United States v. Ronald Mabine , 629 F. App'x 470 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4198
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD LEE MABINE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (2:14-cr-00113-HCM-TEM-1)
Submitted: October 15, 2015 Decided: October 26, 2015
Before WILKINSON, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geremy C. Kamens, Acting Federal Public Defender, Patrick L.
Bryant, Appellate Attorney, Suzanne V. Katchmar, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant.
Dana J. Boente, Acting United States Attorney, Sherrie S.
Capotosto, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Lee Mabine was convicted, following a jury trial, of
Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2012);
brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012); and possession of a
firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2012). On appeal, he argues that the district court
erroneously denied his motion to suppress identification
evidence, and he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We
affirm.
Mabine first argues that the show-up identification was
unduly suggestive and that the identification is not reliable.
We review factual findings underlying a district court’s denial
of a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246
(4th Cir. 2011). Because the district court denied the motion
to suppress, we construe the evidence “in the light most
favorable to the Government, the party prevailing below.”
United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th Cir. 2013).
“Due process principles prohibit the admission at trial of
an out-of-court identification obtained through procedures ‘so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’” United States v.
Saunders, 501 F.3d 384, 389 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Simmons v.
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United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)). The defendant bears
the burden of proof in challenging the admissibility of an out-
of-court identification. See United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d
435, 441 (4th Cir. 1997). “First, the defendant must show that
the . . . identification procedure was impermissibly
suggestive.” Saunders, 501 F.3d at 389. If the procedure was
improper, the court must “consider[] whether the identification
was nevertheless reliable in the context of all of the
circumstances.” Id. at 389-90. We may uphold a district
court’s denial of a motion to suppress an out-of-court
identification without determining whether the identification
procedure was unduly suggestive if we find the identification
reliable. Holdren v. Legursky, 16 F.3d 57, 61 (4th Cir. 1994);
see United States v. Greene, 704 F.3d 298, 308 (4th Cir. 2013)
(listing factors courts consider in assessing reliability of
out-of-court identification).
We conclude that the witness’ out-of-court identification
was reliable. The witness had ample opportunity to view the
perpetrator during the robbery and described the high degree of
attention she paid to him. Although the robbery lasted
approximately two minutes, the witness, who was within only a
few feet of the robber, testified that the robber’s face was
uncovered for the majority of that time. Further, the witness’
description was fairly accurate; she accurately described his
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skin complexion and weight, and her descriptions of the robber’s
age and height were not significantly different from Mabine’s.
Finally, the witness identified Mabine with certainty within 40
minutes of the robbery.
Mabine next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions. We review de novo the denial of a
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. United
States v. Fuertes, __ F.3d __, __, Nos. 13-4755, 13-4931, 2015
WL 4910113, at *7 (4th Cir. Aug. 18, 2015). “A defendant
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy
burden . . . .” United States v. Said, 798 F.3d 182, 194 (4th
Cir. 2015). The jury verdict must by sustained when, “view[ing]
the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the
verdict.” United States v. Cornell, 780 F.3d 616, 630 (4th Cir.
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, __ S.
Ct. __, No. 14-10267, 2015 WL 3793104 (U.S. Oct. 5, 2015).
“[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of
fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mabine argues that, without the identification, the
Government’s evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he
committed the offenses. However, when reviewing for sufficiency
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of the evidence, “a reviewing court must consider all of the
evidence admitted by the trial court, regardless whether that
evidence was admitted erroneously.” McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S.
120, 131 (2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted);
United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 159 (4th Cir. 1990).
Considering all of the evidence admitted at trial, we conclude
that the Government presented sufficient evidence to support
Mabine’s convictions. The witness identified Mabine—both during
the show-up and in court—as the man who entered the store,
pointed a firearm at her, demanded the money in her register,
and took $429. Mabine, who stipulated that he was a convicted
felon and that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce,
was discovered within 30 minutes of the crime in a dumpster
behind the store, with discarded clothing and a firearm that
matched the witness’ description, as well as four $100 bills.
See United States v. Reed, 780 F.3d 260, 271 (4th Cir. 2015)
(stating elements of Hobbs Act robbery and § 922(g)(1) offense),
cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, No. 14-10485, 2015 WL 3946842 (U.S.
Oct. 5, 2015); United States v. Strayhorn, 743 F.3d 917, 925
(4th Cir.) (stating elements of § 924(c)(1) offense), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2689 (2014); see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(4)
(2014) (defining brandishing).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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