Troy Charles v. Carolyn Colvin, Acting Cmsnr , 628 F. App'x 290 ( 2016 )


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  •      Case: 15-30579      Document: 00513331716         Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/06/2016
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-30579
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    TROY GERARD CHARLES,                                                      January 6, 2016
    Lyle W. Cayce
    Plaintiff - Appellant                                             Clerk
    v.
    CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
    SECURITY,
    Defendant - Appellee
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:12-CV-2980
    Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Plaintiff Troy Charles appeals the determination of the Commissioner of
    Social Security denying him disability and supplemental security income
    benefits. We AFFIRM.
    * Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
    CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 15-30579      Document: 00513331716        Page: 2     Date Filed: 01/06/2016
    No. 15-30579
    I
    Troy Charles applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
    security income benefits on January 27, 2010, alleging disability due to
    depression, dyslexia, hypertension, and poor vision. 1 He sought and was
    granted an administrative hearing. An ALJ conducted the hearing on August
    2, 2011, and then denied Charles’s request for benefits, finding that his
    impairments were not severe. Charles asked the Appeals Council to review the
    decision. After the Appeals Council refused, he filed suit in the district court,
    which referred the matter to a magistrate judge and then adopted the opinion
    of the magistrate judge affirming the ruling of the ALJ. Charles appeals.
    II
    “Our standard of review of social security disability claims is exceedingly
    deferential and limited to two inquiries: whether substantial evidence supports
    the ALJ's decision, and whether the ALJ applied the proper legal standards
    when evaluating the evidence. Substantial evidence is enough that a
    reasonable mind would support the conclusion. The evidence ‘must be more
    than a scintilla, but it need not be a preponderance.’ Any findings of fact by the
    Commissioner which are supported by substantial evidence are conclusive.” 2
    III
    In his analysis, the ALJ considered reports by a psychologist and a
    medical doctor; both concluded that Charles was able to work. Charles’s
    employment history, educational records, and self-reported daily activities
    corroborated this result. The ALJ also reviewed records from Charles’s 2010
    hospitalization, during which he was diagnosed with marijuana dependence
    1  At the subsequent administrative hearing, Charles’s representative also raised the
    possibility of an intellectual disability.
    
    2 Taylor v
    . Astrue, 
    706 F.3d 600
    , 602 (5th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted) (quoting
    Leggett v. Chater, 
    67 F.3d 558
    , 564 (5th Cir.1995)).
    2
    Case: 15-30579        Document: 00513331716           Page: 3     Date Filed: 01/06/2016
    No. 15-30579
    and psychosis not otherwise specified. Finally, the ALJ considered a
    psychological examination by Dr. Jerry Whiteman, which suggested that
    Charles’s impairments were serious. Citing inconsistencies in the examination,
    its reliance on Charles’s incomplete self-reporting, and Dr. Whiteman’s express
    caution that the results were unreliable, the ALJ justifiably gave this report
    no weight. 3
    After reviewing this evidence, the ALJ concluded that Charles suffered
    from certain legally cognizable impairments, but was nonetheless ineligible for
    benefits because the impairments were not severe. 4 Charles contests the ALJ’s
    conclusion on two grounds.
    First, he argues that the ALJ ignored our decision in Stone v. Heckler,
    which clarified that an impairment is “severe” unless it merely constitutes a
    “slight abnormality.” 5 The record contradicts him, as the ALJ expressly
    invoked the “slight abnormality” criterion. And even if the ALJ had not done
    so, any resulting error would have been harmless, as substantial evidence
    supports the finding that Charles’s impairments were not severe under the
    Stone standard. 6
    3  See Greenspan v. Shalala, 
    38 F.3d 232
    , 237 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hen good cause is
    shown, less weight, little weight, or even no weight may be given to the physician's
    testimony.”). The ALJ also found Charles a less than credible witness. For example, Charles
    claimed poor vision, but the medical doctor’s report indicated that he had 20/20 vision.
    Charles also failed to inform Dr. Whiteman of his history of daily marijuana use.
    4 See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a); Perez v. Barnhart, 
    415 F.3d 457
    , 461 (5th Cir. 2005)
    (outlining the five-step analysis used to evaluate disability claims, the second step of which
    concerns “whether the claimant has a severe impairment”; if the claimant’s impairment is
    not severe, the analysis ends and the claimant is deemed not disabled).
    5 
    752 F.2d 1099
    , 1101 (5th Cir. 1985); see 
    id. at 1106
    (an ALJ’s ruling that fails to cite
    Stone’s interpretation of the severity requirement is presumed to have used an incorrect
    standard).
    6 See 
    Taylor, 706 F.3d at 603
    (applying harmless error analysis to an ALJ’s failure to
    invoke Stone).
    3
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    No. 15-30579
    Second, Charles argues that new evidence undermines the ALJ’s ruling.
    Specifically, he cites a supplemental report by Dr. Whiteman, completed after
    the administrative hearing, in which Dr. Whiteman diagnosed him with mild
    mental retardation. 7 The Appeals Council reviewed this report, but concluded
    that it did not provide a basis for changing the ALJ’s decision. As the
    magistrate judge noted, Dr. Whiteman’s supplemental report is of questionable
    value, as it appears to again rely on Charles’s self-reporting (aspects of which
    seem inconsistent with other evidence in the record). Even assuming its
    validity, it does not outweigh the extensive record evidence demonstrating
    Charles’s ability to work. 8
    The ALJ’s decision conforms to proper legal standards and is supported
    by substantial evidence. We AFFIRM the district court's ruling upholding the
    decision of the ALJ and reject Charles’s claims.
    7 This report is part of the administrative record because Charles submitted it to the
    Appeals Council. See Higginbotham v. Barnhart, 
    405 F.3d 332
    , 336 (5th Cir. 2005).
    8 Charles argues that Dr. Whiteman’s diagnosis of mild mental retardation entitles
    him to benefits under 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 12.05(C). See 20 C.F.R. §
    404.1520(a)(4)(iii) (an impairment that meets Appendix 1 criteria may entitle a claimant to
    benefits). § 12.05(C), however, requires “[a] valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60
    through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant
    work-related limitation of function” (emphasis added). Here, there is substantial evidence
    that Charles lacks an additional and significant work-related limitation of function.
    4