Konan v. Sengel , 239 F. App'x 780 ( 2007 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-2308
    RAYMOND W. KONAN,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    NOEL D. SENGEL, Bar Counsel, Virginia State
    Bar; STEPHEN H. RATLIFF, Chair-Designate
    District Subcommittee, Virginia State Bar;
    KAREN A. GOULD, Chairperson, Disciplinary
    Board Virginia State Bar; BARBARA SAYERS
    LANIER, Clerk of Disciplinary System, Virginia
    State Bar; STEPHEN M. HALL, Assistant Attorney
    General, Commonwealth of Virginia,
    Defendants - Appellees,
    and
    ELIZABETH B. LACY; LEROY ROUNDTREE HASSELL;
    BARBARA MILANO KEENAN; LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ,
    JR.; DONALD LEMONS; G. STEVEN AGEE; CYNTHIA D.
    KINSER, Justices of Supreme Court of Virginia,
    Defendants.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
    District Judge. (1:06-cv-00175-JCC)
    Submitted: April 18, 2007                        Decided:   July 6, 2007
    Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Raymond W. Konan, Appellant Pro Se. Mike F. Melis, OFFICE OF THE
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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    PER CURIAM:
    Raymond W. Konan appeals from the district court’s order
    dismissing his 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     (2000) complaint.             The district
    court dismissed Konan’s complaint on the grounds that Konan failed
    to adequately state a claim for violation of the Equal Protection
    Clause and that his Due Process claim was barred by collateral
    estoppel. After having reviewed the record, we find that, pursuant
    to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,* the district court did not have
    subject matter jurisdiction over Konan’s claims.
    Konan’s claims seek redress for injuries caused by his
    disbarment    by    the   Virginia   State   Bar   Disciplinary   Board,   an
    administrative agency of the Supreme Court of Virginia.             See 
    Va. Code Ann. § 54.1-3910
     (Michie 2005).         While the Disciplinary Board
    is not itself a state court, the form of the proceeding is not
    determinative under Rooker-Feldman; rather, it is the nature,
    character,    and    effect   of   the   proceedings   themselves   that   is
    controlling.       Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482.       In Feldman, the Supreme
    Court took note of the judicial nature of state bar disciplinary
    proceedings.       Id. at 482 n. 15 (citing Middlesex County Ethics
    *
    See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 
    460 U.S. 462
     (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 
    263 U.S. 413
     (1923).
    The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is confined to “cases brought by
    state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
    judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
    and inviting district court review and rejection of those
    judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 
    544 U.S. 280
    , 284 (2005); see also Davani v. Virginia Dep’t of Transp.,
    
    434 F.3d 712
    , 718 (4th Cir. 2006).
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    Comm.     v.    Garden     State   Bar     Ass’n,      
    457 U.S. 423
       (1982)).
    Additionally, this court has held that the disciplinary board of a
    state bar can be considered as part of the “system of state courts”
    and that their judicial decisions are not subject to review by the
    federal courts.       See Allstate Ins. Co. v. West Virginia State Bar,
    
    233 F.3d 813
    , 817-18 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding Rooker-Feldman
    doctrine deprived district court of jurisdiction to review decision
    of West Virginia State Bar).
    The Virginia State Bar is, by statute, an arm of the
    Supreme Court of Virginia, and its decisions are judicial in
    nature.    See Allstate, 
    233 F.3d at 817
    ; see also Supreme Court of
    Virginia Rule Pt. 6, § IV, ¶ 13 (procedure for disciplining and
    disbarring attorneys).          In this case, while Konan challenges the
    procedures of the Bar’s Disciplinary Board, the decision by the
    Board was upheld by the Supreme Court of Virginia, the appropriate
    court to review such challenges.            Because the Board’s function is
    judicial in nature, we hold that its rulings are subject to the
    Rooker-Feldman doctrine and, therefore, not reviewable by a federal
    district court.            Accordingly, we modify the district court’s
    dismissal      to   show    that   the   case    was    dismissed   for   lack   of
    jurisdiction and affirm the dismissal as modified.                   We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
    would not aid the decisional process.
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    AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
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