David M. Shapiro v. S. Lark Ingram , 207 F. App'x 938 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 25, 2006
No. 06-10834 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-02741-CV-ODE-1
DAVID M. SHAPIRO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
S. LARK INGRAM, Judge, Superior Court
of Cobb County,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(October 25, 2006)
Before CARNES, PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
David M. Shapiro, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his “appeal,”
which the district court construed as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil complaint, for failure
to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Liberally construing his
appellate briefs, Shapiro challenges this dismissal. For the reasons set forth more
fully below, we affirm.
Shapiro’s “appeal” was apparently based on a 1993 Georgia state court civil
contempt proceeding. The district court construed Shapiro’s pro se pleading as a
challenge to Judge S. Lark Ingram’s failure to recuse herself from an action to
which Shapiro was a party. The district court further stated that it appeared that
Shapiro was found in contempt and was displeased with that ruling. The district
court found that it lacked jurisdiction, under the Rooker-Feldman 1 doctrine, over
Shapiro’s challenge to his contempt finding and Judge Ingram’s denial of
Shapiro’s motions for her recusal. In addition, the district court found that Judge
Ingram was absolutely immune from damages.
We review the district court’s dismissal, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), for failure to state a claim de novo. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112
F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). We also review a grant of judicial immunity de
1
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923); District
of Colombia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed. 2d 206
(1983).
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novo. Smith v. Shook, 237 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001). We “may affirm the
district court where the judgment entered is correct on any legal ground regardless
of the grounds addressed, adopted or rejected by the district court.” Bonanni Ship
Supply, Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 1558, 1561 (11th Cir. 1992).
Upon review of Shapiro’s pleadings, we agree that Shapiro’s main complaint
was Judge Ingram’s denial of two motions he filed seeking her recusal. We are
uncertain whether Shapiro alleged that he was wrongfully found in contempt, or
whether he alleged that the court violated his rights by failing to rule on the
contempt charge. Furthermore, based on the pleadings before the district court at
the time of its dismissal, it appears, although it is by no means clear, that state
court proceedings were still ongoing. Regardless of the status of the state court
proceedings at the time of the district court’s dismissal, the court’s dismissal is due
to be affirmed; even if the district court applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
prematurely, comity concerns warrant abstention under Younger2 as to injunctive
relief, and Judge Ingram is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages.
See The News-Journal Corp. v. Foxman, 939 F.2d 1499, 1510 n.13 (11th Cir.
1991) (recognizing that incomplete state court review made federal suit premature
under Younger, but, once state court review was final, federal review would have
2
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971).
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been barred by Rooker-Feldman).
A. Younger
Although abstention is the exception and not the rule, “[f]ederal courts
should abstain from exercising their jurisdiction if doing so would ‘disregard the
comity between the States and the National Government.’” Wexler v. Lepore, 385
F.3d 1336, 1339 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). For abstention to be triggered,
(1) the federal injunction must “create an ‘undue interference with state
proceedings,’” and (2) “the state proceedings at issue must involve ‘certain orders
that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial
functions . . . it has never been suggested that Younger requires abstention in
deference to a state judicial proceeding reviewing legislative or executive action.’”
Id. (citations omitted). “We interpret the Younger doctrine as preventing federal
courts from being the grand overseers of state courts and court-like
administration.” Id. at 1341. Younger abstention applies to civil proceedings. Id.
at 1339. The Supreme Court has recognized that a state’s interest in its contempt
process is of sufficient importance to warrant the application of Younger and that a
federal court’s interference with this process constitutes undue interference with a
state’s legitimate activities. Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335-36, 97 S. Ct. 1211,
1217-18, 51 L. Ed. 2d 376 (1977).
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Shapiro essentially sought to overturn Judge Ingram’s orders. This would
have required the district court to direct Judge Ingram to reverse her prior rulings,
effectively telling the state court how to run its contempt proceeding. Thus, any
injunctive relief granted in this case would unduly interfere with state court
proceedings. See id. at 335-36, 97 S.Ct. at 1217-18. This interference would relate
to one of Judge Ingram’s judicial functions – whether or not to recuse herself. To
the extent that Shapiro challenged other decisions relating to a finding of contempt,
administration of the case, and an evidentiary ruling, these also implicate Judge
Ingram’s judicial functions. Because of this direct interference with the judicial
functions of a state court, comity would have warranted the district court’s
abstention as to any pending matters. See Wexler, 385 F.3d at 1339, 1341.
B. Immunity
Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages for
those acts taken while they are acting in their judicial capacity unless
they acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. This immunity
applies even when the judge’s acts are in error, malicious, or were in
excess of his or her jurisdiction. Whether a judge’s actions were made
while acting in his judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the act
complained of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events
occurred in the judge’s chambers or in open court; (3) the controversy
involved a case pending before the judge; and (4) the confrontation
arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.
Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations and quotation
marks omitted).
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To the extent that Shapiro sought damages, Judge Ingram is entitled to
judicial immunity. Shapiro complains about rulings that Judge Ingram made
during a contempt proceeding, Georgia Superior Courts have jurisdiction to punish
for contempt, see O.C.G.A. § 15-1-4, and the pleadings neither allege nor provide
grounds to suggest that Judge Ingram acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.
See Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1070.
C. Rooker-Feldman
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts, other than the
Supreme Court, lack jurisdiction to review the final judgments of state courts.
Amos v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11 (11th Cir.
2003). Rooker-Feldman applies when the following four criteria are met: (1) the
party in federal court is the same as in the state court; (2) the state court ruling was
a final or conclusive judgment on the merits; (3) the plaintiff in federal court had a
reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claims in the state court proceeding; and
(4) the issue before the federal court was either adjudicated by the state court or
inextricably intertwined with the state court’s judgment. Id. “[A] party’s ability to
raise a claim on appeal constitute[s] a reasonable opportunity to raise the claim.”
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Maryland, Inc. v. Weiner, 868 F.2d 1550, 1555 (11th
Cir. 1989) (citing Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1548 (11th Cir. 1983)).
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“A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment ‘if the
federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the
issues before it.’” Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25, 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1533,
95 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring)). Assuming that there was a final
judgment on the merits at the time of the dismissal, the district court correctly
dismissed the case based on Rooker-Feldman. See Goodman ex rel. Goodman v.
Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that Rooker-Feldman bars
claims that essentially seek to challenge a state court judgment).
D. Conclusion
Judge Ingram has absolute immunity from damages. Either Younger
abstention principles or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded Shapiro’s attempt
to challenge Judge’s Ingram’s rulings in the district court. In light of the
foregoing, the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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