ballard’s statement that Chung said he “would
    rather die” than tell Agent Ballard to whom he was delivering the packages)
    affected the outcome of the proceedings. See Gutierrez v. Holder, 
    730 F.3d 900
    ,
    903 (9th Cir. 2013).
    We lack jurisdiction to review Chung’s argument that the BIA’s factual
    findings were not supported by substantial evidence because 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)
    strips us of jurisdiction to review factual determinations underlying
    adjustment-of-status decisions. Carrillo de Palacios v. Holder, 
    708 F.3d 1066
    ,
    3
    1071 (9th Cir. 2013); Morales-Izquierdo v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 
    600 F.3d 1076
    , 1084 (9th Cir. 2010). We also lack jurisdiction to review Chung’s argument
    that the BIA abused its discretion when it denied his application for adjustment of
    status. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a); Hosseini v. Gonzales, 
    471 F.3d 953
    , 956 (9th Cir.
    2006); Bazua-Cota v. Gonzales, 
    466 F.3d 747
    , 749 (9th Cir. 2006).
    PETITION DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
    4