Yolanda Parker v. Nancy Potter , 368 F. App'x 945 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MARCH 15, 2010
No. 08-16332
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 06-00183-CV-T-26-EAJ
YOLANDA PARKER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NANCY POTTER,
individually,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
No. 08-16667
_______________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00183-CV-T-26-EAJ
YOLANDA PARKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
NANCY POTTER,
individually,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 15, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and BARZILAY,* Judge.
BARZILAY, Judge:
Defendant-Appellant Nancy Potter (“Potter”) and Plaintiff-Appellee
Yolanda Parker (“Parker”) appeal certain aspects of the decision of the U.S.
District Court for the Middle District of Florida (“District Court”) in Parker v.
Potter, No. 8:06-CV-183-T-26EAJ, 2008 WL 4539432 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2008)
(not reported in F. Supp.) (“Parker III”).1 Potter asserts that the District Court
erred in rescinding the mortgage transaction between her and Parker under the
Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), while Parker alleges that the District Court abused
its discretion by denying her request for monetary compensation. The District
*
The Honorable Judith M. Barzilay, Judge, United States Court of International Trade,
sitting by designation.
1
The Court has consolidated the appeals of Potter (No. 08-16332) and Parker (No. 08-
16667) because both concern the same factual and legal issues.
2
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case and, therefore, the court
vacates the lower court’s decision and remands with instructions to dismiss
Parker’s original claim for rescission.
I. Background
A. Relevant Facts
On May 20, 2003, Parker’s husband, Gary Parker, refinanced his home in
the Bayside Subdivision in Clearwater, Florida, contracting with Money
Consultants, Inc. (“Money Consultants”) for a balloon note and mortgage in the
amount of $875,000.00 secured by the Bayside residence.2 Docket Entry (“DE”)
117 at 1. That same day, Money Consultants assigned the note and mortgage to
Potter. DE 117 at 2. Potter subsequently instituted foreclosure proceedings on the
property on January 20, 2004, in Pinellas County, Florida. DE 117 at 4. On July
7, 2004, Gary Parker quit-claimed the home to “Gary K. Parker and Yolanda
Parker, husband and wife.” Appellant Potter Br. 4 (quotations omitted). In
January 2005, a Florida court granted final judgment of foreclosure to Potter
against Gary and Yolanda Parker. DE 117 at 4.
On September 29, 2005, Parker sent a letter to Potter, expressing her intent
2
A “balloon note” involves several low-interest payments during the course of the loan
and a final, large payment upon maturity.
3
to rescind the already foreclosed mortgage under TILA. DE 117 at 4. Potter
pursued a foreclosure sale on the property after receiving the letter. DE 116 Ex. A
at 3. On February 6, 2006, Potter purchased the property at the foreclosure sale
and subsequently sold the property to a third party in December 2006 for
$1,600,000.00. DE 117 at 5.
B. Procedural History
On February 1, 2006, Parker filed suit against Potter and Money
Consultants in the District Court, seeking a restraining order to prevent the sale of
the property. DE 1. The District Court dismissed the action with prejudice,
Parker v. Potter, No. 8:06-CV-183-T-26EAJ, 2006 WL 1529546 (M.D. Fla. May
24, 2006) (not reported in F. Supp.) (“Parker I”), but this Court vacated and
remanded the decision to afford Parker the opportunity to amend her complaint
and proceed with an action for rescission under TILA and certain state law fraud
claims. Parker v. Potter, 232 F. App’x 861 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished)
(“Parker II”). Pursuant to the District Court’s order, Parker filed an amended
complaint on July 23, 2007, containing four claims: Count I asked for a rescission
of the mortgage transaction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1635 and 1641(c) and the
“return of her interest in the property and residence,” DE 64 at 1, while Counts II,
4
III, and IV sought damages resulting from the state law fraud claims. DE 64 at 2.
Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court entered an
order granting summary judgment in favor of Parker as to Count I. Parker III,
2008 WL 4539432, at *5. The District Court held (1) that the refinancing of the
home constituted a consumer credit transaction under TILA; (2) that Potter took an
assignment of the loan and mortgage; and (3) that Parker’s homestead rights in the
residence under Florida law constituted an “ownership interest” for purposes of
TILA and that she therefore could rescind the transaction based on Potter’s failure
to provide her with the requisite TILA disclosures and notice of the right to
rescind. See id. at *2-5. Parker voluntarily dismissed her fraud claims.3
Parker subsequently filed a Motion for Clarification, asking the District
Court to clarify its award of rescission in her favor. DE 137. She asked the
District Court to invoke its equitable powers to order Potter to pay her
$725,000.00, an alleged unjust enrichment obtained by Potter through the sale of
the property to the third party. DE 137 at 6-8. The District Court construed
Parker’s motion as a request to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. DE 138 at 1. The District Court
3
Parker filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts II, III, and IV of her complaint, and the District
Court granted the request. DE 114.
5
ultimately denied the motion and concluded that Parker had sought only rescission
and eschewed her right to seek damages under TILA by not specifically requesting
monetary relief in her amended complaint or Motion for Summary Judgment. DE
138 at 1-2.
Potter now appeals the District Court’s decision to rescind the mortgage
under TILA, while Parker seeks the equitable relief that the District Court declined
to provide her.
II. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Court hears appeals from suits properly brought before the District
Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court had jurisdiction over the
claims asserted in this action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, a statute which permits an
individual to file a civil action against another who violates, among other laws, a
provision of TILA.
III. Discussion
A. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Potter avers that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the District Court
from reaching a decision on Parker’s claim for rescission. Appellant Potter Br. 30-
32; Appellant Potter Reply 13-19. Noting that a Florida court entered final
judgment for foreclosure against Parker before she filed her claim for a rescission
6
under TILA in federal court, Potter alleges that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction to review, reverse, or invalidate that final state court decision.
Appellant Potter Br. 31. Parker contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does
not apply under the facts of this case because her claim under TILA “go[es] to
whether there was compliance with the disclosure requirements of the federal
statute[,] whereas[ ] the state court proceeding dealt with the question of whether
the payments under the executed documents had been made.” Appellee Parker Br.
28 (citation omitted).
The Court has an independent duty to ensure that a case or controversy
exists and that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims presented before
ruling on the merits of a claim. See Harris v. United States, 149 F.3d 1304, 1308
(11th Cir. 1998). In certain circumstances, a federal court must decline or
postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction by deferring to the courts of the several
states. See, e.g., D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)
(“Feldman”); Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800(1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315 (1943); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Rooker v.
Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (“Rooker”). The doctrine established by the
Rooker and Feldman cases essentially holds that federal courts – other than the
7
Supreme Court – do not have subject matter jurisdiction over “cases brought by
state-court losers [(1)] complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments
rendered before the [federal] district court proceedings commenced and [(2)]
inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). In its reading of the
doctrine, the Eleventh Circuit has held that a federal district court “lacks
jurisdiction to review, reverse, or invalidate a final state court decision.” Dale v.
Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997). The doctrine applies when
(1) the party in federal court is the same as the party in state court; (2)
the prior state court ruling was a final or conclusive judgment on the
merits; (3) the party seeking relief in federal court had a reasonable
opportunity to raise its federal claims in the state court proceeding;
and (4) the issue before the federal court was either adjudicated by the
state court or was inextricably intertwined with the state court’s
judgment.
Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1310 n.1 (11th Cir. 2003)
(emphasis added) (quotation marks & citation omitted). “A federal claim is
inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment if the federal claim succeeds
only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Siegel
v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1172 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks & citation
omitted).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the District Court from hearing
8
Parker’s claim for rescission under TILA. The same parties in this action
participated in the subject state proceeding, and a Florida court granted a final
judgment for foreclosure in favor of Potter against Parker. Notably, Parker – the
state-court loser – first sought a restraining order in the District Court to prevent
the sale of the foreclosed property over a year after the Florida court’s final
judgment. See Harper v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 138 F. App’x 130, 133 (11th
Cir. 2005) (citation omitted) (unpublished) (court held federal claim under TILA
inextricably intertwined with final state court judgment when plaintiff sought
injunction to prevent enforcement of final state foreclosure judgment). Moreover,
no record evidence suggests that Parker did not have an opportunity to raise her
TILA claim in Florida or that the state court would have prevented her from so
doing. See id. at 133 n.2 (stating that “TILA . . . claims are brought in Florida
courts”). Finally, the Florida court adjudicated the underlying issue before the
District Court – the legal effect of the mortgage. While Parker bases her claim on
Potter’s failure to provide her with the necessary notice and disclosure statements
in violation of TILA, the effect of the District Court’s judgment unquestioningly
invalidated the state court’s final judgment granting foreclosure and therefore
9
offended the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.4
IV. Conclusion
The Court VACATES the District Court’s decision in Parker III and
REMANDS with instructions to DISMISS Parker’s claim for a rescission of the
mortgage transaction under TILA.
4
Because the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Parker’s claim, the
court need not decide whether the lower court abused its discretion in denying Parker’s request
for monetary compensation.
10