United States v. Ronaldo Eguia Lara , 228 F. App'x 933 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                    FILED
    ________________________         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    June 19, 2007
    No. 06-15822                  THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                 CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 06-00056-CR-FTM-99-DNF
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    RONALDO EGUIA LARA,
    a.k.a. Ivan Roy Lara,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (June 19, 2007)
    Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Ronaldo 1 Eguia Lara appeals his 70-month sentence following his guilty
    plea to one count of re-entering the United States after being deported based on an
    aggravated felony offense, in violation of 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a), (b)(2). Lara argues
    on appeal, inter alia, that the district court failed to consider properly the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors, fashioned a sentence that is greater than necessary to achieve the
    statutory purposes of sentencing, and imposed an unreasonable sentence.2 After
    review, we affirm.
    We review sentences for reasonableness in light of the factors listed in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). See United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 261, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    ,
    765-66 (2005). “[T]he party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of
    establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and
    the factors in section 3553(a).” United States v. Talley, 
    431 F.3d 784
    , 788 (11th
    Cir. 2005).
    Post-Booker, we have established a two-part process for district courts to use
    in sentencing. 
    Id. at 786
    . First, the district court must consult and correctly
    1
    According to Lara, his first name is properly spelled “Rolando.” However, we use the
    incorrect spelling “Ronaldo” since it is the name used throughout the record and the parties’
    briefs.
    2
    Although Lara objected in the district court to his criminal history category and
    requested a downward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, he does not raise these issues in
    his brief. Therefore, we deem them abandoned. United States v. Cunningham, 
    161 F.3d 1343
    ,
    1344 (11th Cir. 1998).
    2
    determine the advisory guidelines range set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines. 
    Id.
    Second, the district court must impose a reasonable sentence by considering the
    factors enumerated in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). 
    Id.
     Included among the § 3553(a)
    factors are (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) the history and
    characteristics of the defendant; (3) the need to reflect the seriousness of the
    offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
    offense; (4) the need for deterrence; (5) the need to protect the public; (6) the
    Sentencing Guidelines range; and (7) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing
    disparities. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). However, the district court is not required “to
    state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or
    to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Scott, 
    426 F.3d 1324
    ,
    1329 (11th Cir. 2005).
    Upon review of the record and the sentencing hearing transcript, and
    consideration of the briefs filed by both parties, we discern no reversible error.
    First, there is no dispute on appeal that the district court correctly computed
    the advisory guidelines range. Second, the district court listened to Lara’s
    arguments regarding his background and reasons for re-entering the United States.
    The district court stated that it had considered all of the § 3553(a) factors. The
    district court was not required to address separately each § 3553(a) factor, even
    3
    though it addressed some of them. See Scott, 
    426 F.3d at 1329
    .
    Third, Lara’s 70-month sentence is at the low end of the advisory guidelines
    range and well within the statutory maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (b)(2). Although the district court acknowledged that Lara had a
    unique immigration status, no ties to Mexico, and that sending him to Mexico
    would be like sending him to a foreign country, the district court also
    acknowledged the seriousness of Lara’s lengthy criminal history, which is a proper
    factor to consider under § 3553(a). 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(1). Moreover, Lara’s
    argument that the district court gave too much weight to his criminal history is
    unpersuasive.
    In sum, we conclude that Lara has not shown that his 70-month sentence is
    unreasonable.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-15822

Citation Numbers: 228 F. App'x 933

Judges: Anderson, Barkett, Hull, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 6/19/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023