United States v. Gaines , 239 F. App'x 812 ( 2007 )


Menu:
  •                                UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-5269
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    SYLEST ALI GAINES, a/k/a Jerold M. Lee,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
    (6:06-cr-00392-HFF)
    Submitted:    June 22, 2007                   Decided:   July 12, 2007
    Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
    Circuit Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    James B. Loggins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
    South Carolina, for Appellant. Maxwell Barnes Cauthen, III, OFFICE
    OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for
    Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Sylest   Ali    Gaines    pled     guilty      pursuant       to    a     plea
    agreement to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon, one
    count   of   possession      of   a   stolen    firearm,      and    one    count        of
    possession with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), (j); 924(a)(2), (e); 21 U.S.C.
    § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D) (2000).               Gaines was sentenced by
    the district court to a total of 168 months’ imprisonment. Finding
    no error, we affirm.
    On appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
    California,     
    386 U.S. 738
        (1967),        asserting      there       were     no
    meritorious    grounds      for   appeal,      but    questioning      whether         the
    district court fully complied with the requirements of Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 11.    Gaines filed a pro se supplemental brief, contending
    the district court erred in its application of the Sentencing
    Guidelines,     the   Government       breached       the   terms     of    the        plea
    agreement, and his counsel provided ineffective assistance.                             The
    Government elected not to file a responsive brief.
    Because Gaines did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea
    in the district court, we review any alleged Rule 11 error for
    plain error.    United States v. Martinez, 
    277 F.3d 517
    , 524-26 (4th
    Cir. 2002).     To establish plain error, Gaines must show that an
    error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
    affected his substantial rights.          United States v. White, 405 F.3d
    - 2 -
    208, 215 (4th Cir. 2005).     We have reviewed the record and find no
    error.
    Gaines next contends that the district court erred in its
    application of the Sentencing Guidelines.             When reviewing the
    district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we
    review findings of fact for clear error and questions of law de
    novo.    United States v. Green, 
    436 F.3d 449
    , 456 (4th Cir.), cert.
    denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2309
    (2006).
    Initially, Gaines argues that he does not satisfy the
    criteria for enhancement as a career offender.         As Gaines was over
    eighteen years old at the time he committed the instant controlled
    substance offense, and was previously convicted of assault on an
    officer while resisting arrest and possession of cocaine with
    intent    to   distribute,   we   conclude   Gaines   was   appropriately
    sentenced by the district court as a career offender.         Gaines also
    argues that the court erred in determining his criminal history
    category.      However, because Gaines was a career offender, his
    placement in category VI was required by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
    Manual § 4B1.1(b) (2005).
    Next, Gaines contends that the Government breached the
    terms of the plea agreement by making a sentencing recommendation
    to the court.    “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a
    promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to
    be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
    - 3 -
    fulfilled.”    Santobello v. New York, 
    404 U.S. 257
    , 262 (1971).          “It
    is well-established that the interpretation of plea agreements is
    rooted in contract law, and that ‘each party should receive the
    benefit of its bargain.’”       United States v. Peglera, 
    33 F.3d 412
    ,
    413 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Ringling, 
    988 F.2d 504
    , 506 (4th Cir. 1993)).        “A central tenet of contract law is
    that no party is obligated to provide more than is specified in the
    agreement itself.”     
    Id. Accordingly, “the government’s
    duty in carrying out its
    obligations under a plea agreement is no greater than that of
    ‘fidelity to the agreement.’”          
    Id. (quoting United States
    v.
    Fentress, 
    792 F.2d 461
    , 464 (4th Cir. 1986)).           As the agreement is
    silent on the issue of sentencing recommendations, we conclude
    Gaines cannot establish that the Government breached the plea
    agreement.    See United States v. Snow, 
    234 F.3d 187
    , 189 (4th Cir.
    2000) (“It is settled that a defendant alleging the Government’s
    breach of a plea agreement bears the burden of establishing that
    breach by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
    Gaines finally contends that his counsel was ineffective
    for failing to object to the plea agreement and presentence report.
    An   ineffective   assistance    of   counsel   claim    is   generally   not
    cognizable on direct appeal, but should instead be asserted in a
    post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000).            See United
    States v. Richardson, 
    195 F.3d 192
    , 198 (4th Cir. 1999).           However,
    - 4 -
    we have recognized an exception to the general rule when “it
    ‘conclusively appears’ from the record that defense counsel did not
    provide effective representation.”       
    Id. (quoting United States
    v.
    Gastiaburo, 
    16 F.3d 582
    , 590 (4th Cir. 1994)).      Because the record
    does not conclusively establish that counsel was ineffective, we
    conclude Gaines’s claim is not cognizable on appeal.
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
    record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
    appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
    his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
    further review.   If the client requests that a petition be filed,
    but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
    counsel   may   move   this   court   for   leave   to   withdraw   from
    representation.   Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
    was served on the client.     We dispense with oral argument because
    the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials before the court and argument would not aid in the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    - 5 -