Kevin David Johnson v. U.S. Attorney General , 190 F. App'x 827 ( 2006 )


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  •                                                              [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                      FILED
    ________________________          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    July 21, 2006
    No. 05-16612                    THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                   CLERK
    ________________________
    BIA No. A41-652-288
    KEVIN DAVID JOHNSON,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    _________________________
    (July 21, 2006)
    Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Petitioner is a native and citizen of Jamaica. He was admitted into the
    United States as a lawful permanent resident on April 24, 1998. On February 8,
    2005, he was convicted of possession of cocaine in a Florida circuit court and
    sentenced to drug offender probation for three years. In a Notice to Appear filed
    on May 31, 2005, petitioner was charged with removability pursuant to (1)
    Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in
    INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(43)(B), an offense relating to the illicit
    trafficking in a controlled substance, and (2) INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(B)(i), as an alien convicted of a controlled substance.
    Petitioner appeared as required on June 7, 2005. Petitioner told the
    Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that he had an attorney, but that the attorney could not be
    there. At petitioner’s request, the IJ rescheduled the hearing. The IJ rescheduled
    the hearing for the same reason – failure of counsel to appear – on two subsequent
    occasions. At the fourth hearing, convened on July 19, 2005, petitioner told the IJ
    that he had an attorney, but was trying to hire another attorney and needed more
    time. The IJ, in response, said “we’ve been playing with the attorney game for a
    long time. So, I’m going to proceed.”
    During the hearing, petitioner admitted the factual allegations contained in
    the Notice to Appear, including his February 8, 2005 conviction for possession of
    cocaine, and conceded both charges of removability. At the conclusion of the
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    hearing, the IJ ordered petitioner removed.
    Petitioner, represented by counsel, appealed the order to the Board of
    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), contending that the IJ erred in going forward with
    the removal hearing after he stated that he had an attorney. On November 7, 2005,
    the BIA issued a decision dismissing the appeal. In its decision, the BIA noted that
    the IJ held the July 19 hearing without petitioner having explicitly waived his right
    to counsel, but found that the IJ’s action in going forward with the hearing had
    caused petitioner no prejudice. The BIA found no prejudice because petitioner was
    afforded a fair hearing and admitted both charges of removability. Petitioner now
    seeks review of the BIA’s decision in this court.
    Petitioner contends that this court has jurisdiction to review his petition
    because he raises a constitutional claim, namely, a due process claim. The IJ
    denied him due process by holding the hearing in counsel’s absence and without
    obtaining petitioner’s knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to the presence of
    counsel.
    As an initial matter, we must address our jurisdiction to review this petition.
    Concluding that jurisdiction is present, we move in due course to petitioner’s due
    process claim.
    I.
    It is clear that we lack jurisdiction “to review any final order of removal
    3
    against an alien who is removable by reason of having committed a criminal
    offense covered in section 1182(a)(2) or 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this
    title . . . .” See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(C). Thus, we are without jurisdiction to
    review the instant removal order based on petitioner’s conviction of an aggravated
    felony under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(A)(iii). We do have limited jurisdiction,
    though, to review whether the petitioner is “(1) an alien (2) who is removable (3)
    based on a conviction for an aggravated felony.” Del Pilar v U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    326 F.3d 1154
    , 1157 (11th Cir. 2003). Petitioner does not dispute that he is an alien
    who is removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony. Thus, after
    observing this, our jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(C) ends.
    Despite the jurisdictional limitations of § 1252(a)(2)(C), nothing in § 1252
    precludes our review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised in a
    properly filed petition for review. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(D); Balogun v. U.S. Att’y
    Gen., 
    425 F.3d 1356
    , 1359 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the REAL ID Act gave
    this court jurisdiction to review a criminal alien’s petition for review of an order of
    removal raising a question of law). In short, we have jurisdiction to review the
    instant petition to the extent that it presents the constitutional argument that
    petitioner was deprived of due process of law. See Balogun, 
    425 F.3d at 1360
    .
    II.
    Petitioner asserts that the IJ denied him due process by not granting a
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    continuance. As noted above, the IJ granted three continuances to allow him to
    obtain counsel. After affording him these continuances and without petitioner
    having shown that circumstances had changed, we could hardly say that the IJ
    abused his discretion in denying still another continuance. See Zafar, 426 F.3d
    at 1336 (finding no abuse of discretion when it was clear that the petitioner would
    not succeed in the endeavor–changing his immigration status–for which he sought
    the continuance). Moreover, as will be shown below, even if the IJ had granted the
    continuance and petitioner’s counsel had been present, the outcome would not have
    been different. Accordingly, the only additional issue properly before us is the
    BIA’s denial of petitioner’s due process claim.
    A removal proceeding such as the one at hand is a civil proceeding. Hence,
    the alien is not entitled to a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. He does, however,
    have the right under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause to a fundamentally
    fair hearing and to effective assistance of counsel where counsel has been obtained.
    Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    399 F.3d 1269
    , 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2005). “To establish
    due process violations in removal proceedings, aliens must show that they were
    deprived of liberty without due process of law, and that the asserted errors caused
    them substantial prejudice.” Lonyem v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    352 F.3d 1338
    , 1341-42
    (11th Cir. 2003).
    In this case, petitioner fails to make out a due process violation because he
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    suffered no prejudice. He conceded the facts stated in the Notice to Appear, and
    the brief his attorney submitted to the BIA conceded that petitioner was convicted
    of an aggravated felony. Petitioner did not argue before the BIA, nor does he make
    any argument here, that he suffered any prejudice. In sum, he fails to demonstrate
    that the presence of counsel at his removal hearing would have affected the
    outcome of the proceeding.
    PETITION DENIED.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 05-16612

Citation Numbers: 190 F. App'x 827

Judges: Barkett, Black, Per Curiam, Tjoflat

Filed Date: 7/21/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023