Profitel Group, LLC v. Polyone Corporation , 238 F. App'x 444 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                           [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                    FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-13922                      June 7, 2007
    ________________________            THOMAS K. KAHN
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 05-01764-CV-TWT-1
    PROFITEL GROUP, LLC,
    a Georgia Limited Liability Company,
    Plaintiff-Counter-
    Defendant-Appellant
    Cross Appellee,
    versus
    POLYONE CORPORATION,
    an Ohio corporation,
    Defendant-Counter-
    Claimant-Appellee
    Cross Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (June 7, 2007)
    Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and EBEL,* Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    ProfiTel audits telecommunications bills for corporate clients and identifies
    telecommunications overcharges and billing errors. It sued PolyOne, a former
    client, alleging that PolyOne received a credit from its telecommunications
    company, MCI, on the basis of ProfiTel’s audit findings. ProfiTel claims that it is
    thus entitled to compensation pursuant to the consulting contract both entities
    signed at the onset of ProfiTel’s services. PolyOne counterclaims, alleging that
    ProfiTel breached the contract because its audit services unduly burdened
    PolyOne’s personnel. The district court concluded that neither party’s claims
    could survive summary judgment. We conclude, however, that the court below
    misinterpreted the consulting contract and erred by failing to credit evidence that
    PolyOne received value from the consulting services. Because such evidence is
    sufficient for ProfiTel’s claim to survive summary judgment, we REVERSE and
    REMAND for further proceedings on that issue. However, we AFFIRM the
    district court’s ruling that PolyOne’s counterclaim must be dismissed, because it
    failed to establish causation and damages.
    *
    Honorable David M. Ebel, United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit, sitting by
    designation.
    2
    I. DISCUSSION
    In the fall of 2002, ProfiTel offered its services to PolyOne to identify any
    billing errors against PolyOne’s volume telecommunications services contract
    with MCI. ProfiTel would not bill PolyOne for these services. Instead, under a
    contingency arrangement, ProfiTel would receive 50 percent of the amount of any
    recovery for over-charges identified in the audit.
    The parties signed a consulting agreement in July 2003 setting forth these
    compensation terms. The contract also obligated PolyOne to provide the
    underlying information needed for the audit and required that ProfiTel not use
    PolyOne’s staff in carrying out the audit work. ProfitTel commenced work on the
    audit and, in August 2003, notified PolyOne that MCI had overcharged PolyOne
    by more than $1 million for domestic frame relay services. ProfiTel based that
    conclusion on its position that MCI’s contract with PolyOne entitled PolyOne to
    two discounts, both an express discount described in the contract and a generic
    discount that MCI is obliged to apply by virtue of its tariff filings with the Federal
    Communications Commission (“FCC”).
    ProfiTel then drafted a letter for PolyOne to send to MCI to claim the
    overcharges, based on ProfiTel’s theory that PolyOne was entitled to the
    additional discount. PolyOne placed the letter on its letterhead and sent it to MCI
    3
    on December 19, 2003. MCI denied the claim in its entirety on January 24, 2004,
    asserting that no billing error had occurred. ProfiTel drafted another letter for
    PolyOne to send to MCI to protest the denial, which PolyOne sent on February 18,
    2004. In late April 2004, MCI sent another letter to PolyOne reiterating that the
    claim was denied. PolyOne alleges that, during this time, it devoted staff
    resources to ascertaining the validity of the claim, responding to requests for
    information, and assisting ProfiTel.
    Following MCI’s denials of the claim, ProfiTel recommended that PolyOne
    file a complaint with the FCC to resolve the billing dispute. ProfiTel states that it
    met with PolyOne in December 2004 to discuss a strategy for pursuing an FCC
    claim, but that PolyOne told ProfiTel “for the first time” that it believed MCI’s
    billings were correct and “that it was abandoning its billing error claim against
    MCI.” PolyOne contends that it questioned the accuracy of ProfiTel’s audit
    findings and conclusions much earlier, when ProfiTel “first presented” the alleged
    billing error to PolyOne.
    At the same time that ProfitTel was finalizing its audit report and preparing
    to file a complaint with the FCC, a problem was developing in the three-year
    volume contract between PolyOne and MCI. Sometime in the summer of 2004,
    MCI alerted PolyOne that PolyOne would fail to meet its minimum usage
    4
    obligations for the first year of the contract, which was to end July 31, 2004.
    Under the contract’s terms, PolyOne would face $1 million in underutilization
    penalties for that year, and if the same pattern continued, another $2 million in
    penalties for the remaining two years of the contract.
    MCI and PolyOne began negotiations to amend this contract. PolyOne
    presented evidence that a senior vice president at MCI working on these
    negotiations was unaware of PolyOne’s earlier allegations of a billing error.
    PolyOne states that “[a]t no time during the negotiation of these terms did MCI or
    PolyOne ever raise the ProfiTel ‘billing error’ allegation or use that allegation as a
    bargaining chip.”
    Nevertheless, when the new agreement between PolyOne and MCI was
    finally signed in late February 2005, in addition to waiving the past penalty for
    underutilization, lowering utilization requirements for future years, and raising
    from 90 percent to 95 percent PolyOne’s exclusivity relationship with MCI, the
    agreement included the following language releasing MCI from any billing error
    claims:
    Customer hereby releases, forever quitclaims, and discharges MCI . . .
    from any and all claims . . . arising out of any alleged or actual billing
    errors related to frame relay services provided by MCI to customer prior
    to December 31, 2004 (the “Released Claims”). This release and
    discharge from all claims and liabilities applies to matters now known
    5
    and to all matters that may hereafter be discovered, if any, with respect
    to the Released Claims above. After execution of this Amendment,
    Customer shall thereafter be barred from bringing any charge, complaint
    or other action against MCI relating to such matters.
    ProfiTel Group, LLC v. PolyOne Corp., No. 1:05-CV-1764, 
    2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44987
    , at *4-5 (N.D. Ga. June 19, 2006).
    On July 5, 2005, ProfiTel filed a breach-of-contract action against PolyOne,
    alleging that PolyOne received valuable concessions in its contract renegotiations
    with MCI as a result of the billing errors identified by ProfiTel, and thus the
    concessions were a “credit” by MCI that should trigger ProfiTel’s right to
    compensation under its consulting agreement with PolyOne.
    PolyOne counterclaimed for breach of contract, alleging that ProfiTel had
    inappropriately used PolyOne’s staff for the audit and that ProfiTel’s performance
    fell below the standard of commercial reasonableness because it engaged in the
    unauthorized practice of law. PolyOne claimed it was damaged by the wrongful
    use of its staff because they were diverted from cost-saving initiatives that could
    have been implemented earlier.
    The district court, on cross-motions for summary judgment, dismissed both
    parties’ claims. The court interpreted the consulting contract to require ProfiTel to
    identify legally valid “billing errors” as a condition for ProfiTel receiving payment
    6
    for services, and concluded that ProfiTel’s theory of audit recovery was not valid
    under telecommunications and contract law. In the alternative, the district court
    decided that even if ProfiTel had found a valid billing error, it had failed to show
    that PolyOne received monies or a credit for the error. Regarding PolyOne’s
    counterclaim, the district court determined that PolyOne’s alleged loss of the
    opportunity to save additional money through more timely implementation of cost-
    savings initiatives was simply “too speculative to establish the existence of
    damages.” ProfiTel Group, 
    2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44987
    , *38.
    Both parties appealed.
    A. Interpretation of the Term “Billing Error” in the Consulting Contract
    The interpretation of a contract is a question of law we review de novo.
    Daewoo Motor Am., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
    459 F.3d 1249
    , 1256 (11th Cir.
    2006). “If a contract is clear and unambiguous, then its interpretation is a matter
    of law and there is no issue of fact to be determined.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.
    Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 
    652 N.E.2d 684
    , 686 (Ohio 1995) (quotation omitted).1
    “The purpose of contract construction is to effectuate the intent of the parties, and
    1
    The parties do not dispute that Ohio law governs this interpretation, because the
    consulting contract so provides.
    7
    that intent is presumed to reside in the language they chose to employ in the
    agreement.” State ex rel. Petro v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
    820 N.E.2d 910
    ,
    915 (Ohio 2004) (quotations omitted). “[C]ommon words appearing in a written
    instrument are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless manifest
    absurdity results or unless some other meaning is clearly intended from the face or
    overall contents of the instrument.” Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 
    374 N.E.2d 146
    , 150 (Ohio 1978). “When the terms in a contract are unambiguous,
    courts will not in effect create a new contract by finding an intent not expressed in
    the clear language employed by the parties.” Shifrin v. Forest City Enters., Inc.,
    
    597 N.E.2d 499
    , 501 (Ohio 1992).
    Section 2.1 of the consulting contract between ProfiTel and PolyOne stated:
    [ProfiTel’s] fee from “Audit Findings,” as defined in Section 1.1 of this
    agreement, shall be 50% of all monies and/or credits for past billing
    errors and non-conformance actually recovered by [ProfiTel] on behalf
    of [PolyOne]. Payment of [ProfiTel’s] fee from Audit Findings is due
    and payable 30 days from the date such monies or credits are recovered
    or realized by [PolyOne]. . . . For an abundance of clarity, [ProfiTel] will
    receive a percentage only of recoveries for past billing errors and non-
    conformances; [ProfiTel] will not receive a percentage of any recoveries
    on future billings.
    Section 1.1 of the consulting contract states that “[p]ast billing errors and
    non-conformance(s) shall be identified by [ProfiTel] to [PolyOne] and will be
    defined as Audit Findings,” and further puts the term “audit findings” in context
    8
    by stating that “[ProfiTel] will file a claim to recover any and all Audit Findings
    on behalf of [PolyOne].” Therefore, the term “billing error” has no meaning
    independent of the term “audit finding.”
    The district court considered “billing error” to mean only those identified
    amounts for which PolyOne would have a valid legal claim to recover. However,
    nothing in the four corners of the consulting agreement gives rise to this
    definition, nor is there any suggestion that this is what the parties intended. The
    contract lacks any implication that the parties even contemplated that ProfiTel’s
    audit findings would have to be “validated” in any manner other than PolyOne’s
    actual recoveries due to the audit findings.
    Instead, we conclude that the term “billing errors” is defined the same as
    “audit findings” in this contract, and that these terms should be given their “plain
    and ordinary meaning.” Alexander, 374 N.E.2d at 150. Under Section 1.1, it is
    ProfiTel who has the power to identify and define audit findings. Section 2.1
    provides compensation for audit findings only to the extent monies and credits are
    “actually recovered.” The ready conclusion is that “billing error” here means a
    finding by ProfiTel identifying an arguable billing error that proves to be a basis
    for a recovery by PolyOne from MCI. There is no evidence that the parties to the
    agreement intended anything other than a “plain and ordinary” commercial
    9
    meaning to the terms “error” and “finding,” which generally would be defined as
    the errors and findings an auditor or consultant identifies in the
    telecommunications bills. We find no additional requirement that the validity of
    the asserted error be upheld as a legally-recoverable claim in a court of law before
    it qualifies as a billing error.
    Therefore, the district court erred in its determination that, irrespective of
    whether MCI in fact provided credits or monies to PolyOne based on ProfiTel’s
    audit findings, ProfiTel’s audit findings do not identify “billing errors” because
    those claims are not enforceable as a matter of law. Because we hold the term
    “billing errors” in the consulting agreement requires only a recovery by PolyOne
    in order to trigger a right to compensation, we reverse the district court on this
    issue. On remand, the district court should focus on whether PolyOne actually
    recovered credits or monies from MCI as a result of the alleged billing error
    identified in ProfiTel’s audit.
    B. Whether MCI-PolyOne Contract Concessions Amounted to a “Credit” to
    PolyOne
    The district court alternatively concluded that ProfiTel had not shown that
    there was a connection between its audit findings and the concessions PolyOne
    10
    received in its renegotiated contract with MCI. We reverse this holding as well,
    because ProfiTel has put forth adequate evidence to survive summary judgment on
    the issue of whether the new MCI-PolyOne contract terms amounted to a “credit”
    given by MCI to PolyOne for the billing errors ProfiTel identified.
    As a preliminary matter, we conclude that the term credit in the consulting
    agreement between ProfiTel and PolyOne is not limited to an explicit monetary
    refund by MCI. Credit is a “common word[]” that is “to be given [its] plain and
    ordinary meaning,” Alexander, 374 N.E.2d at 150, and although in some contexts
    this may be defined strictly in book-keeping terms, credit also is often defined as a
    “deduction from an amount otherwise due.” Webster’s Third New International
    Dictionary 532-33 (1981). Moreover, the fact that under the consulting agreement
    ProfiTel is entitled to compensation if “credits are recovered or realized” suggests
    that credits may not necessarily be money-in-hand. We need not explore the outer
    limits of that language here. We conclude only that the term “credit” in the
    consulting agreement is broad enough to include valuable concessions allegedly
    given by MCI to PolyOne that were based on billing errors identified by ProfiTel.
    ProfiTel survives summary judgment because there is a genuine factual
    dispute regarding the connection between the identified billing errors and MCI’s
    concessions to PolyOne. “Summary judgment should be entered only if there is no
    11
    genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment
    as a matter of law.” Clemons v. Dougherty County, 
    684 F.2d 1365
    , 1368 (11th
    Cir. 1982) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); alteration omitted). We have been clear
    on how a court must address factual disputes on summary judgment:
    All reasonable doubts about the facts should be resolved in favor of the
    non-movant. If the record presents factual issues, the court must not
    decide them; it must deny the motion and proceed to trial. Summary
    judgment may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic
    facts, but disagree about the inferences that should be drawn from these
    facts. If reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from
    undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment.
    
    Id. at 1369
     (citations omitted). “[T]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
    support of the non-movant’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence
    on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-movant.” Burton v. City of
    Belle Glade, 
    178 F.3d 1175
    , 1187 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation, alterations omitted).
    Here, both parties moved for summary judgment on ProfiTel’s claim that
    PolyOne breached the consulting contract by not paying ProfiTel for its work in
    identifying billing errors. ProfiTel’s evidence that it is entitled to compensation
    principally consists of: (1) the release of claims language relating to the billing
    errors placed in the very contract in which the underutilization penalties were
    avoided; (2) the fact that other terms of the new PolyOne-MCI contract had little
    monetary value to MCI, raising an inference that the penalty waiver and release of
    12
    billing error claims were the most valuable terms; and (3) documentation that MCI
    and PolyOne representatives discussed the alleged billing errors in the context of
    the underutilization concessions.2 PolyOne also has significant evidence that
    there was no connection between the audit findings and MCI’s penalty waiver.
    PolyOne’s evidence suggests that: (1) PolyOne unilaterally decided to abandon
    the claim related to billing errors rather than use it as leverage in negotiations with
    MCI; (2) MCI was prepared to waive the underutilization penalty and renegotiate
    at a lower volume for future years regardless of the existence of a claim for billing
    errors; and (3) MCI added the release of claims language as a mere “afterthought.”
    With this universe of evidence, summary judgment is clearly inappropriate
    for either party. Both parties offered more than the “mere existence of a scintilla
    of evidence” required to withstand summary judgment as a non-movant. Burton,
    
    178 F.3d at 1187
    . There is a “genuine issue as to [a] material fact,” Clemons, 
    684 F.2d at 1368
    , namely whether MCI’s decision to waive current and future
    underutilization penalties had a connection to PolyOne’s original claim that MCI
    had overcharged it for telecommunications services. “[R]easonable minds might
    differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts,” which here would include
    2
    Much of this evidence has been sealed due to its proprietary nature.
    13
    the release of claims language and documented emails, so “the court should deny
    summary judgment.” 
    Id. at 1369
    .
    In conclusion, although the district court was correct to deny ProfiTel’s
    motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether PolyOne breached the
    consulting agreement, it erred by granting summary judgment to PolyOne. We
    reverse that holding and remand for further proceedings.3
    C. Whether PolyOne’s Alleged Damages in its Counterclaim Are Too Speculative
    PolyOne counterclaimed that ProfiTel breached the consulting agreement by
    inappropriately using PolyOne’s staff resources to pursue the claim against MCI
    and by engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. PolyOne alleged it was
    damaged by delays in implementing cost-savings initiatives due to the time
    PolyOne personnel spent on ProfiTel’s audit. The district court granted summary
    judgment to ProfiTel, holding that PolyOne’s damages were too speculative to
    3
    The district court did not decide whether ProfiTel’s alleged damages – compensation
    due from the consulting agreement – could be quantified under ProfiTel’s theory that PolyOne
    received a credit from MCI in the form of utilization concessions. However, the court observed
    that the alleged billing errors totaled around $1 million, but the value to PolyOne of MCI waiving
    the underutilization penalty and setting revised volume requirements was $3.15 million.
    Whether ProfiTel can quantify its damages is a matter that may have to be addressed on remand,
    but it is not an issue that is presented to us on this appeal.
    14
    support its claim, and that PolyOne had not established that any alleged breach by
    ProfiTel caused such damage. We agree.
    Questions of causation and damages often are addressed simultaneously in
    breach-of-contract actions. “Damages must arise as a result of the breach and
    must naturally and necessarily flow from the breach of contract.” Nichols v.
    Chicago Title Ins. Co., 
    669 N.E.2d 323
    , 328 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (quotation
    omitted). A claim for lost cost-savings is analogous to a claim for lost profits.
    While Ohio law recognizes a claim for lost profits, it requires that the “profits
    were within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made, the
    loss of profits is the probable result of the breach of contract, and the profits are
    not remote and speculative and may be shown with reasonable certainty.” Charles
    R. Combs Trucking, Inc. v. Int’l Harvester Co., 
    466 N.E.2d 883
    , 887 (Ohio 1984).
    PolyOne alleges opportunity costs of $638,638 based on the money “lost”
    due to the time that PolyOne spent responding to ProfiTel’s audit activities.
    PolyOne’s evidence at summary judgment consisted of a PolyOne executive’s
    testimony on the specific cost-savings initiatives that had been scheduled for
    implementation, the duration of the delay of each, and the projected savings that
    were lost during that time. PolyOne’s damages claim does not focus on the
    15
    overhead and staff cost associated with the actual time spent reviewing ProfiTel’s
    audit work, but instead sought to recover opportunity costs.
    However, PolyOne’s testimony did not show that its support of the billing
    errors identified by ProfiTel actually caused specific delays for particular projects,
    and it did not take into account whether other factors could have caused or
    contributed to the alleged implementation delays. Moreover, PolyOne makes no
    distinction between staff time that would normally be spent reviewing a billing
    audit conducted by an outside party such as ProfiTel and time that should have
    been protected by the consulting agreement. In addition, PolyOne has assumed,
    without substantiation, that staff time improperly spent on the ProfiTel audit
    would have generated savings to PolyOne.
    PolyOne’s evidence at the summary judgment stage was simply too flimsy
    to establish that ProfiTel’s audit activities caused the asserted delays in cost-
    saving initiatives, and that such delays resulted in opportunity costs of $638,638.
    We affirm the district court’s dismissal of PolyOne’s counterclaim.
    II. CONCLUSION
    We REVERSE the district court’s decision awarding PolyOne summary
    judgment on ProfiTel’s claim, and we hold that the term “billing error” in the
    16
    consulting agreement requires only proof of a related recovery or realization of
    money or credit from MCI based upon an asserted billing error identified by
    ProfiTel in its audit report. We also hold that neither party was entitled to
    summary judgment on the issue of whether PolyOne had breached the agreement.
    We REMAND for further proceedings on ProfiTel’s claim. However, we
    AFFIRM the district court’s conclusion that PolyOne’s counterclaim must fail,
    because PolyOne did not present evidence that any breach by ProfiTel caused “lost
    savings” damages, and because PolyOne’s asserted damages were speculative.
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-13922

Citation Numbers: 238 F. App'x 444

Judges: Black, Ebel, Per Curiam, Tjoflat

Filed Date: 6/7/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023